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The Judeo-Arabic heritage : a historical analysis and teaching curriculum.

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THE JUDEO-ARABIC HERITAGE

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND TEACHING CURRICULUM

A Dissertation Presented

by

ELISE G. YOUNG

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THE JUDEO-ARABIC HERITAGE

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Approved as to Style and Content by

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This dissertation is informed by a sense of historical necessity. However, perceiving a need is only a first step. This work could not have been carried out without the support and inspiration of many people, only some of whom I have the opportunity to mention here.

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ABSTRACT

THE JUDEO-ARABIC HERITAGE

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND TEACHING CURRICULUM

FEBRUARY 1988

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Arab and Jew have shared a common world- socially, economically, politically- for centuries. Relations between them were cordial as well as hostile and the evolution of those relations can only be understood within the context of world historical developments.

Tracing the history and evolution of the Judeo-Arabic heritage, this study emphasizes themes important to the survival of that heritage and developments that have undermined it. Instead of polarizing Jew and Arab by ascribing narrowly defined roles and characteristics to each, this method encourages students to analyze the complexity of forces at work for and against cultural survival.

This study constructs a pedagogy for Arab-Jewish studies by examining Arab-Jewish relations from an historical perspective. Research indicates that educational materials on the Middle East often convey erroneous ideas about Middle Eastern cultures, history and politics. Misconceptions about Jews and Arabs and about relations between them are fueled by racism, ethnocentrism, oversimplification, and lack of information. As a consequence the Judeo-Arabic tradition is virtually unknown in the West.

This project is designed to assist teachers in learning about and conveying some of the central themes affecting the current Arab-Israeli conflict. Students are provided with tools to analyze that conflict and to envision possible resolutions through uncovering historical traditions that have for the most part been ignored or distorted. Understanding how relations between peoples are affected by world historical developments clarifies the forces controlling their worlds. They can become critically aware of the kinds of choices available to them; of the cultural tensions and social forces shaping their values, beliefs and learning process. They can become critically aware of the circumscribed conditions within which they actively construct their worlds and more readily able to relate those conditions and discoveries to the situation of Arabs and Jews in the Middle East.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

This curriculum is a study of relations between Arabs and Jews from a historical perspective.

In an analysis done by the Middle Eastern Studies Association, researchers note that: "For some time, scholars have recognized that secondary school textbooks in the United States and Canada often convey an oversimplified, naive and even distorted image of Middle Eastern cultures, history and politics."(Middle Eastern Studies Association of North America, Inc., 1975:1) Three problems contribute to a lack of adequate teaching materials about Arabs, Jews and relations between them. They are Eurocentrism/ethnocentrism, racism and oversimplification of complicated issues.

Standard histories of America do not acknowledge ways that historical developments, culture and education in America have been influenced by the contributions of both Arabs and Jews. William E. Leuchtenburg, in <u>The American Perception of the Arab World</u>, suggests that Arabs have been absent in histories of America because American historians saw no reason to devote attention to this subject, given the "lack of contact between the United States and the Arab world."(Leuchtenburg,1977:17) Another reason is that the Arab experience has been so different from that of Americans

that "the history of Arabs cannot serve as a measuring rod"(Leuchtenburg,1977:16) Finally, American historians do not write about Arab-American relations because they are "so densely ignorant of Arab history and of the Arab presence in the United States."(Leuchtenburg,1977:16) (In fact the Arab-American community in the United States is in the 1980's around three million.) The explanations reveal the Eurocentric and ethnocentric focus of American education.

Jews are also absent from most standard histories of America. The limited visibility of first and second generation Jews from Europe is distorted by stereotypes. Many North American students, Jews and others, are ignorant about the history and culture and even existence of Arab Jews. Many Jews with mixed family genealogies (Sephardi and/or Oriental as well as Ashkenazi) dissociate themselves from their non-western roots. Educational materials shaped by Eurocentrism invalidate the ancient kinship of Jews and Arabs in the Arab World. The Judeo-Arabic tradition is virtually unknown in the West. On the other hand the term Judeo-Christian tradition is a common catch-phrase giving lip service to the importance of interchange between Jew and Christian for the 'development of the West.' Jews and Arabs, however, are rarely presented in other than an antagonistic stance. The consequences of this distortion are far reaching, precisely because both peoples have always and continue to play a major role in shaping the destiny of the world. Furthermore, a false sense of disconnection between

"East" and "West" distorts even the meaning of the term
'Judeo-Christian' since the Jews and Christians who began
that tradition did so within the milieu of the Arab world.

An educational system that encourages segregation of
cultures through lack of information, distortion of
information and ethnocentrism thereby condones institutional
racism. The assumption that whatever is non-western is
dangerous, primitive, and in need of westernization
impresses upon western students a sense of superiority. The
history of peoples from the Middle East--Jews, Arabs and
others-- becomes the history of western influence upon them.
Eurocentrism perpetuates racism.

The media--T.V., radio, press, film--promote racist
caricatures of Arabs. Arabs are presented as wealthy
'sheiks' who are deceitful and corrupt, or as rootless
nomads. Arab culture is 'primitive', in need of western
enlightenment. Arab women are portrayed as passive,
oppressed, 'behind the times.' Arab cultures are reduced to
discussions of the 'Arab way of thinking.' The notion that
all Arabs are terrorists is continously planted in public
consciousness.

Laura Nader an anthropologist, addresses the fact that
questions raised about the Middle East are often based on
stereotypes:

> Some fifteen years ago I went to the Middle
> East, to see if Islamic law, or religious law, was
> in fact operating in the villages, or had it,
> being an urban religion, never really penetrated
> into the villages. In the villages, when we

started talking about everyday conflicts and disputes and how they resolve them, lo and behold, I discovered there is no Islamic law operating at all.

The procedures were very pragmatic. The neighborhood councils operated in a way we are trying to invent in certain parts of the U.S. today. It was an arbitration procedure, sometimes mediated rather than arbitrated, and it was very pragmatic, very secular. I had absolutely no trouble in this village being invited into the mosque. I was a woman, but that did not make any difference, and all of the stereotypes caved in, one after the other. Islamic women, who are often portrayed as being very compressed and repressed, were much freer in these vilages than middle class women I know in Berkeley. They come and go and do pretty much as they want. They often have the power of their lineage to back their position. There is probably less wife beating in this little village in Southern Lebanon than there is in Berkely, California, according to a recent study in upper, middle and lower income groups in Berkeley.

These stereotypes are just that. Instead of trying to explain many things that may not exist, people who want to study the Middle East should find out what is there, what is happening in the area, rather than taking a stereotype and saying , "I wonder why they are so religious?" We do not even know whether they are or not.(Nadar, 1977:183)

Like the Arab, the Jew is often portrayed as deceitful and untrustworthy. The mission of the Jew is to control western civilization. Such anti-semitic notions, propagated by the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' published in Russia in 1905 reflect centuries of persecution of Jews in the west. Students and others have absorbed and continue this legacy. Recently at a demonstration in support of self determination in Central America, in a small city in Western Massachusetts, a policeman accused the Jews of "stirring up

all the trouble on Central America." A student in a class at a state college in Western Massachusetts insisted that Jews control the educational system and believed that was why she was not getting adequate information about current events in the Middle East.

Anti-semitism, a term generally attributed to Wilhelm Marr (1879) referring to anti-Jewish campaigns in Europe, continues to infect public opinion. In 1985, a movement was organized among farmers in the midwest of the United States, blaming their economic difficulties on the Jew. Anti-semitism preaches that Jews control money, the media, and the educational system.

Racism contributes to the oversimplification of complicated issues. The polarization of Arab and Jew effectively conceals a complex history of cultural intermingling and conceals the historical developments that shape current relations. The formula 'oppressor-oppressed' has Jew and Arab locked into a fight for the 'survival of the fittest.' Students feel that they must choose between good and bad, win and lose.

Edward Said points to the danger of "Large monolithic Platonic concepts such as 'Islam' or 'the Arabs' as if they had some unchanging existence of their own."(Said, 1977:184) The Koran is often treated as the key to 'the Arab psyche.' For example, passages are lifted out of context to prove whether or not Arabs had scorn for Jews, negating the multiplicity of ways the Koran has used in the past.

Complicated issues become oversimplified when historical developments are ignored or distorted by racist assumptions. Two clear examples are the treatment of Arab nationalism and of Zionism. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is treated solely as a terrorist organization. The important evolution/history of that organization, the work that it does in areas of social reconstruction, education, medicine, recreation, are ignored.

Proponents of the view that Zionism is racism ignore the fact that Zionism is a complex historical development. Popular knowledge and institutionalized teaching about Zionism focus on Theodore Herzl and Chaim Weizman. Few studies examine the work of Hannah Arendt, Martin Buber, Judah Magnes and the Ihud Association.

It is also important to examine how simple or clear issues are overcomplicated. For example, arguments about the allegedly God-given right of Jews to Palestine can be used to conceal the sufferings of Palestinian Arabs who have lost their homes and livelihoods. That Israeli Arabs deserve civil liberties is a simple truth that is often obscured by arguments based on stereotypes of Arabs noted above--for example, that all Arabs are terrorists.

Statement of Purpose

This curriculum examines Arab/Jew relations from a historical perspective informed by a critical awareness of how the above factors shape our view of history, access to information, and ability to process information. The history of Arab and Jew reveals a complex and rich symbiosis that was interrupted for periods of time, but never severed. The fact that Jews and Arabs shared a common world—socially, economically, politically—for centuries, tells us that relations were cordial as well as hostile and that variations over time and place were and are inevitable. Jews and Arabs have the ties—therefore the assets and liabilities—of kinfolk.

Placing the Arab-Israeli conflict in historical perspective informed by a critical awareness of how history is written about and taught in our educational system, of necessity places it within a global context. The struggle against colonialism, for example, is a predominant theme in the history of both Arab and Jew, sometimes concomitantly (as in North Africa in the late 1800's). The effect of French, British, U.S., and Soviet Union interests in and actions upon the Middle East is a major factor shaping the survival of both peoples and affecting relations between them.

Understanding how relations between peoples are affected by world historical developments gives participants clarity about forces controlling their worlds. Instead of

blaming particular peoples by the characteristics ascribed to them, participants can analyze the complexity of forces at work for and against cultural survival. They can learn about how the imbalance of power in the particular society in which they live has evolved. They can become critically aware of the kinds of choices they and others make; of the cultural tensions and social forces shaping their values, beliefs and their learning process. They can become critically aware of the circumscribed conditions within which they actively construct their worlds and are thus able to relate these conditions and discoveries to the situation of Arabs and Jews in the Middle East.

In light of the above, the following are the goals of this study:

1. To identify the main historical trends in relations between Arabs and Jews.

2. To challenge the notion that Jews and Arabs are natural enemies.

3. To challenge the notion that Arabs and Jews are <u>by themselves</u> responsible for the fate of the Middle East.

4. To develop in participants an awareness of how racism affects the context and availability of information on the Middle East and how that information shapes their views of Arabs and Jews.

5. To identify historical developments affecting the current Arab-Israeli conflict.

6. To assist students in learning how to approach controversial political issues.

7. To contribute to improved relations between Jews and Arabs.

8. To construct a pedagogy for Arab/Jewish studies.

To achieve these goals, four chapters of interpretative analysis of the history are followed by a curriculum design. The curriculum is intended for secondary and higher education, as well as for use in community settings. For each chapter, the following are provided:

1. Goals of chapter

2. Outline of chapter

3. Important themes of chapter

4. Suggested activities for chapter

5. Suggestions for evaluating content with students

6. Materials, other resources

7. Glossary

Methods

To understand the Jew and Arab in history requires first of all a critical examination of attitudes and biases that can affect our understanding of that history.

The important work of Marshall Hodgson serves as a useful starting point: Hodgson teaches us ways that geography influences our view of history. For example, he notes that :

"In the case of 'Europe' and 'Asia', at least, the artificial elevation of the European peninsula to the status of a continent, equal in dignity to the rest of Eurasia

combined, serves to reinforce the natural notion, shared by Europeans and their overseas descendants, that they have formed at least half of the main theatre (Eurasia)of world history, and of course, the more significant half. Only on the basis of such categorization has it been possible to maintain for so long among Westerners the illusion that the 'mainstream' of world history ran through Europe. Acceptance of such terms by non-Westerners too is a sign of their continuing cultural dependence on the West. The other major pair of popular world-historical conceptions 'West' and 'East' (or Orient) form a variant on the pair 'Europe' and 'Asia' and serve the same function of reinforcing Western ethnocentric illusions."(Hodgson, 1974:49)

While I have not adopted Hodgson's terminology, for instance the use of the term 'Oikoumene' to indicate the Afro-Eurasian agrarian historical complex, I consider this discussion central to any discussion of the history of Jew and Arab.

Chapter One focuses on the origins of the Judeo-Arabic tradition in the Middle Eastern lands. Like the Arabs, those Jews indigenous to the Middle East, who continued through the centuries to make their homes there, are neglected in the Eurocentric historical view which places the Jews of western Europe in the foreground. Called 'Oriental','Sephardi', and 'Middle Eastern', Arab Jews are the link to the Arab world; in the ideologies of many regarding Arab-Jew relations, the missing link. Lack of research and therefore information on Jews indigenous to Middle Eastern lands is one of the unfortunate consequences of this bias and concomitantly, lack of research and information on the history of Arab/Jew relations.

One purpose of Eurocentric historical research, coined by Lewis as 'colonialist' history,(that is history recorded

from the perspective of the colonizing government) is to justify colonialism.(Lewis, 1973:51-56) Hence it distorts the historical experience of the 'colonized' peoples. European colonialist interpretations of history distort Arab/Jew relations. Researchers who present a wholly negative historical purview of Arab/Jew relations are serving colonialist history. Not coincidentally, those researchers who present a more balanced view of the history, most often include an analysis of the effects of colonialism on Arab/Jew relations, however minimal that analysis might be. A more balanced view is one that embraces the positive elements of Arab/Jewish coexistence, as well as the problematic ones, and that stresses the effect of outside forces on relations rather than focusing solely on Arab versus Jew.

A second consideration in the area of historical research that affects our discussion is the erasure of women. Descriptions of reality by men often exclude women, and are necessarily distorted. History becomes literally 'his' story and is nothing more than male interpretations of their own exploits and failures.

Yael Katzir, in his article, 'Preservation of Jewish Ethnic Identity in Yemen: Segregation and Integration as Boundary Maintenance Mechanisms," notes that :

"Women played a most important role in the infusion of Arab folk culture elements into Yemeni Jewish society, thereby contributing to the integration of this ethnic minority into its environment. Women, who were marginal to the perpetuation of religious and vocational traditions and who did not carry the daily burden of keeping and guarding the formal features of Jewish ethnicity, were far more free

than men to absorb the local non-Jewish cultural elements.
Women thus often served as the cultural mediators within the
sociocultural environment."(Katzir, 1982:277)

These important statements appear in the last few
pages of this article and offer us no further information
about the process he describes. Other historians have (also
in passing) corroborated Katzir's insights. Absence of
research in this area is an indication of lack of validation
for such research.

Arab and Jewish women have shaped the history of Arab-
Jew relations in every sphere--economic, religious,
cultural, political. And it is also true that the silencing
of women in history has affected the history of Arab-Jew
relations, as has the resurfacing of those voices in recent
decades. In Chapter One, I note that in pre-Islamic times,
Arabs and Jews participated in the worship of female deities
based on agricultural cycles. Later, Arab and Jewish women
continue to share a spiritual life as they create together a
folk religion based on saints and pilgrimages to holy sites.
As stated in Chapter One, Baron notes that Jews may have
been open to worship of female deities because of the
importance of women in field and agricultural labor.(Baron,
1983) Jewish and Arab women as noted in Chapter One,
created a literature of political and social commentary in
the form of poetry and song.

Jewish and Muslim women were business partners in the
12th and 13th centuries sometimes owning homes together or
stores.(Goitein, 1978) In early years of Ottoman rule,

Sephardi women played a central role in those economic ventures open to Jews. Clearly in all areas of importance to the subject of Arab/Jew co-mingling-- economics, religion, culture, and politics-- women are a major force contributing to peaceful co-existence. While not exploring this theme extensively, this curriculum will indicate areas for further research and emphasize the importance of this research in the field of Arab/Jew relations.

One final bias informing historical research is discussed in Chapter One and throughout this work. An example is the fact that much historical research on Jews in the Ottoman period focuses on the experience of the Sephardi, who for the most part, by virtue of their connection to Europe, represent an elite class. The issue of class makes clear that the question of Arab/Jew relations is not so much a question of what was it like for Jews under Arab rule, but rather, what was it like for different groupings of Arabs and Jews, depending on economic status, religious leanings, politics, sex, during the particular centuries under discussion. With the development of a powerful Muslim merchant class in the sixth and seventh centuries, the potential for conflict with the Jewish merchant class had to be confronted. Further, inter-group conflict is stimulated by economic stratification. Effective forms of social organization and economic mutuality that had evolved between Jews and Arabs for centuries continue to provide workable solutions. Business

partnerships in the 12th and 13th centuries are one example.
Patron relations are another important example that will be
explored in Chapter Two. The factors contributing to a
breakdown in economic complementarity in the period of Arab
Muslim and Turkish Muslim rule, will be explored extensively
in Chapter Two.

Chapter One makes clear that forms of social
organization and economic mutuality between Arab and Jew
represent elements contributing toward peaceful co-existence
In the face of world historical developments in the 17th-
20th centuries however,they become elements contributing to
dissension. Another element noted in Chapter One
contributing both to peaceful co-existence and dissension is
transformation in the area of religious life. Arab and Jew
shared religious practices in connection to strategies for
daily survival, resulting in the creation of a 'folk
religion' emblematic of a shared 'folk culture'. Where
religion becomes tied to power and in particular to the
state, religion becomes an element contributing to
dissension between Jew and Arab. This theme is further
elaborated in Chapter Two in relation to the question- how
do western values impact on Islam and on Judaism? The final
theme introduced in Chapter One contributing both to
peaceful co-existence and to dissension, is the impact of
outside forces. The impact of the intrusion of Europe on
economic, social, religious and political life raises the
central questions of Chapter Two. First, what were the

roles that Jews and Arabs filled in the creating of the new world order, coined by European historians as the 'modern age'? Secondly, what were the range of responses to the shifting economic base and changing cultural values inhering in that shift, of the 17th- 20th centuries? Third- how did Europe view Jew and Arab in this process? And finally, how did Arab and Jew view one another in that process?

Chapter Three examines historical developments that shape the choices made by Jews and Arabs as national identifications become solidified. This Chapter makes clear that both national movements were complex and many-faceted, and that Jews and Arabs related in a multitude of ways within both movements and between both movements, to the question of how nationalism could benefit Jew and/or Arab. The central questions of Chapter Four arise out of the founding of the Jewish state. What were the consequences of the new political status of Palestine for the Judeo-Arabic heritage? The historical methodology applied in this work makes possible an in-depth exploration of this question. That is, how have historical developments contributed to the situation in which Jews and Arabs find themselves in the twentieth century? What elements of the Judeo-Arabic heritage have survived? From this perspective, it is essential to note that resolution of current tensions in Israel depends upon response to this question.

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CHAPTER II
THE JUDEO-ARABIC HERITAGE - ARAB/JEW RELATIONS
PRE-ISLAM THROUGH OTTOMAN RULE

Chapter Two establishes the historical background of
the Judeo-Arabic heritage. It examines Jewish-Arab
coexistence in pre-Islamic times, the period of the
emergence and consolidation of Islam beginning in the
seventh century, and the period of Ottoman rule, beginning
in 1517.

The Judeo-Arabic heritage was based on cultural
sharing, complementary systems of social organization,
economic livelihood, religious life and political life. In
all these areas the Judeo-Arabic heritage made crucial
contributions to life in the Middle Eastern lands and to the
world at large.

Geographic proximity of Jew and Arab in the Middle
Eastern lands and world historical developments have been
critical factors in the evolution of relations between the
two peoples. In the centuries immediately preceding Islam,
relations between Arab and Jew were shaped by three
interrelated forces: shared geograpahic challenges,
religious life and the impact of outside forces. Arab and
Jew were subject to similar conditions affecting daily life:
shared traditions evolved in response to those conditions.

Economic competition stimulated by the struggle between
the Roman-Byzantine and Persian Empires and the

institutionalization of monotheism were two factors

challenging traditional relations of economic

complementarity and shared religious practices of Jew and

Arab in the seventh century. With Islam the dominance of

the Muslim Arab and shift in status of the Arab Jew and

Christian Arab further challenged traditional relations.

However, in spite of these changes, the participation of

both Jew and Arab in the creation of a new world order is

testimony to the fact that mutual relations continued to

benefit both. Relations between Jew and Arab continued to

shape the course of history as well as being shaped by it.

This chapter will begin with a general view of Judeo-

Arabic social organization, religious life, economic life

and cultural expression in the period immediately preceding

the rise of Islam in the seventh century. The interchange

between Jew and Arab was a critical factor in the survival

of both. On a daily basis Jew and Arab evolved forms of

mutually beneficial exchange. Each culture resonated with

the creative impact of absorbing knowledge and ideas from

the other.

Secondly, this chapter will examine the circumstances

of Muhammad's rise to power, the Arab conquests and the

ensuing centuries of Muslim rule. Jew and Arab were thrust

into a new relation to one another as the Judeo-Arabic world

became subject to the Muslim world order. Jews became one

of the 'dhimmi', minorities who followed a monotheistic

religion other than Islam. The dhimmi were second class

citizens protected by the Islamic state in exchange for payment of the 'jizya' or poll tax and adherence to a number of restrictions defining their role in Muslim society. Within this general structure, many circumstances affected the quality of dhimmi life over time and place. Arab and Jew continued to share a common language and social world. Judeo-Arabic traditions continued to provide a basis for mutually beneficial exchange.

Finally, this chapter closes with a discussion of the patterns of Arab-Jewish relations that evolved as a consequence of changes instituted under Ottoman rule. While the Turkish-Muslim state for the most part adhered to the social norms defined by the Arab Caliphate, a shifting world economy, challenges to Turkish dominance internally and externally and the impact of both on the dhimmi communities created new challenges to Jewish-Arab relations.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European dominance precipitated a new world order which challenged Judeo-Arabic traditions and radically changed the nature of relations between Jew and Arab. Those developments are critical to understanding how Arab and Jew stand in relation to one another in the 1980's, since both played a central role in creating this new world order. But the shifting economic base, changes in social organization, religious life and political power, how Europeans viewed Arab and Jew in this process and how Arabs and Jews viewed Europe in this process, fundamentally affected the norms that had evolved

for centuries in the Judeo-Arabic world. It is crucial to examine the kinds of choices made by both peoples in response to those challenges. The historical imperatives guiding those choices have shaped the complexity of relations between Jew and Arab in the modern age. This critical period will be introduced in Chapter Two.

Close relations between Jews and Arabs were in evidence long before the rise of Islam in the early seventh century. Both peoples emerged from desert populations, some of whom formed agricultural communities, in 'the Middle East', the current name for the Nile Valley to Oxus basin, Fertile Crescent (Syrian lands and Mesopotamia (Iraq)), Iranian highlands and Arabian peninsula. Prior to the rise of Islam in the early seventh century, Jews and Arabs were subject to a series of conquering empires; the Assyrians, Neo-Babylonians, Ancient Persians, Macedonians, Romans. In the sixth century, the Jews had suffered religious persecution and dispersion by the Romans who controlled the Syrian lands, the Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and the eastern parts of North Africa (Tunisia and Algeria). Sasanian Iraq became the center of Jewish life, where the Mishnah and Babylonian Talmud evolved and the ancient law and traditional ritual of the Jews were codified. As the struggle between the Roman-Byzantium and Sasanian Persian Empires weakened both, Jews increasingly faced discrimination.

In Northern Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, Jewish Arab and other Arab tribes evolved a way of life based on complementarity between the settled and nomadic populations. The sedentary populations built agricultural communities around river banks as far as systems of irrigation would permit. Bedouins(from Arabic, badawi, referring to the steppes and semideserts of Arabia), called themselves Arab, a name that became associated also with the settled tribespeople who lived from the date palms and grain of the oases as well as engaging in commerce.(Hodgson:1974)

Co-operative systems developed in response to the challenges of daily life were one element that contributed toward peaceful co-existence among Arabs and between Arabs and Jews. On the Arabian peninsula, as cited above, Arabs and Jews had to develop a viable way of life on arid steppe lands, areas of rock or sand and occasional oases where water was close to the surface and accessible for regular irrigation. Extensive agriculture was possible in some areas, such as southern Arabia or Yemen where a sedentary agricultural way of life had existed for centuries. In areas where cattle were raised, wheat and dates grown in the oases could be exchanged for meat. Arabs and Jews had extensive experience in developing irrigation systems for cultivation: the refinement of irrigation systems encouraged more extensive development of crafts and subsequently, commerce in the towns.

A second element contributing to creative intermingling, hence, peaceful co-existence, between Jew and Arab was the close connection between economic, cultural and religious life, and daily survival. Some information about the conditions and social life of Arabs in the fifth and sixth centuries comes from pre-Islamic Arabic poetry. Poets were recognized as tribal spokespersons, respected for their faithful renditions of all phases of tribal life.(O'Leary,1972) This period was also one of the most creative in the development of Hebrew poetry which was influenced by the unique stylization and recitation of Arab poets. Poets were culturally and politically respected through their associations with tribal chiefs. The women of Arabia were famous for songs and poems reflecting not only the details of their daily lives, but also the political circumstances of their times. The Jewish women of Yemen, following local tradition, utilized satirical poetry to reflect on public events. This form of commentary gave meaning to the everyday circumstances that affected most them.

Religious life among the cultures of the river valley was intimately connected with agriculture. Planets whose movements guided agricultural endeavors, were considered 'givers of the harvest'. Folk tradition centered on the worship of the Mother Goddess and fertility. The Arabs of the Sinai offered animal sacrifices to three Goddesses; al-Uzza, identified with the planet Venus; Allat, the Sun

Goddess and Manat,Goddess of Fate. When the Jews entered
Canaan, they adopted many of these practices in spite of
warnings from their prophets.(Baron,1983) Similarly Arabs
adopted Jewish prayers for rain observing success of the
Jews in raising crops. Religion and economic survival were
further linked in that pilgrimages to the holy places of the
Arabs led to the development of markets for exchange of
goods at those sites.

The increasingly important role of women in orchard and
field labor may have been connected to worship of female
deities. Jewish legends,for instance the story of Sarah,
reveal that in early times Jewish women had many rights,
including that of owning property .[1] In Arab societies,
kinship and marriage laws underwent significant change in
the time of the Prophet. With changes in the economic
structure and in religious life in the days of Muhammad,
Ba'al marriage, in which the husband is 'lord' over the wife
was predominant, particularly among the wealthy. There is
evidence that pre-Islamic societies were matrilineal.[2]
Marriage could be dissolved at will by the wife who remained
in her own tribe and kept her children who became members of
her tribe.(O'Leary, 1927)

Judaism and Christianity gradually replaced the
prevalent religious cults based on agriculture with a new
concept of a single God whose presence as an ethical force
became the organizing factor for a new notion of community.
Those who responded to the worship of the new deity had an

historic responsibility to create a social order harmonious with the dictates of that God. Monotheism called for a new moral order and for the reorganization of cultural priorities. The Monophysites and Nestorians of the Eastern Christian Church spread in Mesopotamia (Iraq), Syria, Palestine and among the tribes of northern and western Arabia. Jewish tribes were strong in Yathrib (Egyptian) or (Medina, Aramaic for the city) and in other parts of Northwestern Arabia. In the fifth century, Judaism became the religion of the Himyarite kings of the Yemen, until they were superseded by the Ethiopian Christians in 525 A.D. Meanwhile, an autonomous form of monotheism, Hanifism, evolved in Arabia and probably influenced Muhammad's vision of unification of the Arab tribes under Islam.(Stillman, 1979 et al.)

The influence of monotheism as a social as well as religious force in the Arabian lands took hold slowly. While Judaism had evolved for centuries before Islam unified the Arab world, folk culture continued to embody the mutuality of religious beliefs, social customs and cultural modes, of Jew and Arab.

In the area of social organization Jew and Arab had much in common. The type of societies developed by Jew and Arab were based on respect for human dignity and freedom.(Goitein,1974) Social groups known as clans were internally autonomous but were most often grouped in larger associations known as 'tribes'.(O'Leary,1927 et al.) Tribes

were organized in loose confederations with loyalty based on
kinship groupings and alliances, rather than obedience to
one authority figure.

In the century preceding Muhammad, the Qurayzah, an-
Nadir and Qaynuqa were the most powerful of the Arab Jewish
clans on the Arabian peninsula. The two dominant Arab
clans, Aws and Khazraj settled on those lands forming
confederations of 'jiwar', protected as neighbors, with the
Jewish tribes.(Watt,1956; O'Leary,1927). With an influx of
new settlers the Arab tribes expanded and were unified under
Malik ibn Ajlan,which precipitated a reversal in this
relation. But the basis of social organization remained the
same. Tribes of Arabs and Jews formed alliances that
afforded each protection and ensured mutual support when
faced with external threats or in settling internal
disputes.

The Arab Jewish tribes of Yathrib or al-Medina , "the
city", may have been refugees from rebellions against Rome
in 70 and 135 C.E., or Arabs who converted to Judaism. The
Quaynuqa made and sold crafts at a market they supervised.
The Qurayzah and an-Nadir settled the richest lands in the
oasis of Yathrib and raised palm trees. The structure and
dynamics of tribal life were conducive to economic
complementarity, rather than economic competition. Because
the state and its institutions had not yet evolved, there
was no central authority with decision-making power over all
within its domains. Several manifestations of economic

complementarity are apparent. These included: co-operation between settled and nomadic tribes; the imperative within each tribe of responsibility for the welfare of all who were 'kin, either through blood ties or through acquired tribal affiliation; and political confederations that ensured the providing of protection for the weaker tribes by those who were stronger.

While these economic factors contributed toward peaceful co-existence between Arab and Jew, there were elements in the pre-Islamic period that contributed toward dissension. Three factors are important. The first is that the development of various branches of the economy had consequences for the internal structure of tribal life as well as for relations between Jews and Arabs. The second factor is tensions generated as a consequence of developments in religious life that reach a turning point with the rise of Islam in the seventh century. The third factor is the effect of external forces, such as the struggle between the Roman-Byzantium Empire and Sassanian Persian Empire, on economic, social and political life.

An important shift in social organization based on the development of the economy came about as a class of land owners emerged. The wealthier members of the Arab tribe were those who owned more cattle and hence claimed privileges of land use. By asserting rights over property, they acquired surplus produce which they sold within Arabia and in neighboring lands. Those left without land,

therefore with no means of production, became a separate class resisting the tribal aristocracy and living outside of the proscribed tribal mores. Gradually the power of tribal elders based traditionally on respect and custom, became identified with economic strength.(Belayev,1969)

The consequences of this development over time, were felt by the Jews of Medina who had control over much of the fertile land of the oases. While tensions were dealt with in the form of political confederations representing alliances between Jew and Arab, the Jew was nonetheless viewed as a power to be reckoned with.

Jews and Arabs were affected by the struggle between the Roman-Byzantium and Sassanian Persian Empires. Their presence in the Syrian desert made them a natural buffer between Rome and Persia, who manipulated tribal animosities to win allies. From the third century Jewish communities at Hirah near the Euphrates were controlled by the Lakhmids, Arab vassal princes of Sasanian Persia until 602.(Baron,1983) The stimulus of competition for control of international trade resulted in increased wealth for the Arabs who controlled the important trade routes. Merchants gaining access to merchandise, knowledge, and customs from other lands became an increasingly important and powerful class. Within their own cultures and between cultures, the potential for exploitation of the less powerful had to be confronted.

These initial remarks on Jewish Arab co-existence in the centuries preceding Islam have demonstrated that daily survival for Jew and Arab was enhanced by the exchange of ideas, beliefs, cultural expression and complementary forms of economic and social organization. Further, relations between Arab and Jew have been influenced by the impact of outside forces in the economic, political,and religious fields.

Simultaneously, Judeo-Arabic culture has been shaped by the traditions of ancient Babylonians, Egyptians, Persians. Both communities had inherited the administrative language of the Assyrians--Aramaic-- and the traditions of Hellenistic culture, which at first the Jews had resisted only to finally absorb through its assimilation by Arab culture. Jew and Arab have been nurtured by the traditions of civilizations that have stimulated each culturally: they have also been bound by the effort to maintain autonomous existences, cultural integrity, and economic viability. In the next century the potential for Arab dominance is realized, as Arab culture becomes solidified by the unifying force of Islam.

The Emergence of Islam

The emergence of Islam in the seventh century, its subsequent unification of the Arab world and expansion of the Muslim Empire to include the Arab peoples and most of the Jewish communities of western Asia, North Africa and

Spain, resulted in a new order restructuring Arab-Jewish life. From the time of the hijra(migration of Muhammad to Medina in 622), Islam meant a new sense of community, structured by faith and submission to the authority of the Prophet Muhammad; and later to the Empire and Caliph (ruler).

The Muslim state emerged as a resolution to societal conditions in Medina in the seventh century. Tensions among feuding tribes were resolved by a structure that affirmed tribal autonomy. In exchange for that autonomy, recognition of the community of Umma, the Muslim community, ruled by divine law, provided an acceptable structure for resolution of differences. Muhammad became the religious and administrative head of the community overseeing its armies, tax collection and legal system. The resulting interpenetration of faith and power, religion and authority shaped political and social organization.(Lewis,1982)

The Muslim community was governed by the holy law, Shari'a, developed by jurists from the Qur'an and traditions of the Prophet. This code reflected an ideal pattern of conduct toward which society must strive. According to the Shari'a, the Caliph, or ruler, was elected by God and had ultimate power in military, civil and religious matters. His charge was to maintain the spiritual and material legacy of the Prophet. Support came from the 'Ulama'- doctors of divine law, who interpreted and advised. The status of dhimmis accorded minorities under Islam, was based on

recognition of this structure; a recognition expressed in payment of a special poll tax, jizya, and obedience to a series of restrictions defined by holy law.

The following section will examine Muhammad's rise to power, his relations with the Jews, and the circumstances surrounding the consolidation of Islam. Under Caliphal rule which culminated in assumption of power by the Ottomans in 1517 regional variations, sectarian movements and political upheaval resulted in a range of consequences for minorities under Islam. We will ascertain how the events of these years influenced life for Jews and for Arabs and how these events affected the evolution of Arab-Jewish relations.

Circumstances of Muhammad's rise to power

Prior to the Hijra, migration of Muhammad to Medina in 622, the struggle for dominance between the two large federations of Arab tribes dominated life in Medina. Abu-I-Qasim Muhammad B. Abd-Allah was born in Mecca, the major trading center of western and central Arabia. At this time the Meccan economy was in significant transition. An emerging class of merchants became increasingly powerful as they claimed trade monopolies. Muhammad's teachings counteracted the trend toward individualism and accumulation of wealth in this period. He contradicted the claim of the merchant princes that the significance of life lay in power and wealth. He taught that God has an eternal punishment

awaiting those who are unjust and an eternal reward for those who are upright. This was an appeal to the merchant princes to fulfill the obligations of the chief of the tribe or clan and to look after the interests of the weaker members instead of oppressing them.(Watt,1956)

The emphasis by the merchant class on freedom for the individual that emerged in Mecca along with the shifting economic order, did not accord with tribal expectations. Muhammad gained many adherents from among marginal people who were not benefiting from the shift to individualistic commercial life. Islam introduced a moral conception that retained the sense of security of the old moral order in a form that could be and would be adopted to the new order. The Meccan ruling class however was not open to clear moral sanctions for behavior based on a new concept of authority. Because of their resistance, Muhammad was forced to leave.

Invited to Medina in 622 by members of the Aws and Khazraj who were drawn to Islam and who saw an opportunity to utilize Muhammad as an arbitrator of intertribal disputes, Muhammad became chief magistrate of the city. Negotiations involved two meetings near Medina, at al-Aquaba. In June, 622, at the second meeting, seventy five Medinese accepted Islam.(Belayev,1969;Watt,1956)

Several factors affected the successful emergence of Muhammad's empire. The Persian/Byzantium struggles allowed Muhammad to step in, accruing allies dissatisfied and oppressed in those respective kingdoms. Because of the

chaos engendered by continuous warfare, the Jews were hopeful that the Age of the Messiah was imminent. Conflicts between Jews and Christians in Palestine contributed to disunity. The Jews had already begun to lose their power with the influx of Arabs from South Arabia. Muhammad seized the opportunity to unite the Arab world under a new concept of community informed by religious revelation.

Muhammad and the Jews

Muhammad was cautious in his attempts to reconcile the Jews. He affirmed the reality of his prophethood by asserting that his revelation (known as the Qur'an, which means 'recitation'), was in line with that of Jesus and Moses. He honored Arab traditions affirming practices adopted from the Jews. Both religions practiced an ethical monotheism. Muhammad kept the idea of the Sabbath, without complete abstention from work and shifted it to Friday in commemoration of the Hijra and to differentiate between Muslim community and that of Jews and Christians. As a result of the negotiations of 622, Muhammad introduced a document defining relationships between the Medinese tribes and confirming Jews as members of the Medinese community with certain rights and responsibilities, with the stipulation 'as long as Jews did not act wrongfully'.(Stillman,1979:11)

In spite of these and similar efforts, Muhammad's attempts at persuading the Jews that he was only renewing

the faith which "was in the books of yore-the book of Abraham and Moses", were unsuccessful.(Watt,1956:197) His critics accused him of being a false prophet. Recognizing the Jews as a threat to his vision, Muhammad turned against them. Shortly after his first victory over the Meccans at Badr in 624, Muhammad defeated the Banu Qaunuqa, weakest of the three Jewish tribes. In 625, the Banu Nadir were defeated and two years later the Jewish oasis of Kaybar were subdued. Quranic arguments against the Jews reflect Muhammad's change in relation to the Jews and his insistence that believers regard themselves as a community distinct from both Jews and Christians. His teachings now emphasized that:

1. Abraham was not a Jew.

2. Jews broke their covenant with God at Sinai by worshipping a calf.

3. Jews disbelieve in the part of the Book given to them and act wickedly in disobedience to the commands of God through usury and worldliness.

4. Jewish and Christian scriptures are textually corrupt

5. Jews and Christians denied one another's exclusive claims to election. They could not both be true because they are similar. Both go beyond what their revealed scriptures justified.(Watt,1956:205)

The agreement between Muhammad and the Jews of Kahybar who did not flee became the basis for future relations between Muslims and their newly acquired populations. In

return for personal safety and the right to retain their homes and property, the Jews agreed to pay one half of their annual date harvest.(Stillman,1979) In exchange for this settlement, Jews and others (now known collectively as the dhimmi,or protected minorities) were to be shown tolerance. Those who did not follow a monotheistic religion were not entitled to be classified as dhimmi.

The Consolidation of Islam

Eighteen months after the conquest of Kaybar, Mecca surrendered peacefully and accepted Islam, many tribes requesting missionaries to teach them the new faith. (Tribes already Christian were not expected to convert.)(Watt,1974; Hodgson,1974) The Jews and Christians of Yemen in the south and of Yamana, Nejd and Bahrayn in the East began to pay tribute.(Stillman,1979) In the years following, each minority paid an annual tribute to the Muslim treasury and a poll tax per head. In return the dhimmi received protection from external enemies and were entitled to the same protection from 'internal' crime as given to Muslims- a concept deeply embedded in the traditional life of the Arabian world. Just as an Arab could not raid his own tribe or a friendly tribe, so the Muslim could not raid other Muslims or groups in alliance with Muhammad. Because the Islamic federation was open to Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and other monotheists as 'protected minorities', once settlement was made with them

they could no longer be attacked. The custom of smaller tribes forming protected federations with larger ones was continued in this way. (Watt,1974)

The Period of the Caliphates

Abu-Bakr (632-634) (of the Quraysh tribe) became Muhammad's successor, assuming the title of Khalifat (Caliph) rasul Allah (successor of the messenger of God).(Goldschmidt,1979) His main task was to subdue the tribal rebellions that broke out in response to Muhammad's death. The agreements made by Muhammad with Jews and Christians were solidified by Abu Bakr's successor, Umar in the Document of Surrender, presented to the Patriarch of Jerusalem. Umar pardoned the tribes renouncing Islam and enlisted them in a jihad (holy war) to expand the lands of the Umma. Christian Arab tribes also participated in the conquests. During the Caliphate of Umar and his successor Uthman (644-656), all of Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and Cyrenaica became part of the 'ummah'.(Stillman,1979)

The effectiveness of the Caliphate in its early years was due to its ability to synthesize the existing legal, religious, and cultural life of the conquered populations with Islamic practices. Muslims of Jewish descent, for example, Ka'bal-Ahbar or Al-Habr, the rabbi, of Yemenite origin, influenced the evolution of the Hadith (sayings transmitted in Muhammad's name) through which Islam absorbed Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian teachings and legal

concepts.(Goitein,1955) While the conquering Arabs formed
an elite class, they relied on the conquered populations to
maintain the administration of their own communities. In
this way they acquired support for the new regime and were
able to focus on the expansion of Islam. While there was
differentiation from one Muslim region to another the goals
and visions of Islam provided a common thread, weaving
together the developing ideas and customs of the newly
identified Arab world, the Dar al-Islam.

Islam and Dhimmi Status

The Muslim religion, like Judaism, is a religion of
'Halaka', in Arabic, 'Shari'a'- God given law regulating
every aspect of life: law, worship, ethics,and social
etiquette. There was no hierarchy of religious dignitaries
who sat in official synods or councils mandating social
practice, as was the case with Christian churches. For non-
Muslims, life was regulated by a contract that
institutionalized attitudes and practices regarding their
status. The Muslims conceived of society as an association
of separate groups- religions, nations, classes, held
together by a system of rule dictated by God.(Lewis,1973)

The origins of the dhimmi status go back to the first
period of the Arab conquests.(Lewis,1983:25) Policies in
regard to conquered peoples were incorporated into Holy Law.
Some of the restrictions placed on the dhimmi may have been
security precautions, and/or ways of distinguishing among

various groups. For instance, limitations were placed on what clothes might be worn, by the dhimmi. In the ninth century the Caliph of Baghdad forced dhimmi to wear a yellow badge.(Lewis,1973:25) The prohibition against dhimmi owenership of certain animals and against bearing arms, limited mobility and potential revolt of these groups. Some types of discrimination such as limits on building and uses of places of worship were inherited from the previous empires of Iran and Byzantium.(Lewis,1973:25)

In exchange for payment of the jizya, or poll tax, and in theory,there were theoretically no restrictions on dhimmi regarding settlement or occupation. However, in certain periods dhimmis engaged heavily in trade and finance,vocations scorned by Muslims because they necessitated contact with unbelievers. In later centuries, dhimmis were represented in trades such as cleaning cesspools and drying the contents for fuel, a common occupation for Jews in Morocco, Yemen, Iraq, Iran and central Asia. Dhimmis were tanners, butchers and hangmen and engaged in other 'despised' occupations necessitating dealings with unbelievers- diplomacy, commerce, banking, brokerage and espionage. They were workers in gold and silver- regarded by strict Muslims as endangering the immortal soul.(Lewis,1973:28)

While the actual situation of the dhimmis varied from century to century depending upon political developments and individual rulers, it seems clear that certain of the

restrictions must have been particularly burdensome for the poor, such as the paying of the jizya.(Lewis,1984:26) Jews traditionally had mechanisms for dealing with this since the Jewish community organization was structured around egalitarian principles, and the institutionalization of charity was a moral obligation.(Baron,1983)

In most Muslim political thought: "the central duty of the government, the justification of its authority and the cardinal virtue of a good ruler, was justice."(Lewis,1984:53) In later years, this meant the maintenance of social and political order with each group in its proper place:" giving what it must give and getting what it should get."(Lewis,1984:53) In what ways did this system encourage cultural survival for Jews and for their Muslim rulers? What kinds of interactions did it stimulate and how did those interactions contribute to the common good of both?

Jews Under Islam

For their part, Jews and Christians (Nestorian and Monophysites suffering from oppression in Byzantium) viewed the Arabs as liberators. The persecutions of Heraclius (610-641) after the recapture of Palestine from the Persians in 629 had severely disrupted Jewish life. The Jewish communities of the Near East, North Africa and Spain suffered from legal, material and spiritual restrictions, which became far less onerous under Islam. Writing during

the period of the Arab conquests, Rabbi Simon bar Yohai
described Caliph Umar as 'a lover of Israel who repaired
their breaches: "The Holy One is only bringing the kingdom
of Ishmael in order to help you from the wicked one
(Christians)"(Swartz,1970:7)

By the third century of Islam, with the downfall of the
Umayyads, the locus of power shifted from Damascus to the
province of Iraq (ancient Babylonia) where the Abbasids
ruled. Babylonia was the home of the important Jewish
academies of Sura and Pumbedita and the place from which the
Babylonian Talmud emerged. The head of the community was
recognized by the Arab invaders and Jews increasingly became
integrated into the mainstream of Arab
society.(Stillman,1979)

Jews Under Abassid Rule- Eighth Century

The Abassid period saw a resurgence of Persian
(Iranian) influence from Iraq accompanied by a dramatic
growth of mercantile economy. Jews were employed by Muslim
rulers as advisors and chief ministers to Caliphs in Iraq,
Egypt and Spain, the three major political centers of the
Arab world. (Goldschmidt,1979)

During the time of Abassid rule, tribal soldiers from
Arabia slowly gave way to salaried troops, Iranians from
Khurasan and Turkish tribal horse soldiers. As a result of
the increased role of the Turkish bodyguard in Caliphate
politics, two Turkish war leaders acquired the throne who

favored an orthodox policy and for a brief period imposed harsh measures restricting Christian and Jew . However, Abu-Yusuf, advisor to the Caliph in Baghdad, opposed taxing the needy and warned that the dhimmis " should not be dealt with unjustly, nor mishandled, nor overburdened; nor should anything be taken from their property over and above their rightly dues."(Lewis,1984:61)

Tenth through thirteenth centuries- The Fatimids and Ayyubids

The Fatimid Caliphs claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and ascribing supernatural powers to its religio-political leaders, ruled an empire extending from Syria to Morocco.(Goldschmidt,1979) Under their liberal rule, Christians and Jews attained high government positions without for the most part, the necessity to convert. The rule of the third Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, Al-Hakim (996-1021) was an exception to the efflorescence of Jewish/Arab symbiosis during this period. Al-Hakim, in what is considered to be a fit of insanity, revived and attempted to institute restrictions on dhimmi; wearing distinguishing clothing and prohibitions on ownership of property and use of churches and synagogues.(Goldschmidt,1979) On the other hand, documents discovered in Old Cairo, provide adequate testimony to the over all stability of Arab/Jew co-existence. The Cairo-Geniza documents and letters, buried in the vault of the

synagogue in Old Cairo (due to the custom that documents bearing the word 'God' could not be destroyed), details the Muslim-Jewish world, from Spain and Morocco in the west, to Aden and India in the East.(Goitein,1967)

During the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, evidence in the Geniza documents makes clear that dhimmis were regarded as responsible members of a society that afforded them protection and basic freedoms. Non-Muslims and Muslims were bound together by one government and economic system. The fate of the country was shared. The sense of commonality established by place of origin is expressed in this passage from the Genizas. A Jewish judge of Barqa (eastern Libya) wrote: 'On this very day a big caravan is setting out for Barqa under the common of Ibn Shibl. I have booked in it for myself and for my goods at the price of three dinars and have already paid the fare.Most of the travelers are Barqis. They have promised me to be considerate with regard to the watering places and the keeping of the Sabbath and similarities. For in the whole caravan there is not a single Jew beside myself. Notwithstanding, I confide in God that everything will work out fine according to his will."(Goitein,1967:274)

Partnerships

Commercial partnerships between Jews, hristians and Muslims were common, often with one party supplying the capital or goods and the other doing business. Houses and

shops were often held in partnership. The Jewish statute forbidding sale or rent of parts of houses to Muslims was often overlooked because of economic considerations. In spite of fears that Muslims would hinder observance of the Sabbath, and that Jews would violate the Muslim custom of secluding women in separate sections, cohabitation was not uncommon. (Goitein, 1967) The following inquiry to Maimonides indicates that differences were not insurmountable barriers to cooperative ventures: 'What does our master say with regard to partners in a workshop some being jews and some Muslims, exercising the same craft. The partners have agreed between themselves that the (gains made on) Friday should go to the Jews and those made on Saturday to the Muslim. The implements of the workshop are held in partnership; the crafts exercised are in one case goldsmithing, in another the making of glass. Maimonides rules that the arrangment was legal, as long as the Jewish craftsmen did not partake in any profit on Saturday. (Goitein, 1974:278)

Legal Matters

Institutional practices affecting legal and economic life continued to be influenced by the proximity of Jewish-Muslim communities. For example, Muslim contracts were informally recognized by the participants of the transaction, while Jewish contracts were of religious import, requiring symbolic acts for confirmation. Contracts

were often instituted in both courts in order to secure
religious legality as well as judicial authorization. While
Jewish law, influenced by the agricultural nature of Jewish
society alloted the bulk of an inheritance to a few, Muslims
distributed small shares to many. Medieval Egyptian Jews
began to write wills according to the laws of Muslim
inheritance, in order to discourage Jews from going to
Muslim courts.(Goitein,1967)

An indication of the range of religious and civil
liberties enjoyed by Jews during the Fatimid period is that
a wide range of legal matters- marriage, divorce,
inheritance, status of slavery and freedom, and religious
matters- were brought before rabbinical courts. As in the
Muslim world, Jewish religious law encompassed economic and
social life. Jewish laws and procedures diverged from those
of Muslims and while dhimmis could apply to a Muslim judge,
there was no need to do so, except in areas of criminal
jurisdiction related to the state. Application to a state
court was further discouraged by the fees, tips and bribes
involved. Juridicial continuity provided stability and
coherence for the dispersed and mobile Jewish population who
would find the same laws applicable in all communities.
(Goitein,1967)

Leadership

The Fatimid Empire relied on members of the dhimmi, Jew
and Christian, for leadership in government as well as in

commerce. A Jewish convert to Islam became a vizier in the Eastern part of the Fatimid Empire, assisted by a Christian finance director in charge of Egypt and a Jew in charge of Syria. There is evidence that Muslim Jewish and Christian religious scholars and officials of various kinds maintained friendly cooperative relations. A Geniza document of 1182 indicates that Moses Maimonides, Ibn Sana al-Mulk, qadi of Cairo and a famous poet (1151-1211) and other Jewish and Muslim intellectuals, were closely connected. (Goitein,1967)

Jewish Vulnerability

The close development of Arab and Jewish cultures in pre-Islamic times continued under the Islamic Caliphate, which was influenced by Arab/Jewish traditions (notions of confederation and protection), as well as by the administrative systems of Persia and Byzantium. As dhimmi, Jews were not singled out from other non-Muslim populations except positively, in so far as they maintained an already existing special place in the Arab world. Those aspects of life affected most immediately by the conservatism of orthodox Islamic tenets were the most exacting for Jews and other dhimmis. For example non-Muslim religious practices had to be inconspicuous. In 1123 the Fatimid vizier decreed that Jewish and Christian funerals could only take place during the night.(Goitein:1967) Other dhimmi restrictions, that Jewish physicians could not treat Muslims and the need for distinguishing dress, were not enforced during the

Fatimid or early Ayyubid periods and in general were only instituted when a particularly weak or cruel government led to persecutions. The Fatimid Caliphate of Al-Hakim, mentioned previously, and the rule of the Almohads in North Africa and Spain during which Christians, Jews and dissenting Muslims were slaughtered, are examples.

Examples of discrimination do not seem to indicate a continuous state of strife between Jews and Muslims. The term sin'uth, 'hatred' and sone, 'a hater', appears in the Geniza to indicate a Jew baiter, but is applied to particular groups or persons rather than as an indication of generalized anti-semitism.(Goitein,1967:278) For instance, the town of al-Ma'ara in northern Syria was known for its sin'uth: one merchant is congratulated on escaping from it. A son writes to his father from Fez, Morocco to Almeria Spain: "Anti-Semitism in this country is such that, in comparison with it, life in Almeria is salvation. May God in His Mercy grant me a safe departure." At the same time he refers to friendly relations with Muslims with whom he does business.(Goitein,1967:279)

Prohibition of ritual slaughter was imposed at times upon Jews in Jerusalem, Old Cairo and Acre, when market police were not willing to grant Jews the privilege of reserving space for special slaughter houses. Natural devastations could also result in additional burdens for dhimmi: for instance in a time of famine in Egypt, it was reported that Jewish houses were plundered on the Sabbath

with the contention that the household had hidden food supplies.(Goitein,1967)

The administration of the Muslim state was carried out in part by officials and in part by agents and tax farmers. Those within the Jewish community who served the government became the elite. While during the Fatimid and most of the Ayyubid periods non-Muslims were well represented in state administration,as mentioned above, these positions could become precarious in times of shifting power struggles accompanied by religious propaganda. For this reason Jews tended to prefer areas of business and industry that could prove less dangerous and more lucrative. Because of their vulnerability and subsequent close adherence to the notion of loyalty to the state, Jews were put in positions that could not be entrusted to Muslims; for instance, the manufacture of coins remained largely in the hands of Jews.(Goitein,1967)

Government Interference

One Geniza document indicates the extent to which Jews could turn to prevailing political conditions to their advantage. The Ayyubids were Kurds who maintained an orthodox position on Islamic law. Opponents in the Jewish world of innovation within Judaism addressed the following query to Imad al-Din, 'legal expert of the realm of the Caliph': "Jewish prayer on workdays, Sabbaths and holidays follows ancient patterns and long established customs. Now

certain people want to introduce changes. Are such
innovations permissible in the days of Islam, may God make
them permanent?" The expected answer was that they were
not.(Goitein,1967:296)

Jewish/Arab intermingling

At the time of the Arab conquests, most Jews spoke
Aramaic and used Hebrew for religious and literary purposes.
By the end of the third century of Arab rule, Arabic had
become the language of daily life for Jews, as well as most
of the conquered populations. Literary and religious works
were translated into or written in Arabic: for example, the
Old Testament, the Mishna, and a major work on Hebrew poetry
composed by Moses ben Ezra. (Goitein,1974) Religious
poetry, a tradition of the Arab world incorporated by Jews
in pre-Islamic times, continued to be influenced by the use
of different meters, arrangments of stanzas and themes
developed in Arabic. In the area of philosophy and
theology, Jews were influenced by the Arab encounter with
Greek-Hellenistic thinking.(Stillman,1979 et.al.) The early
Muslim pietists influenced the development of Hasidism,
originally a Jewish pietist movement. In both religious
communities, religious-political movements led to the
proliferation of sectarian communities, the most influential
being the Jewish Karaites and the Arab
Shi'ites.(Goitein,1974;Stillman,1979) Both communities, in
the face of monumental changes in the early centuries of

Islam, experienced many messianic movements, as well as ascetic movements, resisting the transformations and mourning an ideal of a religious life in the Holy Land.

The Jewish Talmud and Midrash and the Muslim Hadith reflect the incorporation by both communities of shared ideas, customs and patterns of behavior. The similarity of Jewish and Arab folklore reflects the commonality of local life. In Yemen, for example, both populations followed the same Muslim or Jewish holy men and healers and worshipped at the same holy places.(Katzir:1982) In both urban and rural settings Jewish and Muslim customs and dress, physical appearance, and patterns of daily living were similar.

Within Yemen Jewish society and in general, women were responsible for the integration of Arab folk culture into Jewish life. Their greater freedom to intermingle allowed them to absorb and integrate elements of the majority culture with their own. This exchange is manifested in traditions of folksong and dance as well as in Jewish women's love songs which follow a local Muslim tradition.(Katzir,1982)

In summary, the transformation of the economy resulting from the Arab conquests, and of social and religious life, had a variety of consequences for Jews (and other minorities within the Islamic world) and for relations between Arab and Jew. The imposition of the conquering Arab elite upon a social structure that was already burdensome to the peasantry resulted in unrest and uprisings. The transfer of

goods (wealth) into the hands of this new class resulted in what Goitein calls a 'bourgeois revolution'. The market became glutted and a new reserve of cheap labor was created. Consumerism was stimulated by the expanding international market.(Goitein, 1974)

In the early years of these transformations, Jews to adjusted to a change in status that had already begun in the sixth and seventh centuries. Increasingly Jews lost their agricultural base. As the Muslim Empire acquired land Jews were forced into towns where they were poor and had to rely on crafts for a living. However the new world order required skills that Jews had developed in pre-Islamic times as merchants. Jews became suppliers of goods to rulers, to the army, and to the general populace. Using their connections with the widely settled Jewish communities of the Diaspora they became an important link in the development of international trade.

As noted above, restrictions on Jewish life in the new Empire were initially rooted in the imposition of the jizya (poll tax), a burden especially for peasants who maintained a subsistence existence tied to the land. According to an Arab papyrus of the ninth century an agricultural laborer received as a yearly wage six gold pieces and had to pay one as a poll tax, which was a considerable loss of income.(Baron, 1983) Restrictions on dhimmi detailed in the Covenant of Umar were enforced to varying degrees depending upon the state of the Empire and the discretion of the

Caliph in power. For the most part they were not enforced: the benefits of dhimmi life became the basis for widespread reports on the positive experiences of Jews in Islamic lands. Stories are told about Caliphs who wanting to assist their Jewish friends by lifting the obligation of jizya were told by those friends that it would bring more harm than good.(Baron,1983) The obligation of jizya initially restricted life (Jews could not leave town without tax receipts in their pockets) but on the other hand, it was an obligation that kept intact a system from which benefits were derived. The promise of protection of life, religious freedom and property in return, was with few exceptions, rigorously kept.

Thus in the period of the rise of Islam, as a result of transformations in the Middle Eastern lands, Jews were transformed from a people mainly engaged in agriculture, small crafts and other manual trades, to a people whose most important occupations were in the areas of commerce. Strong inner migratory movement related to commerce brought about a renewed sense of the community of Jewish people within the Muslim world. Because the economic and social advantages of conversion to Islam were not strong, Jewish religious cohesion was not threatened.

In pre-Islamic times Jews and Arabs developed shared strategies for daily survival, including 'religious' practices to bring rain, healing by magical means, and the development of a viable social system affording protection

and valuing loyalty between affiliated clans. In the early centuries of Islam these interactions continued in a new form. While Islam was dominant, this did not inhibit a monumental interchange on all levels of practical and philosophical existence that shaped the form, content and future of both Islam and Judaism.

From the seventh century, political and therefore economic control by the Muslim state shaped the institutional nature of Arab/Jew relations. In daily life a shared folk culture kept alive traditions of mutuality between Arab and Jew . From the seventh century on, the interpenetration of both factors,' Muslim' as well as' Arab' is significant for the evolution of Arab/Jew relations.

In the Islamic world, Christians, Jews and Muslims shared a common language, and were participants in a common economy mediated by separate communal administrative systems that were intact, under their own initiative. Jewish communal life continued to draw upon and develop survival strategies that had been evolving for centuries of living in the diaspora. As a consequence of persecution, Jews experienced exile and disfranchisement. In response they constructed a world within a world; a communal life that insured a measure of safety allowing for the creative evolution of social, religious, literary, juridical, life. This fact was not inhibited by Islam; rather for the most part, it was encouraged. Arabs had a history of productive association with Jews. The Arab world continued to benefit

from that mutuality and interdependence, and from the recognition that while different, Arab and Jewish cultures were not separate.

Thirteenth-Sixteenth Centuries- The End of the Caliphate

From the thirteenth century until the Turkish-Ottoman conquest of the Middle East and North Africa in the sixteenth century, a succession of invasions, beginning with the Spanish Reconquista and Crusades of 1098-1291, and Mongol invasions that brought an end to the Caliphate in Baghdad in 1258, transformed the spiritual, social and economic climate of the Muslim world.(Stillman,1979)

By 1124, the Crusaders controlled the Syro-Palestinian coast. The Crusaders were overcome by the Ayyubid dynasty, who ruled in Egypt and Syria from 1171 to 1250.(Stillman,1979) In 1250, the Mamluks, former slaves of the Ayyubid sultans, overthrew the Ayyubids in Egypt and conquered as well parts of Libya, Syria, Palestine and Western Arabia.(Stillman,1979)

Two factors contributed to the deterioration of Muslim-Jewish relations under Mamluk rule. General corruption on the part of the feudal military aristocracy and religious fanaticism as a result of the Mamluk campaign against the Crusaders, created an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and oppression.

The Mamluks presented themselves as defenders of Islam against the Christian invasions, devout Muslims who

emphasized the role of the Ulama (Muslim clergy)and
enforcement of dhimmi restrictions.(Encyclopedia Judaica,
Vol.6, 1971) In 1301 and 1354 there were severe
persecutions of non-Muslims, including forced conversion,
closing of churches and synagogues and dismissal of
government officials. In 1301 the Mamluks decreed that
dhimmis wear distinguishing turbans- blue for Christians,
yellow for Jews, red for Samaritans. The dhimmi were
forbidden to ride horses and mules, and synagogues or
churches built after Islam could be destroyed. Although the
thrust of hostility was against Christian subjects of the
Mamluk state, the Jew as 'non-Muslim' was also vulnerable to
charges of 'treason' and therefore to
persecution.(Stillman:1979)

A crushing tax burden, weakening economy and frequent
extortion of the indigenous bourgeoisie, exacerbated
tensions between Muslims and dhimmis throughout the
fifteenth century.

In North Africa, at the time the Mamluks were coming to
power in Egypt, Jews were emerging from the traumatic period
of Almohad rule. The Maghreb (the westernmost part of
Morocco was called the Maghreb or Arab west, while Algeria,
Tunisia and Tripolitania were coined the eastern Maghreb
Zenner and Deshen,1982:6) was divided into three main Berber
kingdoms in which the social and economic status of Jews was
stable. The Merinid dynasty in Morocco appointed Jews to
high administrative positions. However, the appointment of

one such vizier, Aaron B. Batash, provoked a pogrom that decimated the inhabitants of Old Fez, where Jews had been living in special quarters (the mellah) since 1438, and brought down the Merinid dynasty. (Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol.6, 1971)

With the arrival of exiles from Spain and Portugal after 1492, Jewish life improved. Some Jews joined Muslim guilds while others fulfilled economic functions as moneylenders, jewelers, smiths, weavers. Jews formed their own guilds and professional associations as well as continuing to engage in joint business ventures with Muslims.

Three important generalizations can be made regarding Arab/Jewish relations during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. The Mamluks were Turkish Muslims whose relations to Jews were shaped by a relentless drive against Christianity. As we have seen, during the Arab-Muslim conquests, Jews and Eastern Christians were allies to Islam in response to Roman-Byzantine persections. However, in response to the Crusade invasions, the Mamluks regarded all Christians as allies of the Crusaders and Jews as their potential allies. Religious fanaticism, provoked by the success of the Crusades, reversed the favored position of the Jew. In periods of religious fanaticism , religious rivalry prevailed over shared cultural traditions.

Secondly social tensions created by war and governmental corruption reversed the favored position of the

Jew. Economic competition stimulated social discrimination.
Many Jews in secure positions (physicians, government
employees) were pressured to convert. The government
strengthened itself by deflecting criticism onto minorities.

A third observation about this period is important for
the history of Muslim-Jew relations in general. Even within
a single geographical area, the experiences of Jews could
significantly vary. For example, in Morocco, Jews suffered
less in territories under Berber control. Jews in the
Berber regions of the High Atlas Mountains carried weapons,
rode horses and did not pay the jizya.(Stillman,1979)

The Ottoman Empire

In 1517, the Mamluk Empire crumbled before the assault
of Turkish Muslims, the Ottomans.[4].

Throughout their campaigns, Ottoman practice was
consistent with their predecessors. Local leaders retained
their positions in exchange for tribute and troops. Two new
policies facilitating Ottoman expansion were the Surgun and
the Devsirme. Surgun was forced migration and was used to
establish a Turkish presence in newly conquered areas, as
well as to remove unreliable elements fromm sensitive areas.
Jews, like other minorities, suffered from Ottoman practices
of colonization and transfer of populations. Such policies
were responsible for the disappearance of everal Jewish
communities, such as Salonica, which were later re-
established by Spanish Jewish immigrants.(Braude and

Lewis,1982) The devsirme, or impressment of Christian youth of the Balkans who were converted to Islam, provided an educated trained military with important bureaucratic status. The mounted troops of the Ottomans eventually came to replace local lords in the provinces as they were granted 'benefices' in exchange for service. (Braude and Lewis,1982)

Societal Organization

Governing institutions in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries kept intact the fundamental principle of Muslim social and political organization. The Ottoman Sultan, head of the House of Osman, was considered to be the leader in the struggle of Islam against non-believers. Important matters of state were dealt with by the Sultan and the divan, a council of ministers who included the highest officers in the civil-military bureaucracy as well as religious heads.(Epstein,1980)

Like other Muslim dynasties before them, the Ottomans accepted the proscriptions of the Shariat, Islamic law. Situations dictated by the diversity of conditions in newly conquered lands, not handled by Islamic law were dealt with through Turkish customary practices and the promulgation of new statutes. Consistent with Muslim tradition, non-Muslims were allowed to retain authority over matters of personal status in their respective communities. Thus, the subjects of the state were organized into carefully defined corporate bodies. Members of the multiplicity of bureaucracies, each with its carefully proscribed social role, fell into two

broad categories- those in service of the state and those
not in service of the state. Members of the military and
religious establishments fell into the first category.
Although in theory only Muslims could be defined in that
way, converts to Islam could also obtain high positions in
the state apparatus. The basic division in society, between
the askeri, military, and other officials of the state and
the raya, the subjects, was not defined by religion. All
raya were subject to the same taxes, with non-Muslims paying
the additional jizya.(Braude and Lewis,1982)

The 'Covenant of Umar' or classic formulation of the
general status of dhimmi, found practical expression and
refinement during the period of Ottoman rule, in the
establishment of the 'millet'. The millet allowed the
Ottoman state to make the best possible use of its dhimmi
subjects by defining clear roles in relation to the state
that did not threaten cultural autonomy. Non-Muslims were
treated as members of a community with a specific ethnic and
linguistic heritage. Survival of ethnic groups in the
millet was reinforced by a system of local administration in
rural(village) or town (malle) communities. Jewish
communities of the empire lived in 'Kehillot', each Kehilla
grouped around its synagogue and subject to its own
rabbi.(Braude and Lewis,1982)

Economic Life

Ottoman and European documents from the late fifteenth century show Jews continuing to be engaged in commerce and having a predominant role in the textile trade.(Braude and Lewis,1982) They acted as middle persons between European and local merchants. The Jews in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries occupied economic roles complementary rather than competitive to the Turks. The Sephardic immigrants from Spain brought useful knowledge of European technology- printing, medicine, navigation, gunnery. Jews had the advantage of being trustworthy allies not suspected of treasonable sympathies with European Christendom. They were encouraged to function as an economically productive, revenue producing element.(Lewis, 1984)

Jews and Ottomans were aware of sharing interests in relation to Christian dominance in Europe. Jewish aid to the Ottoman struggle against Christian Europe accorded them special favors.(Lewis, 1984) Since economic privilege was contingent upon access to the economic activities of the state, court Jews who had increasing influence during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were able to assist aspiring tax farmers. Jews such as Hekim Yakub (Jacob of Gaeta) who had a European education and knowledge of European languages and developments, were utilized as advisors by the Sultan. Dona Garcia Mende and her nephew and son-in-law, Don Joseph Nassi were two Sephardim who attained considerable economic and political power through

tax concessions for lumber, wine and other alcoholic beverages.(Epstein,1980;Lewis,1984) Nassi became the head of an enormous tax farming network and in his capacity as banker and financier maintained a network of agents in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Similarly Jewish court physicians obtained high status and wielded influence, earning themselves an important role in the life of the community.

In addition to tax farming, shop keeping and trade in foodstuffs, immigrants introduced cloth weaving adapted from the Spanish wool industry. Between 1453 and 1492 Jews played a major role in developing the economy of the capital. They collected fees and taxes on goods such as candles, candle-wax and port taxes collected on wine imported for use of non-Muslims, on whom an additional duty was levied. They negotiated commercial exchanges between foreign traders and local merchants and collected a fee from both parties on all transactions. For more than one hundred and fifty years Jews were involved in the activity of the Danubian ports, backbone of the transportation system of the Balkan region. The Jewish trade network assured the government of tax income and decreased the governments' burden of fiscal administration. In addition to dock functionaries and merchants, Jewish money changers formed an important element in the economic life of Istanbul and the countryside.(Epstein,1980; Lewis,1984) For purposes of trade, freedom of movement was assured.

Economic interdependence between Jew and Muslim grew out of the relation between Ottoman Sarrafs and Jewish merchants. Sarrafs were government agents who distributed and recalled coinage. They served as agents for tax farmers, collecting fees for their services. Jewish customs and dock employees had knowledge of day to day affairs necessary to the Ottoman Sarrafs whose knowledge of economic fluctuations were critical to the Jews. The successful functioning of both groups depended upon keeping abreast of political and economic developments within the government and the Empire. Their successful operations assured the treasury of income and assured funds to support officials whose salaries were derived from tax farm concessions.

Jewish tax farmers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries whose affairs were critical to the government represented a small percentage of the Jewish population. Local shopkeepers, peddlers, artisans, maintained a level of vitality necessary to the success of the more privileged. They distributed goods throughout the society and developed client-patron relationships with local potentates. In return for wares and services to local patrons, the latter extended protection. In areas where these relations were less fixed, Jewish traders were able to maintain a relative degree of freedom by playing off one potentate against another.

In rural areas, Arab Jews engaged in occupational specialties useful to their Muslim neighbors. Everyday

relations were based on mutual need and expediency. Jews
were smiths, traders, Shaman. Indigenous custom often makes
difficult economic transactions that can be performed with
ease by the outsider population. The role of trader is a
case in point since trade practices are in conflict with the
expectation of reciprocity among kinsfolk.(Deshen and
Zenner,1982)

Because economic relations provided patron protection
for Jews, an attack on a Jewish trader was considered an
attack on the patron also. Retaliation by the patron was
not uncommon- a practice continuing into modern
times.(Deshen and Zenner, 1982)

Iberian Jews

The influx of Sephardi Jewish immigrants changed the
character of the Jewish community and had a marked influence
on the Ottoman world. Jews exiled from Spain and Portugal
had a history of vulnerability in the face of hostility from
the Catholic church. Called al-Andalus by the Arabs, this
western border of the Islamic world had been inhabited by
Jews since before the third century. The Council of Elvira
in 300 C.E. forbade close social relations between
Christians (still a persecuted minority at the time) and
Jews. In spite of this and other repressive policies of the
Church synods of the Councils of Toledo, Jews remained an
important and integrated population in Iberia. Synodal

canons required royal approval and this was not always forthcoming.

The turning point came with the conversion of the Visigothic ruling houses in the six and seventh centuries to Catholicism in an effort to unify their kingdom. In 613, the ruler Sisebut renewed an earlier church decision that children of mixed marriages had to become Christians. The sixteenth Council of Toledo in 693 forced Jews to sell any slave, buildings, lands or vineyards they had acquired from Christians. Taxes were increased and commercial transactions with Christians overseas were forbidden. When the Muslims overran the Visigothic kingdon (711) Jews welcomed them as more tolerant and many returned who had fled to North Africa in the face of persecutions.(Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol.15, 1971)

In 929 the Umayyad ruler 'Abdal al-Rahman I declared an independent Caliphate in Spain establishing his capital at Cordoba. Muslim Spain proved to be a refuge for Jews who were free to engage in medicine, agriculture, commerce,and crafts. Judeo-Arabic culture flourished. Andalusian Jews were physicians, diplomats, statespeople. With the decline of Umayyad rule and the Berber conquest of Cordoba (1013), various Berber and Arab principalities became cultural and commercial centers. Lack of centralized control resulted in more opportunities for a class of court Jews to emerge. In the Berber kingdom of Granada, Samuel b. Naghrela held the viceroyship for over three decades. The Jewish and Arab

upper classes were strengthened by a shared social milieu.(Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol.15, 1971)

The Christian initiative in Spain brought about the weakening of the Caliphate hold. Alfonso V of Leon (999-1021) encouraged Jewish migration from the Muslim south to the Christian north through granting economic privileges to new settlers.(Stillman,1979) When Alfonso X (1252-1284) extended the Christian reconquest, Jews were employed in the king's army and requested to setttle in towns evacuated by Muslims. As more Jewish shops opened in towns, the municipalities revolted. In 1263, 'Las Siete Partidas' defined the conditions of Jewish existence in Christian Spain. Prohibitions on the number and size of synagogues and against holding positions of authority over Christians reflected the triumph of earlier church policy.

By the first quarter of the thirteenth century the Jews had outlived their usefulness as colonizers; more frequent legislation began to limit their effectiveness. However, because they still were economically useful the state was reluctant to part with such a valuable sourceofincome. As a result, state policies vacilated from the resolve of Alfonso XI to root out Jewish usury, to the liberation of Alfonso's successor in bringing Jews back into his employment.(Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol.15:1981)

Jews were linked with the plagues in Aragon and massacred in Sargossa, Barcelone and other Catalonian cities in 1354. The anti-Jewish campaigns of the archdeacon of

Ecija, Ferrant Martinez (1378, 1390) and riots in Seville in 1391 were followed by the decree of Ferdinand I (1415) that all copies of the Talmud must be submitted for censorship of anti-Christian passages. In 1432, Castilian Jewry held a convention in Vallahlia of Spanish communities and adopted new regulations to reinforce centralization. The marriage of Isabella, heiress to the throne of Castile and Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Aragon, united those two kingdoms in 1479. In 1476 the right of criminal jurisdiction was taken from Jewish communities. The Inquisition extended its activities so that between 1481 and 1488, more than 700 Conversos (Jews who had converted to Christianity) were burned at the stake. In 1483 Jews were expelled from Andalusia and in 1492 from Granada. Many sought temporary refuge in Portugal, but were expelled from there in 1496-1497, and fled to North Africa and the Ottoman Empire, the only major country to open its door and in fact welcome and encourage them to settle there.(Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol.15,1981)

The union of Jewish and Muslim culture in Spain had produced an efflorescence of literature, philosophy, science, religious thinking and architecture. The development of poetry in the Arab world was once again integrated by Jewish poets to produce a flowering of Hebrew poetry. The Spanish academy for Talmudic study became the most important in the world. Muslim Spain was the birthplace of two outstanding poets in the history of Jewish

literature, Solomon ibn Gabirol and Judah Halevi as well as of the influential Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides (1135).(Stillman,1979)

The influx of Sephardi Jewish immigrants diversified Jewish life in the Ottoman Empire. Their Ladino speech and Sephardic ritual superseded the language and ritual of most Balkan and western Asian communities. Many Sephardi communities established a unique system of Jewish self rule; for instance in provinces established at Salonika. Along with smaller groups of Italian and Ashkenazi Jews, they instituted a municipal council in representing each group. The council granted tax and customs exemptions and reductions in exchange for payment of tribute. In the course of the sixteenth century these new immigrant communities outnumbered Jews in old communities. Local rabbis led communities in accordance with agreements drawn by the communities themselves, turning on occasion to Jewish religious authorities in the largest communities.(Baron,1942)

In summary, Jews dependent upon the state apparatus for their livelihood were able during the period of greatest Ottoman expansion to attain a considerable degree of wealth and status. They were also suspect among some Muslims as dhimmi who had overstepped their bounds, and as well, they were vulnerable to the machinations of the court. As a small class of Jews acquired wealth and gained influence in the capital, traditional elements within Jewish society

complained that these men and women spent all of their energy in financial enterprises. Although the wealthy Jews paid not only their own taxes, but also those of the Jewish poor, a large gap separated them from the rest of the community. At times well connected bankers and government officials proved dangerous rivals of the established leadership. Class struggle, deviation from traditional norms and criticism of leadership were the result of Jewish vulnerability in a world where much depended upon individual Jews who could influence rulers and advisors. Jews who were not satisfied with their treatment by the Rabbinic court could use the Muslim courts. It was difficult to enforce laws under these circumstances. Jews such as the Karaites whose practices were criticized by traditional Jews could gain power by stirring discontent against recognized leaders.

The rise to power of court bankers, physicians and diplomats created a system of rule parallel to that of the established administrative systems within each community. On the other hand, Jews in positions of power used their influence in ways that benefited the entire community. Likewise the backbone of Jewish community life and survival were the small traders and artisans whose activities supported those of the more powerful Jews.

While the Ottoman government did not enforce laws requiring changes in ritual or belief, in periods of religious conservatism they did attempt to enforce laws

infringing on freedom of worship, such as forbidding the
building of new synagogues. Such laws were evaded by giving
the synagogues the external appearance of private houses, or
by assering more lenient policies of former rulers.
According to Jewish law, if the government demanded
violation of religious fundamentals Jews were not to obey
because their own laws relating to religious conformity were
"divinely ordained, hence superior to enactments from human
beings." (Baron, 1942) However, Jewish thinkers considered
the state a God willed institution. Individuals or groups
in power could behave sinfully without reflecting on the
institution. Fear of retribution for adverse criticism may
have contributed to a policy of praying for the welfare to
the country and rulers where they resided. While for Jews
everywhere obedience to the state was a necessary condition
for their survival, Jews in Middle Eastern countries did not
experience the pattern of expulsion- readmission- expulsion
experienced by Jews in western countries during the late
Middle Ages.(Lewis,1984)

State policy toward Jews under Turkish Muslim rule
continued the traditions defined by Muslim Arabs under the
Caliphates. In the period of Ottoman rule, Jew and Arab
continued to interact on a local level according to
traditions evolved over centuries. On the institutional
level, Turkish-Muslim rule was accepted by both Arab and Jew
in their respective rule, until the events of the eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries began to alter the foundation upon which those respective roles were based.

Conclusion

This chapter has delineated two models of Arab-Jewish co-existence.

Before Islam, Jews and Arabs influenced one another in daily survival and the evolution of their repsective cultures and societies. Jews and Arabs spoke the same language and faced the same challenges geographically, economically and to some extent politically. Each was influenced by the religious practices, customs and beliefs of the other.

Many of the practices, customs and beliefs shared by Jews and Arabs in this period shaped the evolution of Islam, which also had to incorporate and adjust to changing economic conditions in the final years of the struggle for dominance between the Roman-Byzantine and Sassanid-Persian Empires. The expansion and consolidation of Islam brought a re-ordering of society and a transformation of Arab-Jewish relations. Under Islam, the second model of Arab-Jewish relations considered in this chapter emerges. Jews were one of several minorities relegated to dhimmi status. The dhimmi were treated with respect but were second-class citizens within the Muslim autocracy. Within this institutionalized characterization of dhimmi status there was much movement and variation. On the local level, Jews

maintained autonomous communities with legal jurisdiction over their own affairs. Jews and Arab-Muslims continued to develop complementary social, religious and cultural modes of survival. Those Jews who became part of the government bureaucracy assimilated Muslim social customs. Jews spoke Arabic, wrote in Arabic and absorbed Arab philosophical, literary, scientific ideas and developments. Arabs also were similarly influenced by movements within the Jewish world. Jews under Islam were not subject to the disruptions of Christian anti-semitism resulting in a patterns of expulsion, characteristic of western European countries. There were however situations that repeatedly proved threatening to the dhimmi: and the gradual weakening of the Muslim hierarchy brought a worsening of conditions for minority groups.

The Ottoman Empire was a Turkish-Muslim state that encouraged settlement of Iberian Jews, who, along with indigenous Jews, were invited to occupy important positions in developing the economic life of the Empire. The patterns established under various Caliphates continued to effect Jewish-Muslim interaction: class was an important variable in determining both the degree and kind of interaction.

In the seventeen and eighteen hundreds the emergence of European hegemony began to shake the foundations of Jewish-Arab life. Until this century Jews were a favored minority, ally of the Muslim, fighting in support of the Ottomans against Europe. But in this period, with the support of

Christian Europe, competition from Greeks and Armenians
began to erode Jewish stability. Christian Arabs were
beginning to be influenced by European political ideologies:
and the Ottoman Empire, facing military losses and economic
crises in the face of Christian European expansion,
initiated a series of reforms that challenged the
foundations of the Muslim state. This very critical period
in the history of Arab-Jew relations is the subject of
Chapter Two.

FOOTNOTES

1 Baron suggests that :"It is therefore not surprising that the Israelite farmer should have been more susceptible to belief in a Goddess enjoying a standing more or less equal to that of his Lord." He goes on to point out that:" Later Mosaic religion, while insisting upon the singleness of God tried at the same time to improve in many ways the woman's position within the family and in society at large." (A Social and Religious History of the Jews, Vol.I:151). This phenomenon, simiarly to the shift in Arab societies with the institutionalization of Islam, signifcantly differed within the development of Rabbinic Judaism. See 'The Separation of Women in Rabbinic Judaism', Judith Baskin and 'Islam, Women and Revolution in Twentieth Century Arab Thought', Yvonne Haddad, in Women, Religion and Social Change, Edt. Haddad and Findley, State U. of N.Y. Press, 1985.

2 "After the time of the Hijra then, matrilineal and patrilineal features were found in Arabian society side by side, and often intermingled. This much is fact. The explanation of this fact, which is to be adopted here as a working hypothesis isthat the matrilineal system had been prevelant in Arabia for along period, whereas the appearance of thepatrilineal was comparatively recent and was bound up with the growth of individualism." (Watt, Muhammad at Medina, pg. 273).

3. Osman was a Turkish tribesman who had converted to Islam. By 1300 Osman's gazi state had captured Bursa and begun to overrun the Balkans. In 1402 a family schism resulted in the Ottoman domains being divided among the four sons of the Turkish sultan Bayezid. In 1413, Sultan Mehmed I reunited the Empire. In the next sixty years, Syria and Egypt, Iraq and all the territories of Islam and Eastern Judaism, became part of the Ottoman Empire. The conquest of Constantinople and its reconstruction as Istanbul under Sultan Mehmed in 1453 consolidated the political power of the Ottoman Empire.

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CHAPTER III

TRANSFORMATIONS IN SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC LIFE OF ARAB AND JEW, 18th - 19th CENTURIES

To review, relations between Jews and Muslims after 1453, when Sultan Mehmed consolidated the political power of the Ottoman Empire, were shaped by three important factors. First consistent with Muslim tenets governing social and religious organization, non-Muslims were allowed to retain authority in their respective religio-ethnic communities. Organized into distinct corporate bodies, the subjects of the state were respected as members of communities with unique ethnic and religious traditions. Second, in the area of economic livelihood, Jews were encouraged to function as an economically productive element. Jews engaged in commerce and the trades, fulfilling economic roles complementary to those of the Turks. The third related factor was based on Jewish aid to the Ottomans in their struggle against Christian Europe. In the seventh century Jews had welcomed the Muslims as liberators from the oppressiveness of Byzantine rule. The Ottoman state, based on a tradition of Jews as ally of the Muslim, accorded the Jews special favors and employed them in areas where they could be trusted in this role. Jews were influential as advisors in the Ottoman court, held important positions as tax farmers, bankers, court physicians and negotiated commercial exchanges between

foreign traders and local merchants. These three factors contributed to reports of stability regarding relations between Jews and the Muslim world during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Events germinating in this period and surfacing in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought about deep transformations, disruption and re-ordering, in regard to all three of the above factors. Economic complementarity between Jew and Muslim was eventually disrupted. The stability of socio-religious organization disintegrated. Contrary to the historical experience of Jew as ally to the Muslim, in some strata of society, the Jew came to be regarded as having shifted allegiances to the Christian world. These changes were stimulated by the role of Jew and Arab (Muslim and Christian) in the creation of a new world order, the range of responses to the shifting economic conditions and changing cultural values during the period addressed, how Europe viewed Jew and Arab in this process and how Jew and Arab viewed one another.

During the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Muslims and non-Muslims had profited as part of a rising middle class of merchants and craftspeople in Ottoman society. Trade with Venice involving the transport of Asian spices and silk was a predominant feature of Middle Eastern commerce until the first decades of the seventeenth century. When the spice trade was rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope, the Venetians were superseded by the superior naval capacity

of the Dutch and eventually the British and French
(Hodgson,1974)

The rising national states of Europe were supported by
the power and stability of the Ottoman state, which
controlled a solid area of the European continent:they
benefited economically and politically from their
association with the Ottomans. Beginning in 1352, trade
agreements or 'capitulations' were made with Genoa, which
granted extraterritorial privileges, that is the right to be
under the jurisdiction of their own governments in cases
arising related to trade in the Ottoman lands. As Ottoman
possessions in Europe expanded, comparable trade agreements
were made with Venice and Florence and in 1569, with
France.(Hurewitz,1975) The rise of France as a nation state
was facilitated by her alliance with the Ottomans whose
fleet in the western Mediterranean protected southern France
against attack, while the French monarchs concentrated their
power in the north (Karpat,1974) The Ottoman alliance with
France, as well as Ottoman support of the English and Dutch
resistance helped to check Hapsburg supremacy in Europe.
(Inalcik,1974).

The Ottoman state also influenced European developments
in the religious sphere, through military support of
Protestant Calvinist success in Southern Hungary and
Transylvania, and by offering military help to Lutheran
princes because "they did not worship idols, believed in one
God and fought against the Pope and Emperor."(Inalick,1974)

In spite of these and other examples of the close interdependence of all societies of the 'Afro-Eurasian historical complex'(Hodgson,1974) European historians often ignore the impact and contributions of the Ottoman Empire in the unfolding of the 'modern era'. Contrary to the characterization of the Ottoman Empire as the 'sick man of Europe', Ottoman economic life, made viable by Jews and Arabs Turks and others, supported and helped make possible the developing nation states of Europe.

The rise in social, political and economic power of the European nation-states in the western European lands between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries came about as a result of the Industrial revolution and capitalist industry. The drive of the European nations to pursue industrial-capitalist developments through Imperialist policies, precipitated changes in traditional patterns of social organization in the Islamic lands. The rapid pace of the Industrial Revolution stimulated the need for foreign markets and land resources. Military and economic interventionism (supported by a legalistic framework), affected all elements of society.

These transformations challenging the centrality of the Islamic lands in cultural and commercial spheres, depended upon inventions and discoveries originating in the Eastern hemisphere:gunpowder, printing and the compass from China, and science and philosophy in the Mediteranean societies. (Hodgson,1974) But the interdependence of Islamic and

Western European societies was disrupted by the ways those inventions and discoveries were put to use.

The Industrial Revolution in Europe was characterized by three general movements. The growth of technical specialization created a new class of independent technicians supported by non-agrarian sectors of the economy. Social organization itself became technicalized:that is, all aspects of social organization were transformed by and subordinated to the goal of maximum efficiency and the profit motive. In this process, traditional values and customs receded as the goal of creating a 'rationalized' economy and society, informed by and subordinate to technical efficiency, took precedence. Both of these factors encouraged values of individualism, independence and self reliance. As the rising bourgeoisie supplanted or merged with the landed aristocracy, social relations underwent a transformation: impersonal legal status rather than agreements based on personal commitments, became the norm. The new notion of progress- 'continuous practical improvement' was accompanied by a disdain of those societies, labeled 'underdeveloped' who became the object of imperialist policies under the guise of economic development. (Hodgson, Vol III,1974)

In the Ottoman lands where tribal loyalties, the millet system, guild rules and traditional customs and values shaped social and economic life, the transformations of economic and political conditions affecting the European

lands were also being felt. Using examples from Turkey, Syria-Palestine, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco, this chapter will examine areas in which those changes were experienced: social organization, religious life, economic survival, relations with outside forces. How did transformations in those areas contribute to peaceful co-existence and/or to dissension between Jew and Arab? Finally this chapter will consider the role of Jew and Arab in the creation of a new world order, the responses of Jew and Arab to shifting economic conditions and changing cultural values, how Jew and Arab viewed one another in this process, and how European attitudes and actions toward Jew and Arab affected relations relations between them.

The Ottoman Reforms

By the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman government confronted within its domains internal problems problems that stimulated far reaching administrative changes. The Ottoman reforms were a vehicle for those changes. Outside forces affected the Ottoman reforms in two ways. First, the infiltration of western ideas into the Empire stimulated changes that were dealt with through the application of western principles. For example, national revolts in Serbia and Greece contributed to reform of the millets and to the subsequent concept of Ottomanism (national identification) as a way of unifying the diverse peoples of the Empire. Second, growth of trade with Europe

stimulated changes within the Empire that the Ottoman
government responded to with a series of reforms. Whether
in response to internal conditions or to the impact of
outside forces, the Ottoman Reforms disrupted traditional
relations between Jew and Arab (Christian and Muslim) and
between Muslim and Christian Arabs.

Background

Decentralization of the Ottoman government in the
seventeenth century accounted for a number of problems
within the Empire. Provincial governors increasingly used
their power to build personal wealth at the expense of the
state. In response the state supported a new rural group,
ayans or notables, composed of successful merchants and
local craftspeople. By the eighteenth century the ayans
were in a position to increase their own share of local
revenues and began to control commercial transactions in
major towns. Strain on the Ottoman treasury resulted in
lack of funds to maintain an army overtaxed by military
challenges; the annexation of Crimea by the Russians in
1783, Serbian and Greek revolts in 1804 and 1821 and the
Crimean,Russo-Ottoman wars of 1853 and 1877. This led to
further loss of control in the provinces where standing
armies were needed elsewhere and therefore
dissolved.(Owen,1981)

Insecurity in rural areas in the absence of the
military and abuses by tax farmers taking advantage of the

increased rate of taxation and holding rural surpluses for
their own use, stimulated peasant unrest. Finally the
principle of state controlled land was challenged by
merchants and other increasingly demanding the right to
control rural land in order to profit from the rising prices
of exports to Europe.

French occupation, the westernizing reforms of Muhammad
Ali,(1805-1849) and the opening of the Suez Canal (1869),
opened up the economy of the Middle Eastern lands to Europe
and provoked administrative reform designed to accommodate
shifting relations with the west.   Westernization of the
military and of the civilian government destablized
traditional relations between Jews and the institutions of
the Ottoman government. The Reforms threatened traditional
structures ensuring Muslims of their respective roles in
relation to one another and ensuring the relation of Muslims
to the dhimmi.

Tanzimat

The Tanzimat, or regulations, instituted by Abdulmejid
(1839-1861) utilized European standards of law
administration, and notions of 'civil liberties'. The first
in the series, Hatt-i-Serif (Imperial Edict of Gulhane),
November, 1839, stated the commitment of the government to a
program of future reform, including a regular system of
military conscription and abolition of the tax farming
system. The Hatt-i-Humayn, February, 1856, granted equal

status to the dhimmi. It granted freedom of worship, equality in the administration of justice, and abolished the poll tax and the prohibition to carry arms that for centuries were expressions of the inferior status of non-Muslims. A Council of Justice was appointed with jurisdiction over provincial administration, taxation and the status of non-Muslims.(Ma'oz,1968)

Reforms and the Millet

The transformation of the millet system, stimulated by the Hatt-i-Humayn, represented a critical stage in the evolution of relations between Arab and Jew. The Ottoman state was a theocracy- a state shaped by religious tenets of Islam. The Ottoman reforms reflected the influence of a new concept of a secular state, necessarily at odds with traditional concepts of Islamic rule. The millets were religious communities shaped by ethnic-religious values and traditions. Once those communities were secularized- and religious authorities replaced by lay councils- their members were no longer identified as members of autonomous communities: they were now first of all, in a legal sense, Ottoman subjects. Non-Muslims were in the ambiguous position of, for the first time, facing a contradiction between loyalty to their autonomous communal governments and loyalty to the Ottoman government.

How did Jew and Arab benefit from this change and how did they suffer? Dhimmi status, as prescribed by Islamic

law, was no longer applicable. All minority groups were
'equal before the law'. All minority groups were therefore
equally vulnerable before the law. No longer protected by
their dhimmi status, Jews were vulnerable for the first time
as Jews. Religious differences could become a focus for
persecution and they did. Competition became the primary
field for relations between diverse groups all struggling
for economic and political power. Prescribed modes of
relating that ensured economic viability through economic
mutuality were no longer applicable. Jews and Arabs who had
been privileged within the old system now suffered from the
reforms. As we will see, those Jews and Arabs who were able
to take advantage of the reforms to secure power and wealth
were those who had or who were able to take advantage of
ties with the Ottoman government and/or with European
governments. Since Jews were not favored by the European
Christian nations, those Arab Christians with livelihoods
connected to European interests benefited the most.
However, Arab Christians suffered from the hostility of
Muslims who resented their new status and privileges.

Muslims and non-Muslims were faced with two choices: to
fight to perserve the privileges they had enjoyed under the
old system, or to conform to Ottoman law in order to take
advantage of new benefits. The relative class position of
Jew, Muslim, or Arab Christian, was a critical factor. As we
shall see in some strata of Ottoman society, Jews and
Muslims and Arab Christians preserved traditional systems of

economic mutuality and shared religious and cultural values throughout this period of transition and into present times. In other strata of Ottoman society, economic competition and religious differences came into the foreground and restructured, sometimes destroying, traditional relations between Arab and Jew.

For example, direct tax collection by the state was opposed by sarrafs and by Jews and Turkish and Muslim peasants who found new state collectors more demanding.(Davison,1982) Sarrafs had provided valuable information to Jewish farmers concerning monetary matters and were paid for their services. Economic mutuality between sarraf and Jewish tax farmer was replaced by a new direct relationship between individuals and the state. Monetary affairs were now in the hands of bankers who monopolized currency and charged excessive interest.(Khalaf,1982) Bankers (Muslim and non-Muslim), Muslims who were large landowners, and non-Muslims whose numbers in government service increased, predominantly Christian Arabs, were among those who benefited from Reforms.

The Tanzimat accentuated interethnic rivalry based on religious differences as well as class differences. In the process of redefinition stimulated by the reforms, the millets broke down into sub-groups (confessional groups with distinct religious ideologies).(Ma'oz,1968) The European nations took advantage of ensuing tensions by supporting and

establishing rights over various confessions to ensure their own decision-making power.

Dependency on the west was stimulated in another way by changes in the millet system. Armenian leaders influenced by the French Revolution and Protestant missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, fashioned the Constitution of 1876 providing for lay control and based on Anglo-Saxon 'democratic' principles; for example, lay control of an elected assembly. (Davison,1982). In this way some dhimmi became 'agents for change' within the Ottoman Empire. The new statute for administration of the Ottoman provinces, the Vilayet Law of 1869, providing for provincial councils bore a resemblance to the electoral provisions of the Armenian millet constitution. The provincial councils, like the lay councils given jurisdiction over the millets, were not 'representative'. In so far as changes took hold in the millet, power passed from the religious patriarch to those powerful through wealth. In the provincial councils or meclis, few seats were given to those not in service of the state, and fewer still to non-Muslims. In Jerusalem, for instance, the meclis was composed of seven to ten Muslims and four to five non-Muslims representing a Jewish and Christian population greatly outnumbering the Muslim population. As was historically true, the degree to which non_Muslims were allowed to take a more active role in the work of the Meclis and the degree of discrimination in matters of taxation, economic affairs and religious matters,

against Jew and Christians, varied from place to place. In some places, local notables who became meclis deputies were the chief oppressors of the people, replacing the tyranny of the Ottoman Pasha whose power was diminished by the reforms. Deputies from the lower and middle classes were rare and Muslim religious leaders and notables used their official status to further their political and economic interests.(Ma'oz,1968)

Changes in the millet system stimulated interethnic rivalry by upsetting traditional modes of relation that maintained a balance of power. During the nineteenth century the French, British and Russians established political and economic ties with Christian communities throughout the Ottoman lands.(Ma'oz,1968) These ties were maintained through a network of political and economic intermediaries known as proteges.

The Capitulations

As noted, the Capitulation Agreements, or granting of extra-territorial privileges, were initiated by the Ottoman government as early as the nineteenth century to encourage trade with Europeans. The Europeans were allowed to appoint consuls in the Ottoman lands, who were immune from Ottoman law. This privilege was extended in the nineteenth century to all 'agents' of Europe under the protege system. The Capitulations forbade taxation of European governments and of their proteges, those resident within the Empire who were

representatives, generally in some commercial capacity, of those governments.

The Capitulations and protege system created a new mercantile middle class, predominantly Christians, Greeks and Armenians especially, usurped the role of Jews as commercial intermediaries. The protege system heightened economic rivalry between Jew and Christian who had to compete for favors from the European governments. For example, in 1763 in Egypt, Syrians belonging to the Greek Catholic Church gained control of the customs administration formerly in the hands of Jews. Syrians acquired a virtual monopoly over European consular positions in Egypt.(Zenner and Deshen,1982) Growing economic tensions between Christian Arab and Jew supplied the arena for anti-semitic propaganda imported from Europe. Jewish proteges were subject to the anti-semitism of British consuls who complained that the Jews took advantage of extra-territoriality in commerce through money-lending activities.(Landau,1969) As the Ottoman Christian communities benefited from European capital in the Empire, the interdependence of Jew and Muslim was both reinforced and threatened. On the one hand, Jews tended to side with Muslims and Muslims with Jews. Many Jews felt a loyalty to the Ottoman state where they enjoyed communal-religious privileges and economic opportunities.(Ma'oz,1968) On the other hand, those Jews who took advantage of the protege system were subject to European cooptation. Some Muslims,

sensitive to changes in the traditional forms of social and religious organization, reacted against all dhimmi in the era of the reforms. Another factor affecting Muslim/Jewish relations was the attempt of Christians to divert Muslim hatred of them to the Jews. The Damascus Affair of 1840 in which the European-Christian anti-semitic blood libel was leveled at Jews is an example. In 1840, a Jewish barber in Damascus was accused of murdering a Capuchin monk and his servant, both of whom had disappeared. Encouraged by the French consul, Ratti-Menton, fellow monks claimed that Father Tomasco had been killed by Jews for ritual purposes. Jews were arrested and tortured. The communal leader, Joseph Laniado died under questioning. Syria-Palestine was under the rule of Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt at the time. Pressure from the European powers led to release of the survivors. Shortly after, Syria was returned to full Ottoman control. The British made use of the affair to have Muhammad Ali removed.(Lewis,1984)

The Damascus Affair, disturbances in Aleppo, Jerusalem and Latakia in 1856 and in Damascus and Aleppo in 1860 were the result of increasing xenephobia, rejection of westernization, and economic hardship. The increasing gap between the Muslim masses, the traditional leadership, and Christians and Jews benefiting from European intervention, provoked tensions. Riots erupted in Aleppo and Damascus in which 5,000 Christians died and in the Mosul region where 8,000 Jews were killed. (Issawi,1982)

Intervention by European governments was facilitated by the dhimmi who operated as intermediaries between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Traditionally, 'outsiders' have filled that economic role. The Capitulations and protege system however had a disastrous effect on interethnic relations because of the disruptions created within Ottoman society. Through abusive extension of treaty privileges, the European nations obtained the right to intervene with Ottoman authorities whenever it served their goals. The attitudes of the Europeans toward the local population were also a source of antagonism. For example, Lord Cromer, the British consul in Egypt, 1883-1907, considered the Egyptians a 'backward race, needing to be protected and guided by Europe for its own good.'(Hodgson,1974:241)

Local intermediaries, Christian and Jew, were the buffers between Europe and the local population. Europeans depended on them for their knowledge of Middle Eastern commercial practices, and knowledge of Arabic or Turkish. Local intermediaries were in a better position to recover loans made to shopkeepers or cultivators. In return for their services, they were granted or sold a 'berat' ensuring protection by a European consulate.(Owen,1981) The berat enabled the protege to avoid arbitrary taxes imposed by local authorities and entitled the protege to the same low customs duties as Europeans. Proteges served as agents or employes of European banks, insurance companies, brokerage

houses and as local shipping agents of the French,
Austrians, Russians, British.(Owen, 1981)

Those dhimmi involved in the protege system were
sometimes agents for control by the European governments,
who co-opted the various millets in order to further their
economic interests. In 1774 Russia established a
protectorate over the Greek millet. By the end of the
nineteenth century, France had established rights over the
Catholic subjects of the Empire   These and other forms of
intervention encouraged destablization of the Empire.
Increasingly internal economic stability depended upon the
world market and the role of the European governments in
internal affairs.

The protege system stimulated cultural and economic
tensions within communities and between communities,
creating ever widening gaps between rural and urban peasant
and landholder, large merchant and small craftsperson.
Urban communities, experiencing closer contact with foreign
lands were influenced by cultural and political values from
Europe.(Hodgson,1974) The monopoly of the Christian Arab on
careers and contracts resulted in the increased isolation of
the Muslim Turk, Muslim Arab and Jew. Those Muslims and
Jews who did benefit often swung radically into
westernization. In the nineteenth century, the protege
system was one factor stimulating polarization in Ottoman
society: traditional religious mores were increasingly in
conflict with the option of Westernization and assimilation.

Commerce, Agriculture, Industry

The change in the scale and pattern of foreign trade from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and its effects on agriculture and industry, were central factors in the widening disparities among religious communities and between co-religionists of different classes. Muslims and dhimmi who carried on the new commerce as bankers, financial advisors or moneylenders, identified with the ruling powers rather than the peasantry whose way of life was jeopardized. An infrastructure supported by Europeans, local intermediaries and the Ottoman reforms (machinery from Europe, imported gins, steam cleaning machines, cotton presses, European business practices and capital), threatened the prestige, power and wealth of the traditional elite. (Owen,1981) While the traditional village had been a self contained unit, peasants and craftspeople became dependent upon urban creditors who in turn were dependent upon European subsidiaries. The demands and fluctuations of the world market controlled economic stability and undermined local self sufficiency.

In response to growing demand for raw materials and agricultural commodities as central and western Europe became urbanized, the Ottoman government encouraged agriculture and industrial development. In the 19th century,during the Tanzimat era, measures were taken that reinforced foreign privileges and were harmful to internal

trade and industry. The Commercial Treaty of 1832, for example, lowered customs duties on foreign imports, and on exports by foreign merchants. Local merchants were not granted similar concessions either at home, or in European countries.(Ma'oz,1976)

The economy of Egypt became dependent upon the production of cotton for export. In Syria and Mt. Lebanon, silk and cotton production was stimulated; in Anatolia, fruit and wool and cereal production within easy reach of the coast were stimulated. Imports of British cotton manufactured goods to Turkey, Egypt and Syria-Palestine and cheap European fabrics protected by minimal tariffs harmed many Middle Eastern spinners, weavers and dyers.(Owen,1981)

With the growth of the Ottoman debt to European countries, European control within the Empire moved from commercial to financial. (Owen,1981) The first loan agreement had been in 1854 when the British and French had supported the Turkish military effort against the Russians in the Crimean War. New financial institutions in Europe encouraging foreign investment made borrowing easier. Large profits were obtained by European controlled banks in the Middle East connected with state finance. Although the stated goal was economic development of the region, local people did not benefit. By 1875 the Ottoman government was bankrupt.

Increased revenues to meet interest payments on the state debt were most devastating to the peasantry. The

Capitulations protected Europeans and proteges resident within the Empire from taxation. In rural areas, the government was unable to control the misuse of tax surpluses and other abuses of the tax system.

Another factor stimulating European economic penetration in the Ottoman lands was the construction of two European owned railways. The Capitulations freed management from interference by Turkish courts. The Ottoman government was compensated with further financial support.

Increasingly foreigners providing working capital employed a system of share cropping: in return for half of the produce, they provided seed and equipment. Rural co-operative banks were created, supplying cheap credit to farmers; but terms of loans prohibited poorer farmers from participating. To control abuses of tax revenues, the Ottoman government incorporated landowners and merchants into local administration. This and other polices to assist the local population benefited only the upper classes, who used their new authority to press the peasant further. (Owen, 1981)

Land Reforms

Peasants also suffered from land reforms redefining land ownership and control. According to traditional Islamic practice, most cultivated land was classified as miri, or state land. Individuals and communities had a variety of ways to establish rights over the land, without

full legal ownership. Some areas (Upper Egypt, Southern Syria and Iraq) maintained communal systems of land ownership and regular distribution of land among the local population. (Owen,1981). Increasingly control of land by 'absentee landowners' defined new forms of rural property. The Land Law of 1858, amended in 1867, gave land titles to people with local influence rather than to the cultivator. Title deeds were granted and registration required. Communal ownership was forbidden. The Ottoman government hoped to encourage agricultural production by assisting in the emergence of a class of small cultivators with clear title to the land. (Owen,1981). However several factors discouraged peasants from registering their land. One was fear that registration might involve them in more tax demands. (Owen,1981) Secondly, registration meant that owners were more vulnerable to manipulation by others seeking control of the land. In addition, land holdings were accumulated by Christians and by Jews in Turkey, Egypt and Syria, through foreclosure for debt.(Owen,1981)

The Law of 1867 granted foreigners the right to own land in the Ottoman Empire and ensured privileges making it impossible to enforce land laws of local courts.(Owen,1981) Control of property rights by Europeans and their proteges signified fundamental changes in the land system.

(Karpat,1974)

Reorganization of the basic economic resource, the land, threatened the power of the traditional elites. They were

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replaced by new social groups whose dominance in government and society depended upon ownership and operation of the land. In areas where the European powers were not able to gain assurance of property rights they established direct rule by creating 'protectorates'. The complexities of customary law were reduced to a single European standard, described and validated as 'international law'.

Transportation,Demographic Changes

Another factor responsible for reorganization of social, economic and political forces was the shift from caravan trade routes to water transport. Improvements in transport, for example, the establishment of regular steamship routes between Egypt and the Levant, and improvement of transport along the rivers, had several important consequences. The Hijaz caravan grew out of the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca and was a source of important revenues for the Ottoman government. The livelihoods of many Jewish and Muslim merchants were connected to the Hijaz. As Jews sought livelihoods in the expanding port cities, many Jewish communities were depleted. Inland towns where Muslim traders had been predominant suffered economically as the focus of trade shifted.

Improvement of several Red Sea canals linking the Mediterranean with the southern seas through Egypt, and the construction of the Suez Canal, proved a political liability rather than an asset to Egypt. Rejection of earlier plans

for construction of a major canal, based on fear of political consequences, proved justified as Egypt became a focus of European rivalry for control of trade routes. (Turqay,1982) Demographic changes as Jews immigrated to the development towns of the canal zone, disrupted continuity within each community and isolated Jews from the local culture with which they had been familiar.(Landau,1969) The shift in trade routes from caravans to steamships hurt Muslim traders in the inland towns while ports, such as Salonica, Izmir, Beirut and Alexandria, where millets were an important part of the population, thrived. (Issawi,1982) Similarly, in Iraq, the move of Baghdadi Jews to the port of Basra in search of greater business and financial opportunities resulted from the creation of new transport by the British. (Rejwan,1985)

Class Conflict

Social tensions between poor and newly rich Jews reflected a similar pattern of growing class disparities in Egypt, the Syrian Provinces, and Turkey. In Egypt the wealthier Jews took advantage of legal equality granted under the British occupation in 1882 by forming business links with powerful Muslim and Copt landowners and politicians. (Landshut,1950) Business people involved in the cotton trade, banking and the stock exchange comprised a growing entrepenurial middle class tied to European interests. The poorer Jews, small peddlers or craftspeople,

silversmiths and coppersmiths were for the most part

descendants of the original Jews of Egypt. These Jews spoke

Arabic, while the Jews of the middle and upper classes, of

Spanish, Italian and other foreign origin, tended to speak

French.

In Palestine also, demographic changes were further

stimulated by the protege system. The protection of

European consuls encouraged Jewish immigrants from Europe to

settle in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias. While in

1839 there were 5,000 Jews in Jerusalem, by the late 1850's

Jews had purchased land in and around Jerusalem and

comprised half the total population of the city.(Ma'oz,1968)

The reforms of Muhammad Ali (1805-1848) (see page 102)

and the opening of the Suez Canal brought commercial

prosperity and brought prosperity to other parts of the

Egyptian economy through connections with Europe,

encouraging Jewish immigration.(Encyclopedia Judaica,1971)

By the middle of the nineteenth century, communities of

Italian and Eastern European Jews had settled in Alexandria,

which became a commercial center equal to that of Cairo.

Yet a large number of Jews were poor and had to apply for

assistance from abroad. (Landau,1969) Competition with

other minorities destroyed economic viability for many Jews.

Similarly in Aleppo and Damascus, a high percentage of Jews

were either beggars or lived off of charity. By the end of

the nineteenth century, the typical Jew was a member of the

lower class- porter, water carrier, window cleaner, tinker,

cobbler, seasonal laborer, harvesting agricultural export products and a mill or factory worker. (Zenner and Deshen,1982) Women and children worked in the tobacco factories of Istanbul and Salonica, and in Izmir, as laundresses, servants, nurses, lacemakers.(Drumont,1982) Their lives became increasingly alienated from those of Jews who were bankers, money-changers or international merchants.

While the occupation of Muhammad Ali in Egypt and of his son Ibrahim Pasha in the Syrian Provinces brought conditions that allowed some Jews prosperity, those conditions created hardships for other Jews and threatened the stability of Jewish/Muslim relations. For example, changes in customary tax exemptions eliminated exemptions for religious scholars. This was significant in a community where the work of religious scholars was crucial to cultural continuity. Competition between Jews and among Jews and Christians for employment as bankers for provincial governors encouraged Jews to identify with official interests. (Zenner, Deshen,1982) Under the rule of Ibrahim Pasha, Christians and to some extent Jews, attained high positions in Syrian administration. They were allowed to build and repair places of worship, ride horses publicly, wear similar dress as a Muslim.(Ma'oz,1968) When the Ottomans regained control of the Syrian provinces and maintained these privileges, which had been forbidden to Jew and Christians as dhimmis, anti-Christian riots resulted. Because of their strong links with foreign powers,

Christians rather than Jews were the target of hostility resulting from economic and political insecurity. However, changes in government tended to create chaotic conditions dangerous for Jews, both rich and poor.

Oppressive regimes created conditions that threatened Jewish-Muslim relations. For example, Muhammad Ali reasserted the state's right of ownership of miri land. (Owen,1981) He took control of tax income from miri land, confiscated agricultural waqfs and used village shaikhs as agents of the central government. He increased government monopolies on agricultural produce and other industries, arousing the enmity of the Ottoman government and the British. Changes in the relative positions of social groups, the old merchant Muslim class and craftspeople and the peasantry, created a new hierarchy in which the European dominated and the native Christian prospered. Jewish communities were divided- but ultimately all suffered a similar fate. Where reforms and privilege based on European intervention improved conditions for Jews, hardship created in other sectors of the population threatened their stability. In remote areas ,for example in some North African countries where social conditions remained intact, Jewish-Muslim relations continued in traditional forms of stability.

Under the rule of Ibrahim Pasha (1831-1840) in the Syrian provinces, local chieftains were disarmed, the Bedouin tribes were subdued and new taxes instituted to pay

for an army numbering 90,000 by 1839. (Owen,1981) Forced labor, conscription, compulsory disarmament and heavy taxation created social unrest among the peasantry and among landowners whose powers were curtailed.(Hourani,1947) While the introduction of new crops, loans and tools increased agricultural output and the export of silk and cotton from Syria doubled, the opening of Damascus to European commerce had a mixed impact. Intercommunal fighting in Mt. Lebanon, the Syrian provinces and Palestine emerged in response to the growth of European influence and changes in the balance of power between social groups; for example Maronite Christians and Druze.(Owen,1981)

Changes in social structure promoted by political and economic goals of the Ottoman government and by the political and economic goals of the European nations provoked interethnic conflict based on widening disparities among classes. Traditionally in the Islamic lands the interests of wealthier Jews were bound up with those of the Ottoman government. The commitment within Islamic ideology to protection of dhimmi rights ensured that cooperation would benefit everyone. When dhimmi status was revoked by the Tanzimat, widening social and economic disparities among Jews had more far reaching implications. Jews continued to support the Ottoman state, investing money and even siding with Muslims against Christians in the Syrian lands. As the Ottoman government lost financial viability, those Jews connected to the state also suffered. One alternative,

whenever it was in the interests of the European governments, was to become agents of the Europeans. Alliances with European governments meant commitment to interests which did not benefit the poor.

In this period Muslim peasants experienced widening disparities between their interests and those of the wealthier Muslim merchants allied with Europe. The critical economic gap in Islamic society however, was between Muslims in general and Arab Christians who were the chief beneficiaries of European intervention.

North Africa

The situation of Jews in Morocco and other parts of North Africa illustrates the ways that social economic, political and religious tensions unfolded in the seventeenth through twentieth centuries. Like the Jews of Egypt, Iran and Yemen, Jews "lived in imperial cities, smaller administrative centers, mountain villages and oasis towns." (Meyers, 1982:88). They engaged in similar occupations; trade, commerce, crafts. In the urban areas Jews were an underclass of day laborers, bath keepers, butchers, prostitutes. They were gunsmiths, making weapons for imperial soldiers and dissident tribes, farmers, shepherds, rabbis, teachers, customs agents, interpreters, money-changers.(Meyers, 1982:90) Jews traded in small market towns on the fringes of the Sahara, the Atlas mountains of Morocco, Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iraq and Iran, the

Caucasus and Yemen. Many urban Jewish craftspeople traveled
for extended periods among isolated tribes. (Zenner and
Deshen,1982:15)

In many rural areas traditions of economic mutuality
and complementary forms of social organization remained
untouched by the upheaval in urban areas. Jews had for
centuries formed bonds with Arab and Berber tribespeople
with whom they traded. Often referred to as 'client-patron'
relations, agreements between rural craftspeople and
peddlers afforded them protection in exchange for goods.
The social distinctiveness of the Jew, expressed by the
various proscriptions of dhimmi status, allowed Jews
flexibility in economic transactions. Lawrence Rosen
characterizes this fact in describing the economic role of
Jews in the Moroccan town of Sefrou: "By turning to the Jew
there was neither risk of unforeseen entanglement nor a
potential loss of one's superior position of power. Jews
could thus form bonds with individual trading partners that
were characterized by mutual economic advantage but devoid
of social competition. This served the Muslim's wish to
avoid the undesirable bonds of obligation and the Jew's wish
to maintain religious separation." (Rosen,1984:153) Jewish
peddlers obtained goods from a Jewish importer in the city
and traveled to rural areas where they supplied clients
needs. A formal bond ritualized by sacrificing a sheep at
the door of the client, ensured that Jew protection from
attack. On his travels through tribal lands the Jew was

accompanied by an armed guard secure in the knowledge that anyone who violated him would be avenged. (Rosen,1984)

In urban areas also Jews "formed highly personalistic clientele relations with individual Muslim buyers."(Rosen,1984:136) In Sefrou a relatively small number of Jews obtained protege status. Economic viability was maintained by the interconnections between Jewish merchants and artisans and Muslims. As was traditional in Egypt and the Syrian lands, Jews formed real estate partnerships with Muslims as well as investing in mutually beneficial agricultural endeavors. In Aleppo, Jews involved in trade of agricultural products, livestock, dairy products, grains, fruit and vegetables formed partnerships with peasants and herders.(Zenner and Deshen,1982)

While, as local artisans and small traders, Jews, like Muslims, were affected adversely by competition with European industry and the decline of the caravan trade, both were adept at finding new markets for their goods. Some Jews moved into more secure industries (such as tobacco factories). Jewish and Muslim craftspeople produced new types of products that Europeans found difficult to imitate. Craftspeople also took advantage of European imports to improve their products, for example, high quality thread. Depending upon the situation in Europe it was often possible for local craftspeople to produce goods cheap enough to find a market among the expanding poorer classes in the towns,

and among nomads and agriculturalists in areas where European goods were less available.(Owen,1981)

Four factors resulting from European penetration in North Africa contributed to social, economic, religious and political upheaval. As we have seen in the Arab provinces, demographic changes disrupted communities and traditional relations between communities. Changes in occupation had a similar effect and both factors were affected by the role of education in supporting European intervention. Finally, as in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, the need to 'modernize' the army and administer tax reform involved European advisors and financial support. In 1901, the loan obtained by Mawlay Abd al-Aziz (1894-1908) from French banks began a process which eventually placed the Moroccan peasantry in the hands of French finance.(Laskier,1983) Finally, economic penetration was again supported by the protege system, a major factor in disruptions between social and ethnic-religious groups.

European merchants hoping to gain control of the economy in agriculture and crafts appointed Jewish merchants as local agents. As merchants of the Sultan for many years,some Jews controlled major imports of sugar, coffee, tea, metals, gunpowder, and tobacco.(Laskier,1983) European merchants in Gibraltar, Tangier, and Mogador, in the hope of gaining influence over internal commerce, utilized these Jews as intermediaries. The special legal status of the Jewish proteges, exemption from military duty, from Moroccan

juridical authority and from payment of the jizya, was resented by Muslims for whom there was no escape from oppressive economic conditions. In their role as economic intermediary, whenever and wherever that was allowed and/or encouraged by European governments, Jews were caught between the traditional society that was being challenged and the tensions emerging between Arabs and Europeans and between their own community and Europe, as a new society was taking shape. Those Jews who were able to utilize the advantages of the new society often became identified as "foreigners" at odds with the economic cultural and spiritual universe of the Judeo-Arab world.

Interethnic rivalry and class conflict were fueled by the proliferation of European styled schools in North Africa and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Efforts on behalf of those Jews affected by accusations of blood libel in Damascus in 1840 represented a growing movement among European Jews to 'assist' Jews in the Islamic lands. Among the organizations created with this end in mind the Alliance Israelite Universelle, formed in Paris in 1860, became one of the most powerful and influential. The work of the Alliance rested on several assumptions about the nature of life for Jews in Islamic lands. One was that anti-semitic incidents were endemic. Another was that ignorance and poverty condemned Jews to oppressive conditions of life in the Islamic lands. The Alliance set about to correct both problems, utilizing the structures already set in place by

the European governments. Diplomatic representatives in countries where Jews were harassed were urged to take action to support them. Schools were created offering a European curriculum. Jews were urged to attend with the promise of better employment opportunities and cultural enrichment.(Laskier,1983)

The Alliance, working with the growing European presence, encouraged appointment of Jewish consuls by first of all teaching the necessary languages- French, English and Spanish. Ironically Jewish agents of the Ottoman government working with European governments had suffered from the proliferation of Commercial treaties (for example, the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty, 1856), allowing increased privileges for European diplomats in Ottoman territories. These agents had been replaced by Christians appointed by the European consulates. Whether or not Moroccan officials approved of their schools, the Alliance was supported by the growing dependence of Morocco on European banks and other institutions. The Alliance created an educated Jewish elite to fill the roles of clerk, interpreter, diplomat, skilled to meet the demands of the new economic and political challenges of the late nineteenth century.(Laskier,1983)

Knowledge of English, French and Spanish proved a great asset for Jews acting as commercial intermediaries between Muslims and Europeans. The cost of a curriculum based on European culture and history was high. Jews attending the schools became alienated from their communities- from other

Jews and from Muslims. Alienated from their culture and history those Jews were often rejected by the Arab world where for generations they had been involved in deep cultural, linguistic, philosophical, religious sharing.

The purpose of an education in an Alliance School- to provide students with practical skills as well as personal enhancement- contradicted the sense of education that Jews had known and experienced for centuries.(Katz,1975) Within traditional Jewish society the purpose of schooling was to pass down from one generation to the next, the traditional religious and cultural mores, providing cultural continuity and survival. Resistance to the Alliance schools reflected a new kind of disparity among classes. Many rabbis and traditional elites- leaders of the community- were opposed to the Alliance schools. Rabbinic schools were after all vital to the survival of the Moroccan Jewish community. Proteges supported teaching the language and using the educational systems of the European powers they represented. Many Jews whose occupations were threatened or no longer relevant as the economy was restructured, turned to the Alliance school in hopes of improving their situations. Often this meant a change in class status, a new self image.

In fact the Alliance school while ostensibly seeking to improve the Jewish 'self image' was based on patronizing Eurocentric attitudes. School directors and teachers whether European or educated in Europe, misunderstood and misinterpreted the customs of Moroccan Jewish communities.

For example, the impoverished facade of the Jewish quarter
often concealed a more luxurious interior. This was because
of a traditional cultural desire for privacy, and often,
too, reflected the motivation to conceal wealth from the tax
collector.(Zenner and Deshen, 1982) Such customs and
attitudes were unknown or overlooked by educational
representatives who characterized the Mediterranean Jew as
having 'bad habits', as impoverished and backward. The
Alliance reflected a common European attitude: that France,
for example, had a 'civilizing mission' among the Muslims,
Jews, and Christians of the Middle East and North Africa,
and part of that mission was to improve them morally. Such
rationalizations for colonial rule fostered false
perceptions of Jewish life, and explains why the school
curriculum met the needs of the colonizer rather than of the
Jew. Some AIU teachers, however "realized that LaFontaine's
fables were reflections of a sophisticated society ruled by
Louis XIV and hence not always applicable to the children of
the mellah. Interestingly, Israel Pisa, director in
Casablanca, explained this position eloquently in 1906,
contending that in Morocco education had to differ from
education in the developed nations: the young should not be
taught about their counterparts in France, who belonged to
the affluent bourgeoisie, and enjoyed pretty clothes and
pleasant games; they would be better off learning about the
somber conditions of their coreligionists in the Russian
Empire, with whom they shared unfavorable conditions.

Familiarizing them with their counterparts in far away lands would surely contribute to Jewish solidarity."(Laskier,1983:116) In 1894, for the first time lessons were prepared on Moroccan history by the director (a woman) of the Tangiers girls school.(Laskier,1983:103)

While a few Alliance schools were meeting places for Muslims, Christians and Jews, most Alliance schools did not attract Muslims, particularly because they were for the most part run by Christians. The few Muslims who did attend were most often children of proteges. In 1909 of the 32 candidates presented by the AIU and other consular sponsored schools for the certification examination for French primary school certificates, in Tangier and Casablanca, 21 were Jews, 11 European Christians, and two were Muslims.(Laskier,1983:107)

Demographic shifts related to economic insecurity affected Jews and Muslims in the interior and southern regions of Morocco. Many relocated in coastal towns, seeking better living and employment opportunities and seeking freedom from the arbitrary impositions of feudal chieftains. Developing trade activities and ties with already established Jewish financial circles, motivated many Jews to abandon their towns. As a result of such migrations Jews of diverse backgrounds might find themselves in the same Alliance classroom, recreating a sense of community based on learning and speaking French together rather than Arabic or Hebrew.

In Southern Tunisia under the French protectorate Jews were drawn away from their ancient occupations of nomadic herding and fishing, and from the commercial links established over centuries with semi-nomadic Berbers. The French established outposts where Jews became engaged in service trades, crafts and petty commerce. On the Island of Djerba, Berbers experienced a similar dislocation as they took advantage of opportunities provided by French penetration to become migrant traders. The 6,000 Jews on the Island of Djerba were the more settled element, engaging in local trade, wool processing and crafts. Generally peaceful relations between Jews and non-Jews continued to hold within this context. (Deshen,1982)

In the urban areas, including newly established colonial outposts, Alliance graduates found employment in the protectorates administration. They were placed in banking institutions, post offices, commerical houses. Many graduates dissatisfied with lack of access to top bureaucratic managerial positions, joined a growing emigration movement to other Middle Eastern countries, the U.S., England, France and Portugal.(Laskier,1983)

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the AIU attempted to supplement traditional Jewish occupations with modernized vocational and agricultural training. Opponents of peddling and moneylending advocated vocational workshops for men and women promoting modern vocations and those practiced by Muslims. Many Jews benefited from a

modern education and increased employment opportunities: women's schools helped women break away from traditionally circumscribed roles within their communities. Loss of traditional occupations and roles had a range of consequences as cultural sharing and traditional notions of power and respect crumbled. As traditional sources of identity, strength, and survival were replaced, social tensions reflected the ambiguities of the new situation. Jews who were newly educated in European styled schools were alienated from the experience and memory of their community's past. Proteges tended to treat those less privileged with arrogance, disregarding elements of their own communities. Assuming that consulates would bail them out they relied less upon their own innder resources, communal solidarity and intercommunal complimentarity to solve problems. Impoverished Jews were sometimes hostile to wealthier members who shunned them and who aroused the fear of their Muslim neighbors. In this way the differences in how various elements reacted to changing conditions had a range of consequences for solidarity among Muslims and Jews. Anti-European sentiment often was extended to include Jews some of whom were among the small privileged minority enjoying relative comfort as proteges or naturalized citizens. While these Jews had economic influence over the lives of many Muslims, the majority of Jews lived in subservience to Muslims and were vulnerable to bitterness among Muslims resulting from abuses propagated by the Jewish

elite and by Christians, European and Arab. (Bowie,1976) At
the same time the Jewish elite became the target for
reactions to abuses that were the direct result of
imperialist policies by the British, French, Italians.

In spite of the enormous disruptions of intercommunal
sharing propagated by European policies in the Islamic
lands, social, political, economic and religious
complimentarity continued to feed a long history of
mutuality and stable relations between Jews and Arabs
(Muslim and Christian). Where Jews owned land profits were
shared by Muslims who tended their flocks. Where Muslim and
Berber Chieftains were served by Jewish craftspeople and
traders, those relations were honored by client-patron
relations protecting those Jews. Folk culture reflected in
language, religious practices, healing practices and
responses of solidarity to natural disasters such as drought
or plague, continued to provide a solid basis for daily
interaction. Phrases used by Jews and Muslims, such as 'if
God wills' (in Shiallah), "Thank God" (al-hamdah l'llah)
reflected shared cultural beliefs. (Zenner and Deshen,1982)
Muslims, Jews and Druze use the color of light blue and the
number five as protection against the 'evil eye'. Jews
might ask a sheikh for healing, while a Christian might
consult a Rabbi. (Zenner and Deshen,1982) In periods of
natural crises, all religious leaders come together to pray.
While Kurdish Jews were bound by social and economic ties to
Kurdish lords, Muslims often lived in Jewish households, as

lodgers or workers performing tasks on the Sabbath. The
Jews of North and East Iraq were highly acculturated to the
environmental Kurdish culture. They shared values of
family, humor, common magical beliefs and worshiped at the
same holy graves. In Libya the daily struggle to survive,
shared exposure to continual threats of nature, war and
internal upheaval and the whims of those in power, had
brought the two communities together for centuries. In a
cave just north of Sefrou in Morocco, Jewish and Muslim
women gathered strength at a saintly shrine.(Rosen,1984)
When rain was needed, Jew and Muslim engaged in prayers from
a centuries old history. Stephen Sharot notes- "The trend
from local religious diversity to Talmudic uniformity which
had occurred under the Roman and Persian Empires and which
was at first strengthened under Islam, was reversed in the
later Middle Ages when local religious customs again assumed
importance."(Sharot, 1974:336)

Conclusion

Internal changes and external influences in the
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries stimulated
changes in ethnic-religious relations that continue to
unfold with troubled complexity in the twentieth century.
The role of Jew and Arab in the creation of a 'new world
order' based on high speed industrial development,
capitalist economic structures accompanied by imperialist
policies, depended upon class mobility. The revolution in

transportation- introduction of railway systems and improvements in sea-transport- allowed for rapid demographic changes, easier access to foreign governments and as a result of both, a rapidly changing class structure.

In Turkey, in the Arab provinces, Syria-Palestine and Mt. Lebanon, in the North African countries, Jew and Arab transformed traditional mores. They reacted to and initiated changes in administration, social organization, religious life, economic roles and relations with outside forces. Some Jews and Arabs were initiators, other were victims. For the most part, transformations in the Islamic lands in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contributed to dissension between Jew and Arab based on widening class disparities, competition for economic survival, increased religious tensions created by changes in social organization and divisiveness created by outside forces. On the other hand, economic mutuality, shared forms of social organization, shared religious practices and shared responses to outside forces, continued in many areas to provide a stable basis for Arab-Jewish co-existence. While these forms of mutuality survived on all class levels, mutuality was most clearly sustained where European penetration could not reach.

The Ottoman Reforms, Tanzimat, in conjunction with a proliferation of commercial treaties, and Capitulations agreements, represented a strategy by the Muslim-Turk ruler to control social unrest, tensions between religious

communities and pressures from outside forces. The new
centralized policy of the Ottoman government was directed at
undermining the local authority of feudal
chiefs.(Khalaf,1982) The central government tried to
control its growing debt by increasing and assuming control
of tax revenues. It tried to reclaim land ceded to
villages. While the Ottoman government initiated policies
designed to encourage the agricultural pursuits of small
landowners, these policies were contradicted by attempts to
gain control of the land, for example through enforced
registration of title deeds. Competition for rural economic
wealth and for control of tax revenues heightened social
tensions. In Mt. Lebanon, in the Spring of 1859, peasants
demanding an end to tax and other abuses, revolted. In the
Christian districts of the North, Khazins, or feudal
families were evicted from their homes. 12,000 Christians
lost their lives, 4,000 perished in poverty and 100,000 were
left homeless. (Khalaf,1982:128)

During this period, developments in relations between
Muslims and Jews and Jews and Christian Arabs diverged. As
relations between the Ottoman government and its Christian
subjects deteriorated, tensions between Muslims and
Christians surfaced. On the other hand the Ottoman
government tended to continue to protect its Jewish subjects
and Jews and Muslims tended to see one another as allies
suffering a similar fate, as Christians began to take
advantage of and benefit from the changes of the Reform Era.

The Capitulations contributed to Ottoman bankruptcy. For example, they protected Europeans and proteges resident within the Empire from taxes on exports, while Ottoman subjects paid taxes on moving goods from one province to another.(Owen, 1981) The Capitulations allowed the French, British and Russians to establish vast networks of political, economic and cultural links with Christian communities throughout the Islamic lands. The Ottoman government tried to use its own resources and labor for purposes of economic development but was forced to rely on European assistance. Those who administered the new financial systems, those who played a role in the new commercial systems, and whose who acquired new scientific and intellectual skills related to those endeavors, became alien to the main body of Muslims and Jews.(Lewis, 1984) When Ibrahim Pasha occupied the Syrian provinces the Egyptian troops marched like Europeans through the cities playing musical instruments, and using places of worship as barracks.(Ma'oz,1968) Effective forms of social organization and economic mutuality developed over the centuries began to crumble.

In the area of religious life, the Ottoman reforms redefined the status of the dhimmi replacing communal autonomy with individual citizenship. Religious communities with traditional roles broke up into confessional groups fighting among themselves for economic and political power. European governments adopted confessional groups, exploiting

them to further their own interests in the Empire.
Resistance to the changing character of the Islamic state
was evident even in resistance to the Sultan's order that
the male head-dress be replaced by the European Fez.(Rejwan,
1985). His decree emphasized that the dhimmi should no
longer be distinguished by their attire. Disruption of
social organization and economic mutuality preserved by the
millet system contributed to dissensions between Muslim and
Jew and between Arab Christian and Muslim and Arab Christian
and Jew.

To the extent that the situation of some Jews improved
in civil and political security with the growing influence
of western ideologies and economic and political power Jews
became linked with the 'west'. The Ottoman reforms were
used by advocates of the Jews to insist on protection of
their rights. For example, after accusations of blood libel
were made in Damascus in 1840, Sir Moses Montefiore
requested that Sultan Abdulmecid guarantee the complete
security of Damascus' Jews.(Ma'oz,1968) Intervention by
Europeans had two faces. At the same time that with the
encouragement and influence of European political
ideologies, traditional relations between 'believer' and
'unbeliever' were no longer instituted in the Islamic lands,
European anti-semitism first appears among Christian Arabs.
Thus begins a process in which the dual relation of European
governments to the Jews begins to affect their fate in the
Islamic lands. In the seventeenth century Jews were being

supplanted by Greeks and Armenians in international commerce and the trades. As the rising power of Christendom in the Islamic lands solidified in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the situation of Jews worsened. This situation was only alleviated where Jews were considered a necessary and useful tool for economic penetration by the European governments.

Increasingly in the nineteenth century, association with the west ensured economic and political viability. The acculturation of some Middle Eastern Jews to western cultural, political and religious mores contributed to their alienation from their indigenous communities and from Arabs, whether Muslim or Christian, who were not beneficiaries in this process. The first anti-semitic tracts in Arabic appear at the end of the nineteenth century introduced by Arab Christians who were educated in Europe or by European missionaries, and who were caught in the cycle of economic and political rivalry, use the Jews to deflect Muslim hostility from themselves.(Lewis, 1984) As Armenians and Greeks were faced with an invasion of cheap European goods in the second half of the nineteenth century, and as Jews began to catch up with Christians by investing in well-chosen industrial sectors- cigarette paper factories, spinning mills, brickmaking, tobacco-packing, factories- economic competition fueled European style anti-semitic incidents. For example, in April, 1872, the discovery of a Christian body in a sewer provoked charges of blood libel

among the Greeks of Izmir. The Vali was obliged to protect the Jewish quarter. Anti-Jewish riots were accompanied by economic boycott- Christians forbade Jews access to their quarters and stopped trading with Jewish bazaar merchants. (Drumont,1982)

In the area of education the colonial experience also redefined Jews' social relations with and attitudes towards Muslims. Alliance schools, established in Edirne (Turkey), 1867, Aleppo, 1869, Istanbul, 1875, Fez, 1883, Teheran, 1898, prepared Jews for work in westernized sectors of the economy. As well as providing material support, outside intervention by directors of the school sometimes ensured physical safety. Jews learned French and English and were drawn into a cultural world that excluded their Arab neighbors. Bernard Lewis remarks: "In British-ruled Aden, Egypt and Iraq, in French ruled Algeria, Tunis and Morocco, in Italian ruled Libya, imperial rule ushered in a new era of Jewish and educational progress and material prosperity. (It) also ensured the ultimate doom of those communities."(Lewis, 1973:172)

On the other hand, Lawrence Rosen notes that in rural areas of Morocco, for example, in the town of Sefrou where there were few proteges, interconnections between Jewish merchants and artisans and individual Muslims favored a continuation of stable and fruitful relations, beneficial to both. He notes, that: "one encounters people from all sectors of Sefrou society who deeply regret the departure of

the Jews from the religion and blame the decline of the Sefrou economy in no small part on the absence of Jewish merchants.... One never hears remarks that suggest a collective economic cabal by the Jews: there is no notion that the Jews have tried to gain financial control of the marketplace to the detriment of the Muslims."(Rosen, 1984:155) In a revealing analysis of Arab attitudes toward Jews he notes that Jews were respected both as members of a community with its unique customs and beliefs and as persons with whom one could establish mutually satisfying individual relationships. In a series of comments that underline the differences between Christian European and Muslim attitudes toward Jews, Rosen notes that:"one does not hear remarks implying Jews are politically dangerous, that they are individually or collectively undermining the nation, plotting the overthrow of the Kingdom, or that they are responsible for the country's various political problems."(Rosen,1984:156)

Cultural commonality bond Jew and Arab in many ways. For example in Aleppo all house lots were equivalent and were divided into one third interior courtyard and two thirds building, whatever means the inhabitant had and whether muslim, Christian or Jew.(Chevailier,1982:160) The creation of common social space is one way that social culture and organization can create bonds between diverse peoples. Many devices served the Jew in maintaining his/her own culture within the Islamic world. Jews in Aleppo, for

example, would 'rent the city' from the governor for specified time in order to symbolically enclose the space so that they could 'carry' within its walls on the Sabbath. Jewish law proscribes that nothing be carried on the Sabbath other than in an enclosed area, such as a home. (Zenner and Deshen,1982) The editorials of a Jewish newspaper editor in Egypt, James Sanua, are an example of the solidarity that many Jews felt for their countries. His editorials rebuked the exploitation of the current ruler, Khedive Ismail and of the new class of Europeans who exploited others by taking advantage of their protected status.(Landshut,1950) In reviewing how Jew and Arab viewed one another in the process of changing conditions, political affiliations and class status were more significant than religious or cultural differences in determining alliances and tensions. For example, the increasing western orientation of some Jews and of some Christian Arabs was a major cause of hostility, fed by xenophobia, of some Muslims. Furthermore, Jewish communities in different countries and different areas of one country followed different paths.(Lewis,1984) While in some countries, such as Iraq and some areas of Morocco, ancient traditions and alliances were preserved, in others, such as Egypt, the lower classes remained Arabic-speaking while many middle and upper class Jews and Christians and Muslims became alienated from their culture and nationality, using European languages and obtaining citizenship from a European country. The threat of 'modernization' to folk

culture had far reaching consequences for relations between Arab and Jew.

How did the attitude and actions of the Europeans toward Jew and Muslim affect relations between them? Some Europeans, for example, Lord Cromer, British consul to Egypt (1883-1907) considered the Egyptians "a backward race" and imagined that Europe had been: "in the forefront of human progress for two or three thousand years and might be expected to remain there." Hostility toward and fear of the Muslim world had a centuries long history. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Europeans feared the Turks would attack the west and destroy Christianity. On the other hand, the economic and political successes of the Ottoman Empire commanded respect in the sixteenth century. (Karpat) Political manipulation and economic exploitation accompanied a change of attitude as respect turned into contempt in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Allan and Helen Cutler, in <u>The Jew as Ally of the Muslim</u> (1986), maintain that :" Anti-Muslimism was the primary though not only, factor in the revival of anti-Semitism during the High Middle Ages (1000-1300), the effects of which have been felt in all subsequent centuries, including our own."(Cutler and Cutler, 1986: Introduction) Their research substantiates their central thesis that medieval western European Christians tended to associate Jew with Muslim, equating the two non-Christian groups and to consider the Jew as an ally of the Muslim, as well as an

Islamic fifth columnist in Christian territory."(Cutler and Cutler, 1986:89) As western Christian attitudes towards Muslims in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries changed from tolerance to antagonism so did their attitudes toward Jews. The Cutlers quote Julian Amery, former British minister of state, describing Arab-Jewish affinity in an address to the B'nai B'rith Lodge:"Disraeli once said that Arabs were really Jews on horseback; today it would perhaps be more apt to say that Arabs were Jews in Cadillacs."(Cutler and Cutler, 1986:119) As social and economic dislocation and political unrest penetrated the Islamic lands, Jews and Muslims were confronted with an ambivalent Europe which sought to win them over only to control them. Strategies for winning over one group or another, often created hostility between the two, as when Jews received privileges in association with Europe that helped to solidify imperialist policies. Christian Arabs were the chief players in this scenario, since they were favored by the Christian European powers.

On the other hand, the threat of Europe and the tensions arising in the nineteenth century convinced many Arab Christians, Muslims and Jews that a common secular ground was more important than religious loyalties. In Istanbul in 1877, the attempt of the Ottoman government to create a secular constitution drew together Muslims, Christians and Jews in support of a political cause. The constitutional experiment was halted however, by the Russo-

Ottoman wars. At the Congress of Berlin, following the Russian-Ottoman wars the Treaty of San Stefano proposed the partitioning of Ottoman territories.

The development of a legal secular concept of state as opposed to the traditional concept of nationality rooted in religious identity raised the fundamental questions to shape Jew/Arab relations in the twentieth century. In the 1860's and 1870's Christians and Muslims overcame differences in the hope of establishing some kind of Arab autonomy. The movement to free the Syrian provinces from Ottoman rule was spread by cultural and social societies, literary journals and secret committees, as the first stirrings of Arab nationalism emerged. This movement was one result of the transformations in social organization, religious life, economic survival and relations with outside forces. The complexities that are embodied in Arab and Jewish nationalism reflect the unsolved issues raised by changes in all of these areas. Their unfolding is the subject of Chapter Three.

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CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECTS OF NATIONALISM AS A SOCIAL/POLITICAL SOLUTION
ON ARAB/JEW RELATIONS, 1880 THROUGH
THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE (1917-1948)

Preceding chapters have shown that the life of Jew and Arab in the Middle Eastern lands was shaped by a shared folk culture, including for example, reciprocity in economic arrangements and shared religious practices, as much as by official political institutions, religious movements and economic policies.

Furthermore, as stated in Chapter III, in reviewing how Jew and Arab viewed one another in the process of the far reaching changes in social, economic and religious life during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, political affiliations and class status were more significant than religious differences in determining alliances and tensions.

Economic and political developments shaped by European imperial policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries interacted with restructuring by the Ottoman state of economic, social and religious life. The Tanzimat Reforms and Capitulation Agreements represented policies designed to assist in meeting the demands of an expanding world market shaped by the Industrial Revolution.(See Chapter III) Middle Eastern society and economy, characterized by small scale agricultural production and local craft industry was

transformed in the nineteenth century. Large scale
agricultural production for export and replacement of
indigenous crafts by imports precipitated changes in social
organization that threatened customary practices in regard
to land use, modes of production and social alliances. We
have seen how the widening gap between the peasant and elite
classes and between urban and rural concerns exacerbated
religious and ethnic differences. Competition for access to
power and wealth was stimulated by the European powers who
hoped to solidify their hold in the Middle Eastern lands
through a network of intermediaries- whether Christian Arab,
Jew or Muslim Arab. Chapter Two details how disruption of
traditional forms of social economic and religious practices
characterized by widening class disparities created inter-
ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict. At the same time we have
seen how Jew and Arab, as they responded to nineteenth
century transformations, protected and preserved many of the
traditional customs and forms of economic and social
relations that had evolved for centuries.

Along with European penetration and the effects of the
Ottoman Reforms, nationalism was a third critical force
affecting restructuring of social, economic and religious
life in the Middle Eastern lands connected to the above
developments. The development of a legal secular concept of
state in the nineteenth century challenged the traditional
inclusion of all ethnic/religious groups in the Dar-al-
Islam.(House of Islam) Allegiance to Islam and inclusion of

all minorities in a system of social organization dictated by the Sharia had persisted as the Arab Caliphate gave way to successive rulers, culminating in Turkish rule in 1517. Nationalism as a means of organizing peoples and of redefining their allegiances was stimulated by four interrelated forces in the Ottoman lands in the nineteenth century. Political developments evolving out of dissatisfaction with the Ottoman Reforms culminated in the Young Turk Revolution which attempted to redefine Ottomanism. Secondly, nationalism as a specifically European ideology penetrated the Ottoman lands through missionary schools, colonial intervention (as in Egypt) and an emerging generation of western educated intellectuals. Third, in the final stages of European penetration in the post World War I period, nationalism becomes the primary vehicle for resistance to the west. Finally, in the case of the Jews and of the Palestinian Arabs, nationalism in the twentieth century carries the weight of ethnic survival.

Chapter Three will explore two nationalisms, Zionism and Arab nationalism, particularly focusing on Palestinian Arab nationalism. Against the background of developments discussed in Chapter Three, what were the motivating forces behind both movements? What was the impact of rising nationalism on Judeo-Arabic civilization in the Middle Eastern lands? What do the evolutions of Zionism and Arab nationalism as political movements tell us about Jewish and Arab survival in the twentieth century? What were the

forces within the Zionist movement and within the Arab nationalist movement that were supportive to Jewish/Arab co-existence; and what were the forces that created dissension? What was the significance of these political movements for daily interaction between Jew and Arab?

Neither Zionism nor Arab nationalism represents a monolithic movement. Yet, ultimately developments solidifying ideological positions defining both movements led to a bifurcation of Judeo-Arabic culture, historically and otherwise. In other words, as early as 1917, and certainly by 1948, a language sharply dividing Arab and Jew from one another in terms of cultural and historical description, dominates official diplomacy and to a growing extent popular consciousness. A dramatic indication of this phenomenon is the disappearance of the Palestinian Arab Jew from discussion of events in Palestine.

The development of nationalism in the Middle Eastern lands culminates in a restructuring and redefining of society, of social relations and of peoples in relation to one another. Marshal Hodgson aptly delineates the predicament of this reordering in the Middle Eastern lands: 'Egyptians, Ottomans, Indians? Men must identify themselves in some such workable units, to be sure, but what ones? Was not an Egyptian also an Ottoman? Could a Christian be an Ottoman? Or could a Muslim be anything but a Muslim; were not the Copts the only true Egyptians? What was India, what did it mean to be an Indian?- an entity imposed rather by a

conquering British government than by anything in nature. For the first time we are dealing not just with ethnic groups but with nations, not with ethnic feeling but with national feeling;and first the nations themselves had to be defined or invented. A nation, to serve as carrier for the modern institutions, might in principle be based on almost any common circumstances central enough to people's lives to make plausibly for a common fate; a common dynasty (the Ottoman?), a common faith (the Shir'a?), a common language (the Arabic dialects?) or even a common conqueror (the British?)."(Hodgson,Vol.III, 1974:246) This chapter will examine historical developments that shaped the choices made by Jews and Arabs as national identifications took form. Further, as European ideologies take hold, so do European definitions of Jew and of Arab. The 'civilizing mission' of the European, informed as it is with racist distortions of history and cultural realities in the Middle East, results in a European type of segregation of Jew and Arab in the Middle Eastern lands, distinct from the kinds of separateness and segregation that were a customary part of Middle Eastern societies. We will examine the participation of Jew and of Arab in this process and ascertain the benefits and the costs.

Arab Nationalisms: 1800-1914

Movements within as well as outside of Islam provide several perspectives on how Arab nationalism evolved. The

Wahabi movement of the eighteenth century was an attempt of Muslim reformers to 'remove the accretions and innovations beclouding the pure vision of Islam'. The Wahabi movement falls within the tradition of indigenous movements challenging uses and interpretations and political developments within the Islamic world that had sprung up since the days of Muhammad.

The late 1800's were a period in which the interrelation of movements within and outside of Islam are utilized in the attempt to resolve tensions that had evolved in the era of Ottoman Reform. The 1876 constitution promising representative government through parliamentary rule was welcomed by Muslim, Christian and Jew alike. Their enthusiasm represented a general willingness to support the concept of Ottomanism as a way of unifying the diverse peoples of the State. However, national rebellions in the Balkans and continual threats by Russia were used as justifications for the despotic rule of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), who suspended the constitution and dissolved the Parliament. Abdulhamid II utilized the concept of Pan-Islamism to justify massacres of Armenians, who were suspected of having formed allegiances with Russia, and political suppression of Arab reformers.

Westernization was one critical force determining the way in which nationalisms evolved in the Islamic lands. The Young Ottomans in the 1860's demanded 'liberal' reforms along occidental constitutional lines.(Hodgson, 1974:273)

The Koran and Hadith were interpreted as supportive of modern reform. One hadith for example is cited to corroborate that 'love of one's native place is a part of faith'. The Young Ottomans were suppressed by Abdulhamid who elicited the support of a conservative Muslim perspective, promoting a universal Muslim political solidarity. When military officers successfully restored the constitution in the Young Turk Rebellion of 1908, and had to confront the question of what kind of nation the constitution would represent, they chose the most compelling force of the times, modernization in the western sense, to shape their response.(Hodgson, 1974) They chose to subordinate religious and ethnic differences, shifting from the Islamic civilization of the past and accomodating to the dictates of the Europeanized elements of Ottoman society.(Hodgson, 1974) Some Jews and Arabs held high hopes for the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). However, as it became increasingly clear that the CUP defined Ottoman to mean Turkish, instituting Turkish as the official language and ensuring Turikish domination in Parliament, Arabs began to utilize earlier reform movements to resist.

In the traditional Islamic world relations between Jew and Arab are defined by Koran and hadith, teachings of the prophet and interpretations of those teachings. In the twentieth century relations between Jew and Arab were restructured by a new world order shaped in part by westernization. Westernization implied nationalism. Two

consequences unfolded in that process. First, we have
observed how intra-communally and inter-communally widening
class disparities created hostilities. In response to the
ensuing chaos, Jew, Christian and Muslim embraced
nationalisms as a way of protecting themselves. This
happened in one of several ways. Some became nationals of
European countries. For Jews and Arabs who did not have the
choice of becoming European nationals, Ottomanism held
promise of egalitarianism. As historical developments
evolved, Pan -Turanism (or Turkish dominance) propogated by
the CUP, proved disastrous to minority groups. The Young
Turk government, under pressure of European imperialism and
Balkan nationalism, assumed the character of a
'dictatorship' suppressing all minority rights. The
question of what kind of nationalism, if any, could be
supported by Jew and Arab alike, to their mutual benefit
depended upon the kinds of choices available to Jew and Arab
for ethnic, religious and economic survival. In other
words, could the Judeo-Arabic tradition and civilization
survive the process of westernization and concomitantly
nationalisms as peoples in the Middle Eastern lands tried to
create solutions that had cultural integrity and historical
validity for them? For the most part the challenge of
nationalism precipitated a crisis of divided loyalties. For
example, Jews and Arabs who became western educated were
challenged to reframe their relationship to traditional
Judeo-Arabic culture and history. Increasingly class

interests dictated allegiances. Jews and Arabs were

challenged to create and give allegiance to those forms of

nationalism most likely to protect their class interests.

One critical consequence within communities was alienation

of the lower classes for whom national identification was

for a long time irrelevant. A related consequence was a

growing separation of Arab and Jew from a common tradition

as both experienced the effects of historical developments

that were rendering that tradition increasingly invisible.

Further those historical developments threatened the very

basis of Judeo-Arabic civilization embedded in folk customs

and an agrarian way of life.

While many Arabs were not yet caught up in nationalism,

others reacted to the threat of Pan-Turanism as instituted

by the Young Turk government to Arab visibility and power.

In 1908 Arabs in Constantinople founded the Ottoman Arab

Brotherhood. The Ottoman Decentralization Party was formed

in 1912 by Syrians in Cairo.(Goldschmidt, 1979) The goal of

both groups was greater local autonomy, as a way of

weakening the central control of the government. The threat

of Pan-Turanism brought together Muslim and Christian Arab

with a platform calling for local general councils with

budgetary control, the right to legislate domestic affairs

in the Arab provinces and the institutionalization of Arabic

as the official language along with Turkish.(Mandel, 1976)

A secret society of mainly young Muslim Arabs, calling

itself al-Fatat,convened the first Arab Congress in Paris in

1913, demanding equal rights and cultural autonomy for Arabs. A third group, al-Ahd('covenant') was a secret society of Arab officers. Their aim was the creation of an Arab-Turkish European style monarchy . All groups were supported by educated Arabs in Ottoman cities and abroad. (Goldschmidt, 1979)

As noted above, along with political events that shaped the emerging Arab movement, sectarianism promoted by foreign intervention stimulated a different form of nationalism, a return to Islam. French ecclesiastical missions formed alliances with Maronite and Melchite clergy and promoted an education designed to foster allegiance to France. The Russians similarly supported the Greek Orthodox Arab population while Great Britain supported the Druze. American influence led to the creation of the Syrian Presbyterian Church.(Antonious, 1946) The strategy of gaining and maintaining political power in this way, of creating divided loyalties, was useful to the great powers in curtailing the ability of Arab nationalists to increase its membership. In the post World War One period however, political aspirations were to prevail over the forces of religious sectarianism. The disappointments of unkept promises by the Europeans and a continuing threat of colonial rule were the ultimate degradation to Arab Christian and Arab Muslim alike. Similarly, for many Jews the motivation to support nationalist movements in the Arab lands was a rejection of colonial rule. Those whose

interests were protected by colonial rule, whether Jew or Arab, were to suffer the consequences of divided loyalties both as anti-nationalists and as peoples torn within their own communities between two paths that held at once the promise of and the threat to, cultural, economic and religious survival.

Jewish Nationalisms: 1800-1914

Movements within as well as outside of the Jewish world affected how Jewish nationalism or Zionism evolved. Similarly to movements of 'purification' or 'return to sources' within Islam, Jewish sects have always existed promoting a kind of orthodoxy dependent upon return to geographic origins; to Zion, Jerusalem, the home of the first Temple. The necessity for return to the 'homeland' is based on a conceptualization of history that defines the Jews primarily as a people in exile. While embedded in religious ideology, this ideology did not permeate social or political ideology in the European lands. It was not relevant to Jews in Palestine in any social or political sense. However, historical developments in the European lands precipitated the evolution of political Zionism, just as political developments both within the Middle Eastern lands and in the European lands stimulated the emergence of Arab nationalism. In many ways Zionism in the twentieth century, the religious ideology, joined to the 'realpolitik' of European imperialism in the Middle East, worked to the

detriment of those Palestinian Jews most intimately connected to the land and to their Arab roots and culture.

Four general and connected forces outside of the Jewish world affected the way in which Jewish nationalism evolved. First a history of anti-Jewish activity stimulated by Christian religious ideology and acted out in political and non-political movements that cut Jews off from sources necessary to cultural, religious and economic survival as well as resulting in physical violence and death. Secondly nineteenth and twentieth century social movements for example, naturalism, social liberalism, the ideals of the Russian revolution, provided ideological fuel for some Jews who envisioned a new kind of society based on egalitarian principles ensuring economic, cultural, religious survival as an inherent privilege of all its members. A third critical force was the Zionism of non-Jews who, stimulated by the Protestant Reformation's renewal of the Old Testament believed that the second coming would happen when the Hebrew people returned to Zion and became Christians again. Finally, these words of the Earl of Shaftsbury written in 1876, characterize the fourth critical force affecting the evolution of Zionism, European Imperialism:"It would be a blow to England if either of her rivals (France and Russia) should get hold of Syria. Her Empire reaching from Canada in the west to Calcutta and Australia in the South-east would be cut in two. England does not covet any such territories, but she must see that they do not get in the

hands of rival Powers. She must preserve Syria to herself:
Does not policy then- if that were all- exhort England to
foster the nationality of the Jews and aid them, as
opportunity may offer, to return as a leavening power to
their old country? England is the great trading and
maritime power of the world. To England, then naturally
belongs the role of favoring the settlement of the Jews in
Palestine. The nationality of the Jews exists: the spirit
is there and has been there for 3,000 years, but the
external form, the crowing bond of union is still wanting.
A nation must have a country. The old land, the old people.
This is not an artificial experiment: it is nature, it is
history."(Esco, 1947:5)

In the 1880's political anti-semitism sprang up in
Russia, Germany, Austria and France. The politicized
Russian Jews driven west by the pogroms of 1881, were a
source of embarrassment to the Europeanized French and
German Jews who placed their hopes of leading a better life
on becoming 'Frenchmen (or Germans) of the Mosaic faith'.
To Theodore Herzl, founder of the official Zionist party,
both phenomena had equally disastrous consequences for Jews;
both were the result of anti-semitism and both threatened
Jewish cultural and religious survival. In Herzl's ideology
anti-semitism was the 'propelling force' which, like the
'wave of the future' would bring Jews into the promised
land.(Arendt, 1978:174) All historical experience was
reduced to the fact of anti-semitism as an entrenched and

unchanging force which set all non-Jews against all

Jews.(Arendt,1978) This notion of history, in which

particular historical circumstances of time and place are

superfluous, shaped the kinds of choices Herzl made and

became a tool for organizing support. Such reductionism was

to be costly for Middle Eastern Jewry, who had to pay the

price of historical invisibility and the cultural racism

that accompanied that particular aspect of Herzl's ideology.

Herzl's solution for the Jewish dilemma was the modern

solution of self-rule. Protected by a nation state, Jews

would be safe in Palestine where they would be unavailable

as scapegoats for domestic difficulties. Leo Pinsker's

Auto-Emancipation: An Admonition to His Brethren by a

Russian Jew and Herzl's The Jewish State, both encouraged

the notion that Jewish survival was dependent on the Jews

alone; that anti-semitism was 'the natural reaction of all

peoples to the very existence of Jews'.(Arendt, 1978:169)

Pinsker was elected President of the Hovevei Zion (Lovers of

Zion) movement in Russia that in 1884 began to raise funds

for settlements in Palestine.

Organization of Jewish settlement in Palestine then was

stimulated by movements reacting to anti-semitism. Another

facet of Zionism relied more on the stimulation of social

movements of the nineteenth century. The fundamental

principle of life according to Jewish law is social

responsibility and just conduct, the creation of an

egalitarian society. For many Jews Zionism and Socialism

had a common basis. Ber Borochov (1881-1917) attempted a synthesis of Marxism and Zionism which influenced the Russian Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) movement. Ber Borochov believed that the exclusion of Jews from "the most important, most influential and most stable branches of production" was at the root of their problem. (Esco, 1947:25) This problem was exacerbated by modern capitalism- large scale industrialization and monopoly setting Jewish capitalist against Jewish worker and the increasing competition between the 'native' worker and the 'alien' Jewish worker. He saw Zionism as a way of connecting Jews once again to the land and to basic modes of production. (Esco, 1947)

Another facet of the Zionist movement was based on a similar notion that the central element of Jewish national life is Jewish ethics. Asher Ginsberg (Ahad Ha'am) wrote in 1913 that the object of Zionism was the reconstruction of Jewish spiritual life through a national revival of Hebrew literature and thought in Palestine. At the Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901, Ahad Ha'am formed the 'Democratic Zionist Fraction' to call attention to the mandates of his cultural perspective. (Esco, 1947:45) In 1902, he had published 'Altneuland' in which he detailed his vision of a society without race laws based on economic justice and equality for women, where the Arab would be side by side with the Jew. (Ruppin, 1934; Patai, 1974) Spiritual Zionism and labor Zionism represented two of the ways that Zionism was an

attempt to create a new society shaped by universal values of social justice. Our analysis demonstrates that the combined forces of non-Jewish Zionism,the pressures of Imperial rule and the militarism of Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism inhibited and finally made impossible the institutionalization of those ideals within the Zionist movement.

Non-Jewish Zionism

Non-Jewish Zionism " took shape during four centuries of European religious, social, intellectual and political history through the interweaving of many different strands of western culture."(Sharif, 1983:9) The Protestant Reformation popularized the belief that the restoration of the dispersed Hebrew people and of the Hebrew language was necessary to prepare for the second coming of Christ. The revival of the Old Testament familiarized the west with the history and traditions of the Hebrews during the 1,000 years they were centered in the land of Palestine. The religious education of the Reformation period encouraged the notion that nothing of importance had happened in Palestine other than what was recorded in the Old Testament and that no other peoples existed there other than the Jews. The restoration of the Jews as a nation (Israel) in Palestine and the subsequent second coming, was predicated on their conversion to Christianity. Anti-Islamism was a corollary of this theory since Islam was held responsible for the

'ruin' of Palestine. Eighteenth century travel books described the indigenous Bedouin in terms consistent with European anti-semitic attitudes toward Jews as a 'very bad people', untrustworthy and destructive, parasites to the country.(Sharif, 1983:38)

This collusion of anti-semitism and anti-Arabism proved useful as a rationalization for British imperialism in the nineteenth century. The British, fearful of possible French control of the Mediterranean sea were anxious to solidify control of their trade routes to the Far East. In 1799 Napoleon had urged Jews of Africa and Asia to fight with him to re-establish control of Jerusalem. Moses Hess, in his Rome and Jerusalem (1862), quoted Ernest Laharanne, secretary to Napoleon III who asserted that the 'Middle East's decadent civilization could be saved only by an injection of European civilization and hence all of Europe must support the Jewish acquisition of Palestine from the Ottoman Empire.'(Sharif, 1983:53) Embedded in this philosophy and political strategizing was the imperative that Jewish survival be dependent upon the Europeanization of the Jew. That is, as a symbol of Europeanism, in spite of the inherent racism implied, Jews might take advantage of great power diplomacy to achieve their national goals.

The strategic importance of Palestine for British trade was the background for British pressure on the Ottoman sultan to allow emigration of Jews to Palestine. Laurence Oliphant, a non-Jewish Zionist and member of Parliament

proposed in 1880 that Jews settle on the east of the Jordan
River. The Bedouins were to be driven out and placed on
reserves. Oliphant made contact with the Love of Zion
movement, East European Jews escaping pogroms after Tsar
Alexander's assassination in 1881. Lord Anthony Ashley
Cooper, seventh Earl of Shaftsbury (1801-1885), another
vocal non Jewish Zionist, rejected civil or political
emancipation for Jews in England on the basis of preserving
religious integrity in Parliament. For him and for other
non Jewish Zionists restitution of the Jews in Palestine was
the only way that Jews would not always remain aliens.
Furthermore, during the late 1800's and early 1900's
unwanted immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe was met
with an anti-semitic immigration and civil rights policy.
Lord Arthur James Balfour, head of the government (1903)
promulgated the 1905 Aliens Act to save England from 'the
undoubted evils that had fallen upon the country from an
immigration which was largely Jewish."(Sharif, 1983:75)
Cooper was the first to formulate the slogan to describe
Palestine: 'A country without a nation for a nation without
a country' that became popularized by Herzl as 'A Land
without a people for a people without a Land'.(Sharif,
1983:42) While Zionism remained a dormant movement
throughout the nineteenth century among Jews, non-Jewish
Zionists popularized and supported Zionism as a branch of
British imperialism. For those Jews who emigrated to
Palestine in the first Aliyah, Zionism was relevant as an

indigenous Jewish attempt to build a safe society based on principles of social justice culled from Jewish traditions and revolutionary movements of the times. However, when the first Zionist Congress met in Basle in August, 1897, a primary force endorsing the historical necessity for reconstituting a Jewish state in Palestine was the tradition of non-Jewish Zionism in the 1800's.

Zionist Goals

Contrary methodological perspectives presented themselves at meetings of the Zionist Congress . Herzl argued that the aim of Zionists ought to be to obtain a 'legally secured home for the Jewish people in Palestine'. The Revisionists, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940) wanted a more forceful approach demanding "a Jewish state within its historic boundaries", obtained through a mass evacuation of Jews from Europe and the use of military force. The cultural Zionists supported a cultural renascence in Palestine. The 'practical' Zionists argued that Jews ought to begin the work of reconstituting the Jewish nation in Palestine without waiting for diplomatic approval. (Halpern, 1969) After Herzl's death in 1904, under the leadership of Chaim Weizmann, practical achievements in Palestine became the focus for achieving political success.(Arendt, 1978)

Along with divergent views on the meaning of Jewish nationalism, Zionists held divergent views toward the Arabs

commensurate with their politics. The Social-Democratic Poalei Zion party along with other 'labor' Zionists identified their interests with those of the local Palestinian population;Arab and Jewish. The cultural Zionists led by Ahad Ha'am had similar views, rejecting conflict and animosity as a basis for a Jewish national revival. Embedded in the notion that the essential message of Judaism was that of the Prophets- peace and good will , these Zionists stressed the common semitic origins and cultural similarities of Jew and Arab. They created an ambiance and a tradition that provided the background for the Bi-nationalists in the 1940s whose platform and influence will be discussed later. These Jews understood the necessity to maintain the common heritage, traditions and language of Palestinian Arab and Palestinian Jew .(Ro'i, 1982:51)

The 'practical' Zionists worked for good relations with the Arabs to make their task of Jewish colonization easier. Herzl and after him Weizmann subordinated the Arab 'question' to the 'higher goal' of achieving diplomatic leverage with the Europeans. Yet Herzl was aware of the necessity of reassuring the Arabs. In 1899 he wrote to Arab leaders stating that the Zionists did not intend to expropriate Palestine. He asserted an oft repeated argument that Jewish resources brought into Palestine would benefit the non- Jews. Yet, during the early stages of the Zionist movement, the Arab problem was not considered important. In

the wake of a series of articles published in the Jewish

nationalist periodical, _Hashiloah_, on the subject of the

possible danger to Zionism of the Arab Nationalist movement,

the subject was raised by Max Nordau at the seventh Zionist

Congress at Basle,in July 1905. The Actions Committee was

instructed to organize a political commission to decide the

official attitude of the Congress toward Arab nationalism.

The subject was not raised again until after the Young Turk

Revolution, July 1908.(Ro'i, 1982:16)

However when in the winter of 1912-1913, two new

nationalist groups were formed, the Decentralization Party

and the Beirut Reform Committee,the scope of the Arab

national movement became increasingly apparent to the

Zionists. Increased activity was documented through the

Palestine Office in Jaffa, set up by the Eighth Zionist

Congress in 1908 and headed by Dr. Arthur Ruppin. One of

the functions of the Palestine Office was to report on the

Arab press and to translate into Hebrew articles on Jews and

Zionism . In 1913, Radler-Feldmann, for whom a fusion of

the two national groups was a necessary Zionist objective

wrote: "In Palestine we can hear two contradictory

opinions: the one underrating the Arab question , the other

perhaps exaggerating it...The fact is that approximately

thirty years ago our leading thinkers felt themselves

attracted (in the first instance platonically) by the Arabs

as a related race and by Islam as a religion close to

Judaism. In practice, however, the Jews who came here

within the last thirty years (those who came earlier adopted a different attitude) were unable - for reasons I cannot explain here- to establish friendly relations with the Arabs. At the moment their hatred against us is being fanned by the press and animosity is becoming more frequent. Altogether, it must be accepted that two nations such as the Jews and the Arabs can only live side by side either in friendship or in enmity. A third relationship, one of indifference, does not exist."(Ro'i, 1982:52) In April 1911 surveys of the Arab Press documented a range of attitudes toward Zionism in Christian and Muslim newspapers. Sephardi Jews some of whom were editors of Haherut, which attempted to make Zionists aware of what Arabs thought and wrote about them, warned that European Jews were not aware enough of conditions in Palestine. Ruppin hoped to encourage friendly relations with the Arab population by starting an Arabic newspaper in Jerusalem and suggesting that land be settled by Jews who knew Arabic and Arab customs.(Ro'i, 1982)

In conclusion, Jewish nationalisms and Arab nationalisms evolved out of conditions and circumstances both within and outside of Judaism and the Jewish world and within and outside of Islam and the Islamic world. Sectarian movements in both religions, calling for a return to a pure Islam or a pure Judaism, stimulated Islamic revival and the notion of return to Zion. Religious sectarianism joined with political power was a stimulant to both nationalisms.

Dependence on diplomacy with the great powers as a modus vivendi had ambiguous results for the early stages of both the Arab Nationalist and Jewish Nationalist movements. The European governments utilized Arab nationalism to obtain their goal of breaking the alliance of Turkey with Germany in 1914. Britain was not, however, prepared to award the Arabs their independence as had been promised. The identification of Zionism with imperial interests, significantly hurt them in their relations with the Arabs and allowed more militaristic elements to prevail.

Finally, the absorption and/or use of European ethnocentrism and racism by European educated Jews and the absorption and/or use of Christian anti-semitism by westernized Arabs,(Lewis, 1984:171) creates tensions between both groups and inhibits communication at a time when historical developments require of Jew and Arab a particularly acute sense of common history and tradition, common problems and common goals.

Ottoman Policy and the attitude of Arab Nationalists toward Jewish immigration, land settlement and Zionism, pre World War I

The Ottoman policy toward Jewish immigration in the 1880's was influenced by internal and external threats to hegemony: loss of territories in the Balkans as a result of national uprisings, the issue of great power control of Jerusalem raised by the Crimean War and the intrusion of the

European Empires into the Ottoman lands though the

Capitulations.(Mandel, 1976) Fearing Jewish immigration

meant more foreign control the Ottoman government mandated

foreign Jews become Ottoman subjects and not live in

concentrated groups or receive any special privileges. To

local craftspeople and merchants the increasing visibility

of Jews from Europe whose population in Jerusalem between

1881 and 1891 rose from 13,920 to 25,322, represented an

economic threat. In June of 1891 a telegram was sent by a

group of Arab notables to the Grand Vezir requesting

prohibition of settlement by Russian Jews. In March of 1884

Palestine was closed to Jewish business people on the

grounds that the Capitulations did not apply to Jerusalem

which was not an area 'appropriate for trade'. Jewish

pilgrims were allowed to enter, but only for thirty days. In

November of 1882 the Mutasarif of Jerusalem had been ordered

to stop the sale of miri (state)land to Jews, even if they

were Ottoman subjects. In both cases pressure by the

European states persuaded the Porte (heads of state) to

grant concessions: administrative regulations were lax or

were lifted and Jews continued both to conduct business and

to purchase land. By the time of the first Zionist Congress

in 1897, there were 50,000 Jews in Palestine and eighteen

new settlements.(Mandel, 1976:20)

Who among the Arab population supported Jewish

immigration and who resisted? In 1901 the Jewish

Colonization Association (founded by Baron Maurice de

Hirsch, 1891) was permitted to buy land in the Vilayet of Beirut. The Ottoman land code of 1867 allowed purchase of land but prohibited settlement. Although the transaction was not carried out Arab peasants were aware of the proceedings. Furthermore, the Bank , Anglo-Palestine Company, by lending to the Mutasarriflik of Palestine, was able to carry out land purchases without difficulty. In March of 1908 resistance to settlement erupted in violence resulting in the deaths of thirteen Jews and one Muslim. By 1908 approximately 10,000 Jewish settlers lived in Jewish colonies.(Mandel, 1976:26,28)

Tensions between rural Arabs and Jews erupting as early as 1886 had two immediate sources. Grazing rights, rights of access and the acquired right to a winter crop when a piece of land had been sown during the summer, were some of the customary practices regarding land use often violated by the settlers. In addition, land bought by settlers had often been lost by default to Arab moneylenders. Disputes arose because often moneylenders sold more than was their right to sell. Ironically local traditions, described as 'Arab' had evolved out of relations between Jews and Arabs for centuries. Shared agricultural practices were part of a folk heritage that sustained Jew and Arab, neighbors on the land, and produced mutually beneficial relations.

One issue contributing to this problem was the European definition of Jew and Arab. Europeans misunderstood Arab-Jewish customary practices or ignored them. European

definitions of land use, property rights and ownership prevailed and were resisted, at the expense of the indigenous Arab Jew and Judeo-Arabic heritage. However, that relations between European Jews and Arabs improved is testimony to the continuing possibility that ancient traditions can become relevant in a new context.

Government officials, members of the Administrative Council and law courts were among those who opposed Ottoman laxity toward Jews. Their antagonism was supported by Christian Arabs and those among the Catholics and Greek Orthodox who resented Jewish progress and were economic competitors. Their resistance was fed by anti-semitism propagated by foreign missionaries and priests who instigated hatred of the Jews among Arabs. For example in 1897, Pe're Henn Cammens, a Belgian who taught at the Jesuit University of Beirut published an anti-Jewish article, "Zionism and the Jewish colonists" in which he described the Jews of Jerusalem as 'recognizable...by their repulsive grubbiness and above all by that famous Semitic nose, which is not like the Greek nose, a pure myth."(Mandel, 1976:53) Members of foreign consulates and foreign banks passed on European prejudices to local Arabs and to the Ottoman authorities. Referring to the Templars, Protestants from Germany who settled in Palestine, it was written that: "Jerusalem already possess its German anti-semitic club." Anti-Jewish pressure by these groups on the

Mutasarif of Jerusalem encouraged misgivings.

(Mandel,1976:54)

Two related trends regarding Jewish/Arab relations characterize the period immediately following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Motivated by attitudes similar to those of the Ottoman government, Dr. Nasim Bey of the Committee of Union and Progress (the organization created by "Turkish" nationalists who took control in 1908) wrote to Zionist official Max Nordau in 1908 that arrangements would be made for settlement of up to 100,000 Jews in the thirty-two provinces of the Empire. He emphasized as had the Ottomans, that foreign Jews must live in scattered groups, and were not to form another national entity in the Empire.(Mandel, 1976:60) (Furthermore, the policy of scattering ethnic groups was consistent with Ottoman policy in general.) At the same time Arab Jews, Muslims and Christians heralded the revolution by founding a joint branch of the CUP and a literary political club, the Jerusalem Patriotic Society. Fellahin (peasants) joined by Jewish settlers, formed a society to promote their own interests.(Mandel,1976:63)

However, the impact of such joint activities among Arab and Jew was moderated by the activities of Zionists of the second Aliyah who put a damper on Arab-Jewish relations in this period. Parading the Zionist flag in Jaffa and insisting on the election of Zionist deputies to the Ottoman parliament to promote their claims to Palestine, they stimulated misgivings among Arabs and among the CUP founders

who could not afford to alienate the Arab deputies by deferring to the Zionists.(Mandel, 1976)(Esco, 1947)

In addition, anti-Zionist activity was stimulated when Arabs, disillusioned with the return of the Committee of Union and Progress to the centralist (that is, reinforcing control by the central government rather than local control) policies of the Ottomans and subsequent repressive policies, suspected the CUP of supporting the Zionists for economic reasons. Furthermore, even Arab notables loyal to the CUP were among those who believed that Zionism was a danger to the State.

In this period the emerging Arab press also criticized Zionist goals. Along with two small papers, al-Quds in Jaffa and Al-Asma'i in Jaffa, al-Karmil (Haifa) had a significant influence on leaders of the Arab movement, and Filastin (Jaffa), although hostile to Arab nationalism, strongly criticized Jewish immigration. (Mandel, 1976) (Porath, 1974) Of the Zionists, al-Asma'i noted: 'They harm the local population and wrong them, by relying on the special rights accorded to foreign powers in the Ottoman Empire and on the corruption and treachery of the local administration. Moreover, they are free from most of the taxes and heavy impositions on Ottoman subjects. Their labor competes with the local population and creates their own means of sustenance. The local population cannot stand up to their competition.'(Mandel,1976:81) They encouraged their readers to buy goods produced by Arabs, advocated that

wealthy Arabs promote local commerce and industry and that
the Arab fellahin learn techniques used by Jews. The anti-
Zionist position of Najib Nassar, a Muslim and editor of <u>al-</u>
<u>Karmil</u> was adopted by leaders of the Arab movement in Syria
and others influenced by his publication of an anti-Zionist
book. (Mandel, 1976) Nassar also joined the movements
active in northern towns boycotting Jewish goods and
refusing housing to Jews. Sheikh Sulayman al-Taji al
Faruqi, a popular Muslim anti-Zionist in Jaffa organized the
Patriotic Ottoman Party and in July, 1913 attempted to
organize representatives of Palestinian towns to resist land
purchase by Jews. (Porath, 1974:29)

Ottoman Jews were also among those resisting Zionism.
The strongest base of organized opposition against Zionism
by Ottoman Jews was in Salonika where Jews and Donmes,
members of a Judeo-Islamic snycretist sect, were a majority
of the population. Other indigenous Jews against Zionism
were graduates of the Alliance Israelite Universelle. The
Alliance opposed Zionism as contradictory to its aims of
improving Jewish life in the Diaspora. A third group
opposing Zionism were members of the Club des Intimes, a
Jewish society supporting Ottomanization.(Flapan, 1979)

Anti-Zionist activity was promulgated by some British
and French who asserted that Zionism was a front for German
influence in the Empire. The threat to the Triple Entente
(Great Britain, France, Russia) of the Triple Alliance
(Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy) dominated Great Power

politics in relation to the Arabs, as did tensions between Great Britain, France and Russia for control in the Middle Eastern lands.

On the other hand, political tensions between rival European powers could benefit the Zionist cause. For example, financially bankrupt after the first Balkan war and denied financial aid from its usual sources, the CUP was willing to moderate their opposition to Zionism in the hope of finding other sources of aid. The need for capital was one factor motivating the proposal of a Muslim-Jewish alliance by members of the CUP's Central Committee in 1913. At the same time, some Arabs involved in movements calling for reform within the Empire, the Ottoman Arab brotherhood, Beirut Reform Society and Decentralization Party mentioned previously, suggested that an alliance between Arabs and Zionists was a necessity.(Mandel,1976:152) Some Decentralists were impressed by Jewish achievements in Palestine and believed that their capital and knowledge could contribute to the advancement of the Arab provinces and the party's goal of Arab self rule within the State. Because few members of the Decentralization Party were from Palestine, they were able to view the Zionist question in a Pan-Arab context: that is, able to benefit the Arab provinces as a whole without focusing on the unique issues and consequences for Palestine.(Mandel, 1976)

The First Arab Congress met in June of 1913 in the hope of putting pressure on the Ottoman government and enlisting

support for Arab demands for reform within the Empire.
Among delegates to the Congress were those who supported the
Jews as well as those who were strongly anti-Zionist. In an
effort to reconcile conflicting views, the Chairman of the
Congress, Al-Zahrawi, subsequently made the following
statement, published in July in Le Jeune-Turc:'In the course
of the Congress, I presented a new formula which had
considerable success because it accorded perfectly with the
mentality and the spirit of the delegates, namely: The Jews
of the whole world are but Syrian emigres, like the Syrian
Christian emigres in America, Paris and elsewhere. Like them
(the Jews) are also nostalgic for the country of their
birth. We are quite sure that our Jewish brethren in the
whole world will lend us their support to bring about the
triumph of our common cause for the material and moral
rehabilitation of our common land.'(Mandel, 1976:162)

The principal negotiator involved in mediating between
Turks and Arabs and hoping to assist both groups in reaching
an agreement with the Zionists was Sami Hochberg, editor of
a Zionist sponsored newspaper, Le Jeune-Turc. After the
First Arab Congress, the Zionists continued to influence the
Ottoman government to relax restrictions on settlement and
purchase of land and discouraged Hochberg from making an
agreement with the Arab nationalists. Furthermore, once the
Arab Congress had negotiated an agreement with the CUP, its
efforts toward an agreement with Zionists
waned.(Mandel,1976)

An alliance with the Ottoman government was important to Zionists because in order to assure financial support from European Jews they had to ensure the ability of those Jews to settle in Palestine. However, as the government relaxed restrictions, Arabs in the Empire, particularly in Palestine, became increasingly alarmed. Anti-Zionist activities increased and resulted in the killing of an Arab and a Jew in July of 1914. The following statement by _Falastin_ after being closed down by the government, aptly characterizes the ideological basis of Arab resistance to Zionism during this period: 'It seems that in the opinion of the Central Government we have done a serious thing in drawing attention of the nation to the danger threatened by the advancing tide of Zionism, for in the course of last week the Local Authorities received a telegram from the Ministry of the Interior ordering the suppression of our paper _Palestine_ and our committal for trial as having committed in our campaign against Zionism and our appeal to the national spirit an offense which they term "sowing discord between the elements of the Empire."...This is mighty well; still better is the acknowledgement by the Government of the Zionist society as one of the elements of the Empire, in which she shows more devotion to their cause than the Zionists themselves....They cry in their meetings, declare in their conferences, and announce in the highways and byways of Palestine, nay from the very housetops that they are a political party whose aim is to restore Palestine

to their nation and concentrate them in it, and to keep it exclusively for them. Then comes the Government saying, "No, you are on the contrary one of the elements of our happy empire, and he who opposes you is in our sight a criminal bent on causing strife between those elements." (Mandel, 1976:180)

The editors of Falastin asserted that 'Zionist' was not synonymous with 'Jew' and that the wave of immigrants (second Aliyah 1904) sought national autonomy, lived separately and discouraged Jews from mixing with Muslims and Christians. Under the pressure of Muslim and Christian notables in Jaffa, Falastin was reopened.(Mandel, 1976)

Nahum Sokolow of the Zionist Executive delegation in an evaluation of Arab-Jewish relations published in April 1913 suggested that: "the Arabs should regard the Jews, not as foreigners, but as fellow-Semites 'returning home', equipped with European skills which could be of immense worth to the local population. If Jewish immigration was hindered, the land would remain desolate and of no value to anyone. If it went ahead, Arabs and Jews would prosper together. To that end Arabic would be taught in Jewish schools; a health campaign would be begun; social services, including hostels for the poor of all creeds would be launched' and new branches of the Anglo-Palestine Company would be opened to offer the local population long-term credit at low rates of interest." Rafiq Bey al-Azm responded by pointing out that the Zionists separated themselves from the local population

and endangered it economically and politically by encouraging great power occupation of the country. He encouraged Zionists to integrate by becoming Ottoman subjects, to work with the local population by creating joint economic ventures and integrated schools. (Mandel, 1976:189)

The threat of Great Power occupation again influenced developments at this juncture. The CUP had hoped for an agreement between Arabs and Zionists, which would ensure Jewish financial aid to the Empire. By the summer of 1914, war was imminent in Europe and the Arab movement had escalated. At that point the CUP wanted Jewish capital for itself and hoped to block the Arabs from allying themselves with the Zionists.

Arabs viewed an alliance with the Zionists in a variety of ways. Some Muslims encouraged an alliance on the basis that Christian Arabs wanted the Great Powers to occupy Palestine and that this was not in the interest of either Jew or Muslim. They encouraged Jews and Muslims to work together to defeat the Turks. Others encouraged an alliance of Christian, Muslim and Jew against the Ottoman government. In July Nahum Sokolow and Dr. Victor Jacobson, Zionist organization representative in Constantinople, forwarded the following proposals to the Decentralist Party in Cairo:

1. The Arabs and Jews are from one stock (jins), and each people possess attributes complementary to the other. The Jews have knowledge, funds and influence; while the Arabs

have a vast land (bilad), awesome power, cultural treasures and inexhaustible material wealth. Therefore a reconciliation (tawfiq) between both (peoples) will be to the good of both and to the good of all the Orient.

2. The Arabs will receive the Jews in Arab lands as their brethren, on condition that the Jews become Ottoman subjects and that Palestine will not be exclusively theirs.

3. In exchange, the Jews pledge to put their cultural and material power at the service of the Arab cause; they will support the Arab groups (ahzab) and place at their disposal three million guineas.

4. An Arab-Jewish conference will be held in Egypt when the Syrian and Iraqi deputies return from Constantinople to their lands (that is to say during the summer parliamentary recess).(Mandel, 1976:198) These proposals built upon existing openings in both movements for rapproachment, based on reciprocity in regard to respective needs and goals.

In response, the Decentralist Party insisted that the Zionists meet first with Arabs in Palestine and then with Arab nationalists from all groups, since the Zionist question concerned first of all the local population in Palestine and secondly the Arab question in general. In the meantime, Zionists in Palestine were negotiating for a meeting with Palestinians; a meeting that was delayed in the face of opposition by both Arab notables and Zionists in Palestine who felt that the meeting was unnecessary, and that both were acting in accord with orders from the Ottoman

government. The general view of Zionists who were wary of the outcome of the proposed meeting was to avoid 'a confrontation' with the Arabs at this time. The First world war erupted on Aug. 4, 1914, halting all further negotiations toward an Arab-Zionist alliance.

In conclusion pre World War One relations between Zionists and Arabs were shaped by four related factors: resistance to settlement, the cultural gap between indigenous and European Jew, external and internal political pressures and conditions generated in the reform era. Settlement affected Palestinians most directly and was eventually a major reason why Palestinians began to see the "need to rely upon ourselves and to stop expecting everything from the government." (Mandel , 1976) While Zionists argued their financial resources would improve conditions in Palestine, benefits did not filter down to the peasantry. In fact, the Zionists did not make efforts to raise the promised capital for the State in general.

Cultural differences between European and indigenous Jews as well as between settlers and Arabs strongly affected relations between Zionists and the indigenous population. European Jewish settlers were not familiar with customary practices. Some brought European racist attitudes toward Arabs and toward their co-religionists, the Palestinian Jew. In general Zionists brought an ideological framework appropriate in the historical context of their European experience, but not appropriate to prevalent conditions and

developments in Palestine. The attempt to impose a social structure based on an ideological framework external to the environment they were inhabiting was experienced as an intrusion.

Furthermore the Zionist movement was affected by conditions evolving in the nineteenth century 'era of reform'. European states fostered sectarianism as a way of controling indigenous populations. Competition between the ayans, new class of urban notable representing the Ottoman government and rural sheikhs for power and control of land, hurt the peasantry. The pressures of land reforms had resulted in peasants giving title to absentee landlords. And unfair practices by Arab moneylenders fed into conflicts that arose between Zionists and rural Arabs over land ownership. Economic competition was stimulated by the Capitulations which created a new class of wealthy Christians, Jews and Muslims, connected to the European states. Christian Arabs perceived Zionists as a threat to economic security.

External and internal pressure;national revolts and wars in which vast territories were lost, left the Ottoman Empire bankrupt and therefore vulnerable to Great Power pressure. Zionists were perceived by the CUP as a possible source of financial support, but at the same time were perceived by some Muslim Arabs as aiding European occupation.

As part of the Reform Era, a final internal political development was critical to the way in which Arab and Jewish relations evolved in this period. Ottomanism represented the solution of the Ottoman government to the pressure of rising nationalisms, that is, Ottomanism would guarantee civil liberties to its citizens; to all those inhabiting the Ottoman lands. The Young Turk Revolution overthrew the despotic Abdulhamid and restored the promised constitution. This event was welcomed by Arab-Christian,Muslim and Jew alike. The CUP however, instead of carrying out its stated goals, replaced Ottomanism with the concept of Turanism. Disappointment and frustration at lack of power within the new government and resistance to centralization of power within the Empire, were major stimulae to the young Arab Nationalist movement. The CUP courted the Arab Nationalists at the expense of the Zionists and courted the Zionists at the expense of the Arab Nationalists. Finally, the government was not able to satisfy the demands of Arab Nationalist or Zionist. The First World War presented a greater threat to the Ottoman government than either.

Along with outer events working against rapprochment, the range of perspectives within the Arab National Movement and within the Zionist movement weakened the possibility for an entente between the two. Some Decentralists believed the Zionists could be useful to their cause. Their perspective was pan-Arabist, hence did not focus on the particular ramifications of Zionism for Palestinians.

Muslim and Christian Arab Nationalists represented in the increasingly vocal Arab press, warned of the dangers of Zionism and admonished Arab notables for their laxity in recognizing those dangers. By 1914, unease about the expanding Jewish community in Palestine had materialized in the form of strong anti-Zionist polemics. Those Palestinian Arabs who, in support of Ottomanism, perceived the Zionists as a threat to national unity, increasingly focused on 'Palestinian' national identity. While in 1911 the Ottoman Patriotic Party was formed in reaction to Zionist groups in Palestine, in 1914, the newspaper <u>Falastin</u> summoned Palestinians to form a Palestinian Patriotic Company.(Mandel, 1976) As the Decentralist faction moved closer to entente many Palestinian Arabs moved further from a pan-Arab national perspective toward a specifically Palestinian national perspective. Finally, Arab nationalists, Ottoman Loyalists and Palestinian Arab Nationalists were united in their increasing fear that Zionists sought a Jewish state in Palestine; and that they were establishing independent institutions of self-government and self-defense. This was based on their observations that by 1914 few Zionists had become Ottoman subjects; they taught Hebrew and not Arabic in their schools, had financial resources and were representatives of Great Power influence in Palestine.

On the other hand, conditions in the first decade of the twentieth century were very favorable for Arab-Zionist rapprochement. Arabs sought independence from the Turks and needed Zionist financial aid. Jews needed Arab cooperation in acquisition of land and settlement. Given these factors, diplomatic decisions were crucial. Unfortunately, those Zionists and Arab Nationalists who did support each other's movements were not significant enough in numbers or power to influence political action by either. Developments by 1914 made clear Arab resistance to Jewish immigration to Palestine and land purchase and Zionist determination to pursue both.

Social, Religious, Economic Consequences of World War One and Aftermath for Arab-Jew Relations

The Ottoman State entered the War of 1914 in alliance with the Germans hoping to reconquer Egypt from the British, and use German resources to hold together what was left of the State.(Goldschmidt, 1979) In response to the Turco-German invasion of Sinai in 1914 Britain made contact with Sharif Husayn the Emir of Mecca, Arab leader of the Hijaz (western Arabia).Sharif Husayn of the Hashemites, clan of the Prophet, had long struggled with the Ottoman sultan who had appointed a local governor in the Hijaz. The Sharif and his son opposed the centralizing policies of the CUP. Abdallah's close ties with Arab nationalist societies in Syria had prompted him to seek support from the British

consul-general Lord Kitchener in early 1914. Although
initially unresponsive, a British/Arab alliance against the
Ottoman Empire could prove useful to both.(Goldschmidt,
1979)

Formal relations between Britain and Sharif Husayn took
the form of an exchange of letters between Husayn and Sir
Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt. McMahon
assured Husayn that in exchange for collaboration in
defeating the Turks: "Great Britain is prepared to recognize
and uphold the independence of the Sharif of
Mecca".(Hourani,1946:41) Husayn was concerned about
ambiguity concerning status of the Syrian coastlands,
problematic for Britain because of the interest of France in
maintaining control of Syria. Husayn hesitated to make a
commitment to Great Britain until the fate of Syria and
therefore Palestine, an administrative unit of Syria, was
clear. But increasing repression by the Ottoman regime put
pressure on Husayn to move. In the summer of 1916, Muslim
and Christian Arab nationalists were executed for
'treasonable participation in activities of which the aims
were to separate Syria, Palestine and Iraq from the Ottoman
Sultanate and to constitute them into an independent state.'
(Antonious, 1946:189)

Two developments in 1916 and 1917 further fed the
hesitation of Husayn and other Arab leaders to trust the
British. In May, 1916, in response to French cognizance of
the negotiations between the British and Husayn, Sir Mark

Sykes representing the British, and M.Georges Picot, representing the French, concluded an agreement that protected the interests of France, Britain and Russia, in the Ottoman territories. The Sykes-Picot agreement divided the Fertile Crescent into zones. The interior of Syria and Vilayet of Mosul were to be recognized as independent, in the form of a single state or a confederation of states. Great Britain had privileges in the territory that became Transjordan along with a a strip of territory in the south of the Vilayet of Mosul. France maintained similar privileges in the remainder of the territory. France and Britain were to negotiate the status of coastal Syria and the Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra respectively. In what became Palestine, the Sharif of Mecca and others were to consult on the form of international administration; Great Britain was given jurisdiction over Haifa and Acre.(Antonious,1946, Esco,1947, Goldschmidt,1979)

The second factor affecting negotiations between Britain and the Arabs was the publication of the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Imminent war precipitated the possibility of a new connection between the Zionist leadership and the British. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the British had increasingly viewed connection with the Zionists as a liability in their relations with the Arabs. The Zionist movement itself was divided; while the strategy of neutrality had been adopted in order to gain support of the international community,

Weizman believed in 1915 that with Turkey on the side of the Central Powers, the British would try to prevent any other power from occupying her trade routes. Hence his suggestion that the Zionists help secure Britain's position in return for permission to develop Palestine under a British protectorate. (Flapan,1979) Sykes was anxious to acquire Zionist assistance to free Britain from agreements made with the French in 1916 (Sykes-Picot).

A British-Zionist alliance was resisted for several reasons. Some non-Zionist British Jews, including Claude G. Montefiore, President of the Anglo-Jewish Association, took the position of the assimilationists, that political Zionism threatened the rights of Jews as citizens and nationals of the countries where they resided. Some British non-Jews anticipated further problems between the British and the rest of the Arab world. Bernard Lazare was the proponent of a view in the late nineteenth century that was assumed by some leaders of the Zionists such as Dr. Nahum Goldman. Lazare believed that a national movement among Jews had to be a movement by the people, for the people, of the people (Arendt,1978). He was forced to resign from the Zionist party in 1899 because of his strong opposition to the policy of dependence on Great Power diplomacy to secure national goals. Lazare felt that Weizmann's diplomatic maneuvers were a sign of Weizmann's condescending attitude toward the masses. Some Zionist leaders continued to stress the necessity for the Zionist movement to view itself as one

with the struggle of all minorities for cultural autonomy and civic equality. A Jewish national homeland, they insisted, must be based on human rights and democracy, a thesis opposed to the goals of imperial politics.

However, Weizmann and British negotiators were steeped in the nineteenth mentality that supported imperialism: the belief in Europe's 'civilizing mission among the 'backward peoples' of the Middle East. Hence the view that Zionism would overcome the stagnation of the desert with efficiency, economic stability and education. British supporters of the Balfour Declaration hoped that Britain's strategic goals in the Middle East; to secure her position in Egypt and her overland link with the East would be furthered by support of Zionism.(Antonious, 1946) The British were concerned that negotiations between the Zionists and the CUP for a 'Turkish Balfour Declaration' would threaten their goals. They hoped to win over Jews in allied countries hostile toward Russia by giving them a reason to support the allied cause. With much discussion back and forth of wording, the Balfour Declaration was issued on November 2, 1917:'His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object,it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights

and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other
country.'(Antonious,1946:266)

The Balfour Declaration solidified anti-Zionist
attitudes that had been germinating since the turn of the
century. Three events were meant to allay Arab mistrust of
Great Power motivations following disclosure of Sykes-Picot
and the subsequent release of the Balfour Declaration. In
response to protest and recapitulation of Arab demands for
independence by seven Arab officials, the British
Declaration to the Seven renewed Great Britain's commitment
to Arab freedom from Turkish rule and subsequent
independence. (Antonious,1946) Secondly, President Wilson's
Mt. Vernon address, in July of 1918 stated that post-war
settlement would be based upon 'the free acceptance of that
settlement by the people immediately concerned'.
(Hourani,1946) Finally in November 1918, an Anglo-French
Declaration was circulated in Palestine, and other parts of
Syria defining the goals of the allies in the East as 'the
complete and final liberation of the peoples oppressed by
the Turks and the establishment of national governments and
administrations deriving authority from the free initiative
and choice of the populations.'(Hourani,1946)

Based on these reassurances, and responding to
repression of Arab nationalists by Jemal Pasha, Sharif
Husayn and his sons joined the allies and led the Arab
Revolt against the Turks. At the end of the war, with the
population suffering from hunger, plagues and corruption,

and the Turkish troops out of the Hijaz, Britain and France
set up provisional governments, leaving the cities of
Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Damascus and Transjordan to Amir Faisal,
son of King Husayn.(Antonious,1946, Hourani, 1946)

The Arab nationalists had at this point to confront the
determination of France to control the northern half of
Syria and to ignore the promises of Great Britain to Sharif
Husayn. Some Lebanese Christians supported France rather
than give power to the ruling family of Hijaz. Some Arab
nationalists preferred a separate Syrian state to a
confederation with the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula. The
American King-Crane Commission based on a tour of Syria,
including Palestine, in the summer of 1919 recommended
separate mandates for Iraq and Syria, to be treated as a
single geographical unit, with Amir Faisal as King of Syria.
Polls demonstrated preference for a U.S. mandate for Syria
and Great Britain in Iraq. The report, reflecting
indigenous opposition to the French and to the Zionists, was
ignored until three years later .(Hourani,1946:52)

In 1920, Syrian notables met in Damascus and proclaimed
Faisal king of Syria and Palestine. The British and French,
preparing to decide the fate of the Ottoman territories at
the San Remo Conference, proposed French and British
mandates and Britain reasserted its obligation to carry out
the policy of the Balfour Declaration. Faisal was 'deposed'
and a final settlement negotiated by the Allied powers
determined the status of Syria. The northern part of Syria

(including Lebanon) was to give way to gradual self government. In southern Syria, Palestine- the mandate was given full administrative control with provision for the promise of the Balfour Declaration to help in the construction of a Jewish national home in the British area west of Jordan. The region east of Jordan referred to as 'Transjordan' and administered by Faisal's government from 1918-1920, was given to his brother Abdullah, subject to mandatory control.(Antonious,1946,Hourani,1946,Esco,1947)

Geographic boundaries between Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan were designated by Anglo-French agreements in 1920 and 1922 arbitrarily dividing Arab communities from one another. The new 'states', British mandated Palestine, French Lebanon and British controlled Iraq became alienated from one another, as different administrative systems, languages, currencies, economic systems, were institutionalized.(Antonious,1946,Hourani,1946)

Arab nationalists in French mandated Syria suffered the consequences of French hostility toward the Arab Nationalist movement. The French initiated a systematic attempt to encourage regional rather than national loyalties. Several strategies were applied to disrupt the unifying effect of the movement. Police surveyance and suppression of the press drove nationalists underground. Alliances between Christians, Jews, and Muslims were discouraged. Economic instability resulted from the use of the franc to create a new currency and from practices favoring the interests of

French investors. In the area of trade, division of the Ottoman lands into separate states disrupted the free flow of goods from one area to another and contributed to regionalism. In the areas of education, French culture, languages and history were promoted and Arab culture, language and history put in the background. Injustices often were perpetrated by magistrates who did not know Arabic.(Antonious,1946:374)

In conclusion the division of the Fertile Crescent into artificial political units did not resolve the issues that had stimulated the development of a strong Arab nationalist movement. Britain supported the movement when it was politically efficacious to do so. The diplomatic aftermath of the war made clear that support of Britain for Arab independence was framed by British economic and political goals. Rivalry among European nation states for economic and political control of strategic geographic areas was resolved by the creation of a new term 'mandate' to justify and facilitate colonial intervention. Arab nationalists had in their own regions, to develop strategies relevant to the new constitutions.

Developments within the Zionist movement were dependent upon the same set of forces. British support of Zionism represented one possible way of controlling Palestine. Zionism benefited from the mandate system in acquiring a legitimized foothold in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration. However, the decision to rely on British

political and economic support put the Zionist movement into an increasingly vulnerable and antagonistic position in relation to the Arab world.

Sectarian tensions exacerbated by war and diplomatic maneuvers disrupted daily coexistence of Arab and Jew. On the other hand, in the face of these tensions, Jew and Arab from all levels of society continued to solidify ties. Various groups of Ottoman Jews resisted Zionist land settlement. The interests of many Ottoman Jews were the same as those of their Arab neighbors; to maintain traditional ties supported by an indigenous system of social organization.(Porath,1974) Some Sephardi notables resisted losing leadership roles in the Jerusalem Jewish community to new immigrants. For example in April 1920, Sephardim signed an anti-Zionist petition organized by Arabs and in 1923, the MCA (Muslim Christian Association) persuaded Sephardim to hold a meeting in a synagogue against Zionism and Ashkenazi rule. (Porath,1974:61) Orthodox Jews opposed to Zionism attempted to form alliances with anti-Zionist Palestinian groups. For these Jews dissolution of the fundamental communal organization was a threat to their positions of power within the Arab-Jewish world. The period of the British mandate in Palestine, 1920-1948, makes clear how that process was carried out.

Arab-Jew Relations, 1920-1948-Transformations in social, economic and religious life- Palestine

Between 1918 and 1920 Palestine was officially run by a British military administration. In the spring of 1920 the British replaced the military administration with a civil administration run by a High Commissioner. Between 1918 and 1920, tensions between Arab nationalists and the British, and Zionists and the British, escalated. Palestinians found themselves increasingly isolated as attempts by the Arab nationalist movement to include Palestine in its national objectives failed.(Porath, 1974, Flapan, 1979)

Weizmann as official representative of the Zionist movement adhered to the British concept of Pan-Arabism, ignoring the Palestinian national movement.(Flapan, 1979:33) The Weizmann-Faisal negotiations of 1919 were a result of British pressure on the Syrian nationalists to accept Zionism. The British hoped for a common anti-French, pro-British stand from these meetings. Weizmann and Faisal assumed that an agreement between them would ensure that the British would support each of their objectives. The Weizmann-Faisal agreement contained the following provisions:1) Arab and Jewish representatives would be established in their respective territories 2) the Zionist Organization would provide the Arab State with economic experts and use its best efforts to assist in providing the means for developing natural resources 3) Jewish immigration to Palestine was to be encouraged on the basis of the

Balfour Declaration with religious rights and Moslem holy

places guarded 4) the parties were to act in complete accord

and harmony...before the Peace conference 5) Any matters of

dispute..shall be referred to the British government. The

British however were more interested in reaching a

settlement with the French than either the Zionists or

Hashemites. Furthermore lack of support by the Zionists

disappointed the Syrian nationalists when the French army in

Syria deposed Faisal in 1920.(Flapan, 1979:43)

Two objectives preoccupied Palestinian Arab

nationalists during this period. The first was to from

associations to protest Zionist policy. Secondly, two

organizations were formed to advocate that Palestine or

'Southern Syria' be included in the fate of Greater Syria as

promised by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918. (Flapan,

1979:32) Al muntada al-Adabi (the Literary Club, and al-

Nadi-al-Arabi (the Arab Club) emerged in 1918, calling for

Palestinian inclusion in an independent 'Greater Syria'. The

first Arab nationalist newspaper published in Palestine, in

Sept, 1919 was edited by a member of al-Nadi al Arabi.

While al-Muntada al Adabi was financed by the French, al-

Arabi was led by young members of al-Husayni, a prominent

Jerusalem family.(Flapan,1979:35) The Husaynis held high

positions in the local administration and were therefore

dependent upon them. However, both organizations met in

January of 1919 in Jerusalem,and presented petitions to the

King-Crane Commission protesting Zionism. The Damascus

branch of al-Nadi al-Arabi led by Palestinians, was active at the first General Syrian Congress in July 1919, rejecting a settlement by Faisal with the French. Similarly al Fatah organized the al-Istiqlal party to organize public activities calling for independence. On the other end of the spectrum, a group of landowners and businessmen, calling themselves Al-Hizb-al Watani were not willing to pay the price of instability and war for independence, and were therefore willing to recognize the Jewish national home in Palestine. While a number of important associations representing a range of views were made up of notables, Jam 'iyyat al-Ikha wa-al-'Afaf was a more militant arm of al-Muntada al-Adabi and included both religious leaders and ordinary citizens, particularly policemen. (Porath, 1974:78)

The choice between possible self- government as part of an independent Greater Syria and Zionist rule in Palestine, stimulated organizing activities resulting in the First Congress of the Muslim-Christian Association in Jerusalem, January, 1919. This organization was formed to create a platform and send representatives to the Paris Peace Conference for the adopting of Pan-Syrian Resolutions The Muslim Christian Association composed of notable and religious leaders, represented a traditional elite.

The Muslim Christian Association and other activities of Palestinians during this period were organized in response to possibilities within the larger diplomatic situation as well as in response to the necessity for

immediate and direct action within Palestine. Within

Palestine the newly formed Muslim Christian Association

presented a petition to the military governor of Jerusalem

from various Arab associations protesting Zionist policy.

The military governor of Jaffa wrote:"I suggest that a

Palestine Arab Commission be formed for the purpose of

keeping the balance of power between the races. What the

Arabs fear is not the Jews in Palestine but the Jews who

are coming to Palestine."(Porath, 1974:80) These protests

were stimulated by the arrival of the Zionist Commission in

April of 1918 in Jerusalem. Supported by the Balfour

Declaration, the Zionist Commission was recognized by the

military authorities. While the Arabs had no officially

recognized representative body, Jews were able to use their

influence in Palestine and London to acquire privileges, for

example, concessionary rail travel and use of the telephone

at a time when war limited use of both.

The Zionist Commission immediately met with Arab

notables in Jerusalem. Weizmann reassured them that the

Zionists sympathized with the cause of Arab nationalism and

were not planning to set up a Jewish government. But the

Balfour Declaration promised Jews a share in administering

the country. Zionist demands for control of immigration,

institutionalizing the Hebrew language and control over land

transfers, contradicted Weizmann's assurances. Britain's

obligation to Zionism was one tactic of the British to

retain control of Palestine. The British Military

Administration pressed for resolutions for 'home rule' in Palestine under British control. While the British assumed a majority of delegates at the Paris Peace Conference would support these resolutions, fear of Zionism stimulated unity between pro-French and pro-British elements of the Arab Nationalist Movement. Resolutions of a majority of Arab delegates called for unity of Palestine with Syria, complete withdrawal of the French and establishment of friendly relations with Britain.

The most significant dissent from the latter point of view came from Jerusalem's elite who were afraid that total unity would diminish Jerusalem's administrative importance. An assembly of notables of the city and surrounding villages convened by the Jerusalem MCA issued the following restriction:"Owing to the fact that the Big Powers by the Anglo-French Declaration bestowed upon the liberated peoples the right of establishing governments which shall derive their authority from the free choice of the indigenous population, we therefore on behalf of the public in general, beg that a constitutional and internally independent government be, by the free choice of the indigenous population, established in Palestine. This government will enact its all necessary laws, according to the wishes of its inhabitants, and be politically associated with the completely independent Arab Syria."(Porath, 1974:90)

The range of positions held by Arab nationalist associations and parties inside and outside of Palestine

represented class interests and political allegiances. For example, al-Muntada al Adabi advocating unity and complete dependence without foreign protection, tried to block the pro-British traditional elite of Jaffa. These rich merchants grew and marketed citrus and were motivated by their interest in keeping the trade with Britain in citrus fruit stable. The traditional Muslim elite of Damascus contained pro-French elements. Many Arab nationalists in Damascus were wary of this element, as well as of Faisal's pro-British leanings and ambiguous stance on Zionism. The British themselves took a hard line in their attempt to influence public opinion in favor of a British mandate in Palestine. They blocked Palestinian delegates from the conference, tried to influence heads of communities to demand foreign protection and threatened arrest of persons advocating 'extreme' views. In spite of British efforts to undermine unity within the Arab nationalist movement, and even in the face of a range of opinion about how independence was to be achieved, the movement was almost unanimously united in its official opposition to Zionism. The general tenor of the movement was expressed by the protest statement of the 'Supreme Committee of the Palestinian Associations' to the authorities. This organization was created in 1919 in an attempt to create a nation-wide network of all organizations. It was concentrated in Jerusalem, Nablus and Haifa and became the coordinator of Pan-Syrian unity associations, demanding

complete independence without foreign protection.(Porath,
1974:94)

Class interest and contrary political motivations
sparked conflict and splits within the Zionist movement as
well.

As discussed previously, Weizmann's views, the most
influential in determining the politic of the official
Zionist movement, were based on his conviction, finally,
that a Jewish state could only be had with British support
and protection. This choice was framed by Weizmann's
adherence to two colonialist ideologies. Weizmann's pan-
Syrian perspective was based on the following
rationalization that 'in the present state of affairs would
tend towards the creation of an Arab Palestine if there were
an Arab people in Palestine.'(Flapan, 1979:57) Ultimately
this rationalization became the basis for many Zionist
policies vis-a-vis the 'non-existent' Palestinian Arab
population. Secondly, the words of Aaron Aaronsohn, advisor
to Weizmann reflect the racist view that the Arabs could be
bought off; that they were not an important enough force to
take into account:"Had we permitted the squalid,
superstitious ignorant fellahin...to live in close contact
with the Jewish pioneers...the slender chance of their
success...would have been impaired, since we had no power,
under the cruel Turkish administration, to enforce
progressive methods...or even to ensure respect for private
property...so far as we knew the Arabs, the man among them

who will withstand a bribe is yet to be found."(Flapan,
1979:55) One consequence of both related perspectives was
that the Zionist movement sought to neutralize Arab
influence on British policy rather than to deal directly
with Arab fears and demands.

A second consequence was that Zionists, like the
British, exploited indigenous family rivalries, differences
between community leaders, tensions between Bedouins and
farmers, between rural and urban elements and between
Muslims and Christians, to facilitate Zionist hegemony. For
example, between 1921 and 1923 the head of the Arab
Department of the Zionist executive in Jerusalem, A.M.
Kalvarisky helped to organize pro-British National Muslim
Associations. The Zionist organization paid leaders to
cover expenses, arranged for agricultural credit at bank
rates rather than the usual high interest rates and
subsidized newspapers supporting the associations.(Flapan,
1979:64)

Dr. Nahum Goldmann and Judah Magnes were two vocal
representative of those few Zionists who recognized the
importance of the Palestinian national movement in the
context of anti-colonialist liberation movements. Magnes
became the leader of the Ihud Association or bi-nationalist
movement whose important role beginning in the 1920's will
be discussed. The Ihud Association supported a Jewish
homeland, but did not believe that a Jewish state- that is a
Jewish majority ruling an Arab minority- was desirable or

possible. The following statement exemplifies Goldman's belief that a Jewish homeland must come about as part of Middle Eastern politics and not as part of Imperialist politics:"The Arab problem can only be solved non-diplomatically, by entering into direct contact with the population...as long as we do not initiate such a policy...a bold effort to talk directly to the Arabs, to discuss the principles of neighborly friendly relations and co-existence, to thresh out these problems directly, people to people, Jewish colony to Arab village, group to group, over the heads of Agents, Clubs, cliques,journalists, Emirs and emissaries- the Arab question will remain a dark spot in the Palestine problem and the problem will remain unsolved."(Flapan, 1979:124,125)

At the other end of the spectrum, Vladimir Jabotinsky played the most critical role in disrupting Jewish-Arab relations in Palestine. Jabotinsky worked outside of the official Zionist leadership, negotiating with heads of governments to facilitate a mass exodus of Jews to Palestine. Jabotinsky elaborated a militaristic concept of a Zionist take over that was based on total abnegation of any rights of the Arab population. While the socialist-Zionist movement believed that Jewish and Arab workers must unite to overthrow the capitalists among the Zionists and the Arab nationalists, Jabotinsky believed that military might and complete subjugation of the Arab would bring about the kind

of society that Jews needed.(Esco, 1947, Halpern, 1969, Flapan, 1979)

In April of 1920, the Pan-Arab Association initiated a demonstration during the traditional Muslim celebration, al-Nabi Musa to show support of a united Syria under the rule of Emir Faisal. The British government arrested leaders and confirmed their mandate over Palestine. In July France and Britain overthrew Faisal and a civilian regime was put in place in Palestine representing the country's new status.(Porath, 1974:102) After the April outbreak, the Arab Nationalist movement continued to forcefully resist British rule. The traditional leadership of the MCA opposed them, supported by the al-Nashashibi family (al Nashashibi was appointed mayor since he had not taken part in the demonstrations), and other community notables, merchants and many of the Greek Orthodox community. The first stage of the Arab nationalist movement among the Palestinians, advocating inclusion of Palestine or southern Syria in a greater independent Syria, came to an end. From 1920-1948, Arab nationalism in Palestine and Zionism both evolved on a practical as well as ideological level within the context of the British mandate. Both movements within this context were forced to use the British administrative system and the European concept of nation-state to make themselves felt and heard.

The British Mandate

The League of Nations sanctioned the imposition of a modern bureaucratic system in Palestine. It gave the British political authority with no connection to the society it ruled. All recommendations or requests from Palestinians regarding the new state system were processed in London. Decisions regarding these requests were based on their relative significance for the international and domestic goals of the British.

Under the Ottoman state, Palestine was divided into three major districts or sanjaks, administered by a representative of the Ottoman government and a representative legislative council. Each sanjak was divided into districts headed by local sheikhs, whose power was maintained through traditional custom and enforced by military at their disposal. Ottoman administrative reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century were designed to weaken the power of sheikhs by removing the function of tax collection from them. Tax collection was put in the hands of a newly created class of urban notables, a'yans.(Miller, 1985: 141) Sheikhs were brought within the framework of the Ottoman administration and appointed as mukhtars of villages.(Porath, 1974:9) Minority communities had separate administrative systems connected to the central apparatus of the Ottoman state.

The political apparatus created by the British administrative system was based on a decision to utilize

existing communal ties, customary traditions and religious affiliations to maintain control. The British had to decide whether to consider the Palestinian community as one national group or according to religious affiliation. The population could be addressed as Arabs and Arab Jews; Muslims, Christians and Jews, or Palestinians and Europeans. By preserving religious identifications as primary, the British exacerbated and institutionalized religious tensions.(Miller, 1985) By isolating religion or using religion as a primary basis of identification, the British ignored the fundamental communal organization of the Ottoman state in which the religious community was a multi-faceted organic organization whose functions included but were not limited to the religious element. Thus, one step in the transformations of communities into organizations that would serve the interests of the British was the establishment of separate administrative bodies for Muslims, Jews and Christians. This worked to the benefit of the Zionists. For example, Article 15 of the mandate stipulated that education be conducted in the language of each community. Zionists used this to teach in Hebrew. In conjunction with the Religious communities Ordinance of 1925 allowing communities to tax for educational purposes, the Zionist were able to establish their own school systems.(Lesch, 1980:40)

The new administrative system gave bureaucrats accountable to the High Commissioner total power over the

local population. Palestinians absorbed into the bureaucracy, gradually replaced the traditional custom of authority of urban notable. In rural areas local mukhtars became the focus of British attempts to control villages. The effect was to divide the Palestinian population in new ways. Mukhtars, villagers, Palestinian bureaucrats, were subject to conflicting claims as traditional modes of group identification no longer ensured social, economic and political benefits, or power. In this sense political power became a source of disunity. In the face of these developments, the Arab nationalist movement ideally represented one place where a sense of unity could be maintained.(Lesch, 1980, Miller, 1985)

Because Zionism was the only recognized Jewish nationalist movement, Jews and Arabs were pushed by the above developments to choose opposing national identifications to protect their interests in the face of British hegemony. Because the fate of both nationalist movements was bound up with European power and perogatives, conflicting loyalties were a source of disunity within both movements.

Control of the Arab population was maintained by creating a hierarchical system of personnel assigned to various districts and accountable to central offices. Initially these positions were held by a disportionate number of Arab Christians. In response to demands from Muslims to maintain control over their own religious affairs

and for equal representation, in 1921 the British created the Supreme Muslim Council. The SMS was controlled by Muslim elites appointed by the British, and was another tool for maintaining sectarian and class divisions within Palestinian society.(Porath, 1974,Lesch, 1980, Miller, 1985)

Debates in the process of creating systems to control the two central functions of tax collection and education reflected the racist and paternalistic bias of the British. The government played contradictory roles encouraging some level of self government and at the same time maintaining that the 'backward' Arab population was not ready for self government. This racist view allowed the British to ignore the fact that the population had been governing themselves satisfactorily for centuries.

Within Arab society literacy was highly valued and was bound up with religious education. The British authorities subsumed existing Kuttabs (Muslim schools), which had been the vehicle for the transmission of Arab culture and language. Moreover schools did not provide access to skills required to meet the demands of the rapidly changing economy and political system. Literacy education was discouraged and the standard course for fellahin boys was only four years, discouraging acquisition of anything more than basic skills.(Miller, 1985:109) Although by 1926 a large segment of the Muslim population recognized the need for education of both sexes, by July of 1934, there were only 10 government schools for women in the villages of Palestine.

The government's response to the request for women's schools was the following:'If female education is to have any direct effect upon the future of the country, girls must be brought up to understand the value of a good home where cleanliness, sanitation and above all care of children are to be regarded as the aim of every woman...The excellent work already accomplished by various missionary and other bodies, local and foreign, cannot be overrated. They are the pioneers of female education in Palestine and for what they have done and are doing deserve every commendation. But the tendency in schools under their direction has been, if a word of criticism may be allowed, to cultivate too much the literary side of education and to neglect almost entirely what may be termed the domestic side.'(Miller, 1985:104)

Education played a twofold role in providing a context for assimilation into a new social order and cultural values because it determined social mobility and because the values inherent in education as defined by the British negated traditional values of familial and religious authority. The mandate created a new class of educated urban elite who were trained to identify more closely with foreigners (Europeans or European educated) than to peasants who were their own people. Students caught between worlds, were politicized by the process of discovering what their choices were and what they were denied. Many began to realize that schools had social and political significance and that economic hardship

was connected to access to education.(Saigh, 1979, Miller, 1985)

Policies with regard to Arab education did not affect the Zionists who as stated were authorized under Article 25 of the Mandate and the Religious Ordinance of 1925 to maintain separate schools. Control over education gave the Zionists an ideological base to mobilize young Jews. Education became a tool for creating the socioeconomic autonomous base the Zionist movement felt was critical for its survival. The central issues for the Zionist movement in creating the socio-economic base and institutions to maintain it were land and labor. Zionist land purchase exacerbated existing tensions between peasants and landholders, and created a class of landless workers who because of the Zionist boycott of Arab labor, were cut off from alternative sources of income.(Saigh, 1979) Neither the Zionists nor the British developed agricultural programs to support the needs of Arab peasants. Furthermore, Land Ordinances in 1920 and 1929, although instituted to ensure compensation to peasants who gave up rights to land they cultivated, were of no effect or not enforced. Settlement disrupted local economy when people moved who had traditionally traded with neighboring villages.(Flapan, 1979, Lesch, 1980, Miller, 1985)

The belief among Zionists that by establishing autonomous branches of industry and agriculture, Jewish life would be 'normalized' made it impossible for Arab and Jew to

act jointly in recognizing the effects of foreign occupation on indigenous society and customary relations. Policies of separation in regard to land and labor were a major source of estrangement between the two communities. Violence erupting in 1920, 1921, 1929 and the 1936-9 Arab Revolt, was symptomatic of the growing tendency to target one another in the process of trying to win concessions from the British administration. Riots in 1920 and 1921 in Jaffa, and in the Tul-Karm-Hadera region caused dissolution of partnerships and commercial relations between Jews and Arabs. As a result of the 1929 riots provoked by the controversy over Muslim vs. Jewish rights to the Wailing Wall, Jewish communities left Arab towns in which they had lived for centuries. This process was completed by the 1936 disturbances when it became impossible to continue daily contacts in economic relations and physical proximity in mixed towns.(Flapan, 1979)

The call for Jewish labor evolved out of impulses at variance with one another. Socialist-Zionists anticipated the danger of settlers exploiting native labor. Thus evolved the concept of a closed Jewish economy independent of Arab labor and food supplies. However, they saw this within the concept of nationalized land as the basis for colonization and a guarantee against land speculation and exploitation. The class-conscious socialists of the Third Aliyah (1917-1923) thought that by forcing an autonomous Arab sector, class conflict would be focused intra-

communally rather than on Jewish-Arab national differences.(Flapan, 1979) The concept of 100 percent Jewish labor was solidified by the creation of Mapai (unification of the labor parties, Hapoal Hatzair and Ahdut Avoda in May of 1929. Control of Jewish labor was, however, in the hands of the more conservative Histradrut, Jewish Federation of Workers Union. In 1933 the Histradrut initiated a campaign to remove Arab workers from construction sites and other Jewish enterprises in the cities. They also organized a nation wide campaign to picket citrus groves employing Arab labor, using the argument that the mandatory government could assert that Arab labor in the Jewish sector could compensate for labor shortages, giving them an excuse to limit Jewish immigration. The policies of the Histradrut, inimical to the idea of solidarity between Arab and Jewish workers obviated the effects of spontaneous joint activities of Arab and Jewish workers, such as the strike of drivers in November 1931 demanding reduction of the costs of driving licenses, fuel and tire. Arab workers ultimately formed a separate Arab trade union movement (Palestine Arab Workers Society) controlled by Arab National parties.(Flapan, 1979)

Women were prime movers in the Arab nationalist movement articulating important connections between their rights within Palestinian society and Palestinian rights within the larger context of world diplomacy. In October 1929 the first Arab Women's Congress met, representing

Muslim and Christian communities. Their stated goal was to assist the Arab woman in her endeavors to improve her standing, to help the poor and distressed and to encourage and promote the Arab national enterprise. Many Arab Women's Associations had been performing similar functions since 1919. Arab women's organizations presented their demands before the mandatory power at every possible opportunity.(Mogannum, 1937)

In reaction to Arab-Jewish fighting in May 1921, Winston Churchill issued the White Paper on Palestine, limiting Jewish immigration to the 'economic absorptive capacity of the country'. Herbert Samuel tried to assure the Arab movement that the British government 'does not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home, but that such a Home shall be founded in Palestine.'(Esco, 1947:27) Successive restrictions on land purchase and immigration followed each serious outbreak of Arab/Jewish disturbances. However, the Passfield White Paper of October 1930 recommending restriction of Jewish immigration and settlement because of shortage of land for Arab peasants, was annulled by the McDonald letter of February 1931. As the British mandate moved to restrict immigration in order not to further alienate the Arab movement, the Zionist movement built up its means of circumventing that policy. The discovery of arms at the Jaffa port in October of 1935 was one of the events leading to the disturbances of 1936. At the same

time disintegration of village society and urban

unemployment created the basis for the emergence of an

organized armed movement among Arabs also. In April of

1935, members of Ikhwan al-Qassam held up cars on a highway,

robbing the Arab travelors and killing two Jews. Members of

the Jewish community retaliated killing Arabs and holding a

mass funeral in Tel Aviv. Arab politicians in Nablus and

Jaffa responded by calling for a general strike.(Esco, 1947,

et.al.)

The 1936 strike was organized by the Arab Higher

Committee created to coordinate the six political parties

which in turn coordinated local committees. Two viewpoints

emerged- one supporting the economic-political strike as an

instrument instrument of moral pressure on the British

government. The other viewed violence as a necessary

corollary to civil disobedience. While the strike had a

broad base of support, it caused enormous hardship and

losses for citrus growers and merchants, Arab workers, and

peasants who were dependent on the Jewish market. The

strike had the opposite effect upon the Zionist economic

structure, stimulating investments and completing the

process of separating the Arab and Jewish labor markets.

However,as a result of the Peel Commission created in the

autumn of 1936 to reconsider British policy a final White

Paper was issued. The resulting White Paper of 1939

prohibited land transfers to Jews in most of Palestine and

restricted immigration beyond that point dependent on Arab

consent. Finally the Jewish Agency was now faced with the decision whether to continue the policy of economic separation or to return Arab workers to the Jewish sector, resume trade and normalize economic relations.(Flapan, 1979,et al.)

Support for taking the latter course existed both in the Arab movement and in the Zionist movement. Between 1922 and 1941, close to 30 million pounds passed from the Jewish to the Arab sector through payments for land, agricultural produce, rent and wages.(Flapan, 1979:223) The growth of the Arab urban sector and the growth in Arab citriculture from 20,000 dunam in 1922 to 147,000 dunam in 1935, was stimulated by partnership between Arab businessmen and Jews.(Smilansky,1947:58) Arab merchants marketed industrial products manufactured by Jewish firms. Common efforts between Jews and Arabs who were citrus growers resulted in a tremendous rate of growth in citrus cultivation. Moderate Arab forces, beneficiaries of those developments, could have been reinforced in 1936 by fostering co-operation between capital and labor and integration of the Arab and Jewish sectors into one economic base.(Smilansky, 1947)

Martin Buber and Judah Magnes were two influential members of the Bi-Nationalist party, who in the crucial year of 1936 led the effort to reach a modus vivendi with the Arabs in Palestine. As noted previously, the first Zionist thinker to promote the idea of bi-nationalism was Ahad Ha'am who recognized Palestine as the 'common possession of

different peoples, each endeavoring to establish here a national home'.(Buber, 1972:10) Among the Oriental Jews involved in the bi-nationalist movement, Dr. Nissim Malul advocated "the renaissance of a 'symbiosis' of Arabic and Hebrew in opposition to western culture." (Flapan, 1979:164) Co-operation with the Arab movement was the basis of the Brith shalom (Covenant of Peace) movement in the 20's and of the Ihud (Unity) Association in the 40's (founded by Judah Magnes). Martin Buber maintained that a bi-national state aimed at 'a social structure based on the reality of two peoples' living together. The foundations of this structure cannot be the traditional ones of majority and minority, but must be different...The road to be pursued is that of an agreement between the two nations- naturally also taking into account the productive participation of smaller national groups- an agreement which, in our opinion, would lead to Jewish-Arab cooperation in the revival of the Middle East with the Jewish partner concentrated in a strong settlement in Palestine. This cooperation though necessarily starting out from economic premises, will allow development in accordance with an all-embracing cultural perspective and on the basis of a feeling of at-oneness, tending to result in a new form of society."(Buber, 1972:8) Within this context a group of Jewish business and civil leaders known as 'The Five' worked with Musa Alami, crown counsel and an associate of the Mufti to create a proposal including political parity (equality of representative

regardless of numbers in population), an immigration limit of 30,000 a year for ten years and restrictions on Jewish purchase of land.(Flapan, 1979:228)

The Zionist leadership in spite of strong Arab opposition, decided in 1937 to mobilize all efforts to achieve a Jewish state through partition. When the general strike and economic boycott of Jewish goods was called off instead of opting for an agreement with the Arabs and a plan for economic cooperation, they viewed the occasion as a final opportunity to realize the goal of complete economic separation.

The first constitution of Mapai, the labor party formed in 1930 by the merger of Ahdut Avoda and Hapoal Hatzair, adopted the proposal of the cantonal system as the best way to achieve the Zionist goal. The cantonal system recommended Jewish and Arab independent territorial units joined together in a legislative framework to deal with foreign affairs. In 1931 Weizmann persuaded Mapai to adopt the principle of parity, equality between Jewish and Arabs in government whatever their role in the population. However, when Ben Gurion became chairperson of the Jewish agency in Palestine (1938) he did not try to have parity adopted as its official position. By 1936 both Ben Gurion and Weizmann accepted partition - the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine as the only solution for Zionism.

Arab opposition to the partition plan developed into open guerrilla warfare against the British and by the

British army against Arabs. The Haganah, military organization under control of the official Zionist movement, retaliated against Arabs. When a Jewish terrorist was hanged by the British, anti-British feeling began to escalate. Between 1936 and 1939, 2,850 Arabs were killed and 9,000 jailed; 1,200 Jews were killed as were 700 British. (Flapan, 1979:236) Arab villages were terrorized by the British as they attempted to defeat the Arab guerrilla movement. Martial law was declared and the Arab Higher Committee dissolved. In response all Arab political parties united demanding an end to Jewish land purchases and immigration; an end to the British mandate, creation of a legislative council as promised by the British in 1931 and the recognition of an independent Arab state. During 1937 Ben Gurion attempted to negotiate with pan-Arab leaders outside of Palestine for recognition of a Jewish state in Palestine in exchange for Zionist recognition of Arab states. Ben-Gurion was also engaged at this time in gaining the co-operation of Vladimir Jabotinsky and his dissident Revisionist movement to counter the proposal for a legislative council in Palestine unless Jewish representation was based on the population of world Jewry and Arab representation on the population of Arabs in Palestine.

In May of 1936 a Royal Commission was appointed to evaluate the events in Palestine. Their conclusions were that the British mandate was no longer workable and their

recommendation was partition. The proposed partition plan necessitated the transfer of 296,000 Arabs from the area to be designated as the Jewish state. The transfer proposal was resisted by many Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists. Senator and Hextor, members of the Jewish Agency representing non-Zionist groups, stated- 'We can't say that we want to live with the Arabs and at the same time transfer them to Transjordan.'(Flapan, 1979:259) During 1937 bi-nationalists and 'maximalists' (advocates of an undivided Israel) and non-Zionists in the Jewish Agency who opposed the idea of a Jewish sovereign state met with a group of Palestinians headed by the Mufti, who opposed partition and unification with Transjordan on political grounds. Zionists maintained contact with Arab leaders in Cairo, Beirut and Damascus. Throughout this period Jews and Arabs continued to maintain cultural exchanges (the Egyptian soccer team visited Palestine and the Jewish Philharmonic gave concerts in Cairo). Jews vacationed in Lebanon where hotel and restaurants had Hebrew menus. Jewish manufactured goods were sold in Arab countries and Arab agricultural produce in Jewish markets.(Flapan, 1979) In July of 1937 a proposal was submitted to representatives of the Jewish Agency for an independent Palestinian state with complete autonomy for all communities thus providing for a Jewish National home but not a Jewish state.(Flapan, 1979:268) The Jewish Agency rejected the proposal having decided to push for statehood. The moderate National Defense Party run by the Nashashibis,

the one group that could have helped negotiate between Jews and Arabs, withdrew its support, in response to the transfer proposal.

The escalating violence in the years just preceding World War II further divided the Arab population and the Jewish population. Political factions attacked one another; the landless attacked the privileged; those in official positions were terrorized. The New White Paper of 1939 solidified the British position- abandonment of partition and of commitment to the Balfour Declaration. The White Paper posited constitutional changes to permit self government in Palestine within ten years. Up to 75,000 Jewish immigrants would be permitted to enter Palestine for five years, when immigration would cease unless approved by the Arab community. Land transfer was limited to defined areas.(Miller, 1985) The activities of the Irgun, a liason of the Revisionist Party led by Jabotinsky, escalated. While in 1938 the Irgun had placed bombs in Arab markets in Haifa, Jerusalem and Jaffa, in 1940 their aim was to eliminate British rule in Palestine.

This militaristic element in Palestine was aided by the events surrounding the emerging war. The Mufti's decision to ally with the Nazis in the hope that British rule would be defeated, neutralized the effect of resistance among Jews to the extremist revisionist approach. Although the Mufti's rejection of the 1939 White paper was attacked by the Defense Party, the Mufti remained the most powerful leader

of the Palestinian Arabs. His support came from a history
of frustration with French and British movements to prevent
Arab unity and independence. Hitler's rise to power
intensified those feelings, as they began to speculate on a
new Arab revolt against Britain.

After the 1939 White Paper, Zionists began to shift
hopes for political support to the United States government.
In 1942 in New York City the Biltmore Program was adopted by
Zionists demanding fulfillment of 'the original purpose' of
the Balfour Declaration and rejecting the British White
Paper. The conference called for full support of the war
effort by Jews and demands of a post-war settlement assuring
'Peace, Justice and Equality'.(Flapan, 1979:282)

Groups of Jews and Arabs in Palestine in favor of a bi-
national solution continued to search for a political
settlement. Liberal parties such as Hashomer Hatzair,
Poalei Zion, and aliya Hadasha, and the Ihud Association met
with Arab villagers and students and organized lectures and
debates. An agreement was signed by Arab and Jews calling
for common action and the publication of an Arab magazine
promoting Jewish-Arab cooperation. Arab states such as Iraq
and Transjordan proposed various forms of federations in the
Fertile Crescent with autonomy for Jews. In 1943 Arab
notables proposed free immigration up to numerical parity
and possible compromise after that point.(Flapan, 1979:285)

In May 1945, the Zionist movement petitioned the United
Nations and the British government to set up a Jewish state

in Palestine. In June, 1945, Zionists demanded entry of 100,000 displaced persons to Palestine.

Proponents of the Biltmore Program and militarist nationalist elements in Palestine represented by the Revisionists were aided in their cause by the violence perpetrated against Jewish survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. The Haganah continued to build up its resistance, as they attempted to illegally rescue survivors who came to Palestine to find safety. The British responded by arresting Jewish political and religious leaders, and closing down the Jewish agency. In July of 1946 the Irgun blew up the King David Hotel site of the mandatory administration. Zionists continued to dispute proposed solutions, with the added factor of strong United States participation. The 22nd Zionist Congress in Basle, December 1946 rejected negotiations with Great Britain and deposed Weizmann. The matter was taken to the United Nations which with Soviet and U. S. support recommended partition. While the Zionist movement accepted this plan, Palestinian Arabs began to organize to resist its implementation.

Dr. Nahum Goldman's comments on the War of 1948 ending in the military and political collapse of the Palestinians saliently identifies its consequences:

"The Zionist movement had conceived the creation of the Jewish state on the basis of amity and understanding with the Arabs..our ideas contained two points of principle: the demand for a Jewish state in part of Palestine, and the participation of that state in a confederation of Near Eastern states...When it came to the founding of the State, I was against the proclamation of the State despite the fact that I was one of the main fighters for Partition...I felt that after the vote at the UN- where both the Communists and

the democratic bloc, East and West, voted for a Jewish state leaving the Arabs in desperate isolation- it may have been the time to reach some agreement with the Arabs, even if only a temporary one. At the time I had some hints from Egyptian diplomats that we should meet...not to get the Arabs to accept the idea of Partition or a Jewish state,which they wouldn't have done at the time, but at least to get them not to react by a war. President Truman who was also very much afraid of an Arab/Jewish war, offered us his private airplane. The only one to side with me was Moshe Sharett who was in New York at the time...we decided to send him over to convince Ben-Gurion-but the enthusiasm in Israel was so great and Ben-Gurion's determination to proclaim the State immediately so strong that our suggestion to postpone it for a month, to try to avoid a war if possible, was rejected..in a sense it was the original tragedy of Israel because, as the Talmud says, one sin leads to another- aveira goreret aveira; that's what I was afraid of, that there will be another war and another....   The proclamation of the State and the ensuing invasion by the Arab armies naturally ruled out reconciliation..The basic and tragic fact is that no agreement was reached and that the State of Israel made its entrance into history with a war, albeit a defensive war, against the Arabs. How to overcome the consequences of this is the central problem of contemporary Israeli politics and will be for many years to come, for that first war and the Israeli victory produced inescapable consequences for both Israel and the Arabs. As far as the latter were concerned the breach with Israel has been widened enormously..The unexpected defeat was a shock and a terrible blow to Arab pride. Deeply injured, they turned all their endeavors to the healing of their psychological wound: to victory and revenge..... On the other hand, success had a marked psychological effect on Israel. It seemed to show the advantage of direct action over diplomacy...The victory offered such a glorious contrast to the centuries of persecution and humiliation, of adaptation and compromise, that is seemed to indicate the only direction that could possible to taken from then on. To brook nothing,tolerate no attack, but cut through Gordian knots, and to shape history by creating facts seemed so simple, so compelling, so satisfying that it became Israel's policy in its conflict with the Arab world....This was the basis of a whole wrong development of Israel because, first of all, I have always thought of Israel as a neutral state between the two blocs in the world. We are the classic people who have to be neutral, as a people or as a State, because millions of our people live in the Communist world, millions in the Western world, and we must have a State that any Jew living under any regime can be emotionally attached...But in the long run, we have had to depend on arms we got mostly from the west; so we became more and more members of the western bloc and so the whole policy of Israel-not only its relationship with the Arab world- was

determined by it.....The second consequence was that, being threatened by the Arab world, being a small minority, we were absolutely committed to mass immigration and naturally had to depend on numbers of people- not only for the army, but for the economic development of the country. So we organized a great mass immigration which had to weaken all the ideals of kibbutzim and (of) creating a new society in Israel...To sum up, Israel was forced, from its beginning, into a situation where it can only become a State like all other States and I don't believe such an Israel will survive."(Flapan, 1979:295)

The 1948 war had devastating consequences, causing the collapse of the Arab public sector and precipitating the flight of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian merchants, landowners and community leaders. The massacre of Palestinian men, women and children at Deir Yassin in April 1948 exemplified the consequences of a victory for a nationalist-militaristic ideology. In panic, thousands fled becoming homeless refugees.

With the creation of the Arab League in March of 1945, the Arab states had committed themselves to struggle for the independence of Palestine as an Arab State, which meant that the fate of Palestine now depended on what the heads of Arab states wanted. A delegate of the Arab Higher Committee was nominated to represent the Palestinian people in the League's Council. In November 1945 the Arab League had demanded an end to the British mandate and recognition of a democratically elected government with a legislative council based on proportional representation of Jews and Arabs. On the other hand Abdullah, supported by the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and encouraged by the British, continued to pursue a 'Greater Syria' with the partition of Palestine and

arrangement of the Jewish state as the first phase. Distrust and disunity within the Arab movement were a major factor in a Zionist military victory.

Conclusion

This chapter examines the historical developments that as Andre Chouraqui puts it 'institutionalized' a Judeo-Arab conflict.(Chouraqui, 1972) The conflict is institutionalized by the same forces that invent it. The conflict emerges out of the definitions imposed on Jew and Arab in the modern era, the definitions that some Jews and Arabs pose for themselves.

'Jew' in this period means European Jew. If Palestinian Jew were meant, the conflict could not be posed in the same way.

The central question of this chapter is: how did nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century affect social organization, religious life, economic survival, relations with outside forces, of Jew and Arab? How did transformations in these areas, connected to the emergence of Arab nationalism and of Zionism, contribute to peaceful co-existence and to dissension between Jew and Arab?

Two observations are central in this period and inform responses to these questions. The first concerns the way in which nationalism taking shape in the Ottoman lands were affected by relations with outside forces. Second, transformations in social organization, religious life and economic survival in the eighteenth and nineteenth century,

described in Chapter II, had already set in motion the conflicts that became solidified in this period. Three of those conflicts need to be reiterated here. The first was crisis of identity for both Jew and Arab precipitated by increased relations with the west, whether through direct colonization, extraterritorial privileges and foreign national protection for agents of the European powers, or through the impact of European-style education in missionary schools or schools such as the Alliance Israelite Universelle. The second is changing patterns of land relations precipitated by the Ottoman Land Reforms and consequent changes in economic relations and widening class disparities. Third, in the area of religious life, the breakdown of traditional social organization with modernization of the Empire resulted in a focus on religious differences as critical in ways that were new to the Middle Eastern environment. Historically in the Islamic lands, differences were embedded in a system of social organization that provided a basis for common relations. Religion was not the important factor.

Because nationalism was an inevitable part of westernization in the twentieth century, a central challenge for Jews and Arabs in this era was to define on what basis national identification would be pursued. For many Palestinian Jews and Arabs, Ottomanism was the logical choice. The Ottoman state had provided a relatively secure and in many cases comparatively privileged existence for

both Jew and Arab. Others joined emerging movements advocating a return of the Caliphate to its original creators, the Arabs and a revival of Arab culture and history. Arab nationalism was however in its early stages a movement for autonomy within the state- not a movement to overthrow the state.

European intervention in the Ottoman lands affected the way in which Arab nationalism evolved. Anti-semitism in the European lands was a critical factor in the evolution of Jewish nationalism. Two factors were particularly important in the case of Arab nationalism. First, the decision of the Sharif Husayn ally with Britain to overthrow the Turks, and connected to the Arab Revolt, the McMahon-Husayn agreements and subsequent violation of those agreements. The second is the Balfour Declaration which promised British support for a national Jewish homeland in Palestine, as well as for protection of Arab rights. In the case of Jewish nationalism anti-semitism was the ideological frame for the official Zionist movement- that is, the notion that all Gentiles are enemies to the Jew. The critical consequence of that perspective held by Weizmann, Herzl and others,was that it framed all of history in those terms, ignoring and rendering invisible all other historical experiences- for instance, that of Palestinian Jews. Anti-semitism was critical to the evolution of Jewish nationalism in a second way. The violence perpetrated against Jews by Hitler during World War II solidified the extremist element in the Zionist

movement and shaped the course of events immediately preceding the War of 1948.

The Arab nationalist movement was comprised of many movements. Similarly, Zionism must be understood as a plurality of movements with different perspective and different goals. For example, as discussed above, many Arabists believed that Zionism could support their cause. Likewise, some Zionists, for example, Ah'ad Ha'am and the cultural Zionists conceived of a cultural renaissance for Jews in Palestine embedded in the Arab world- that is, inherently a Judeo-Arabic renaissance.

The decision by the League of Nations to first of all create a distinct geographic area out of the administrative area designated as Palestine, and to mandate Palestine to Great Britain, politicized the Arab national movement and the Zionist movement. Elements within both movements who had opted to ally themselves with Britain in hopes of gaining British support to achieve their goals, gained power. Conflicts were exacerbated between those who benefited from British occupation and those who suffered. In the case of both Jews and Arabs, the peasantry suffered from political upheaval, social upheaval and religious hatred. For example, during the uprisings of the 1920's and the 1930's, the distinction between Jew and Zionist was lost and many Palestinian Jews were killed.

The peasantry suffered also because of dislocation resulting from land purchase by the Zionist movement and a

changing economic structure precipitated by the British

mandate, wars and Jewish industrial build- up and labor

practices. As noted before, Ottoman land Reforms (1856,1858)

left the peasant powerless " to convert customary land use

into legal land tenure."(Saigh, 1979:31) In the mandate

period the creation of a new proletariat left many jobless,

particularly where implementation of an autonomous Jewish

sector was possible. This phenomenon in turn precipitated

violence. A new class of radicalized Palestinian

nationalists emerged particularly among the youth whose

interests and experience differed from those of the elite

and who did not have access to official channels to voice

their complaints.

Polarization within both national movements was fed by

historical developments. Disenchantment with the British

precipitated an alliance of the Mufti and Germany as world

War II became imminent. Hitler's rule gave impetus to the

militarist Revisionist movement at a time when bi-

nationalists and Arabs were making progress in finding terms

of agreement.

The disruption of Arab-Jew alliances by outside forces

had a tradition. To give just a few examples, Hannah

Arendt, a leading member of the bi-nationalist Ihud

Association and one of the foremost interpreters of this

historical period, notes:"It was in the interest of foreign

powers that the so-called Weizmann-Faisal agreement was

allowed to pass into oblivion until 1936. It also stands to

reason that British apprehension and compromise was behind the tacit abandonment....When in 1922 new Arab-Jewish negotiations took place, the British Ambassador in Rome was kept fully informed, with the result that the British asked a postponement until the mandate has been conferred; the Jewish representative, Asher Saphir, held "little doubt that members of a certain political school took the view that it was not in the interest of the peaceful administration of Near and Middle Eastern territories that the two Semitic races...should cooperate again on the platform of the recognition of Jewish rights in Palestine." From then onward Arab hostility has grown year by year; and Jewish dependence on British protection has become so desperate a need that one may well call it a curious case of voluntary unconditional surrender."(Arendt, 1978:157)

The territorial definition of the mandate in itself created the conditions for a particular kind of confrontation between Arab nationalists and Zionists. It made the common identity of Jew and Arab no longer viable. A politicized Palestinian Arab identity emerged in the face of a politicized Jewish identity tied to two distinct movements both of which finally claimed mutually exclusive rights. In the face of racism, anti-semitism and colonialism, Judaism had changed into Zionism and Islam into Arab nationalism.

While British control over a clearly defined area created a common historical experience for Palestinian Jew and Arab, "policies designed to emphasize religious and

regional differences, ensured that understanding of that experience would not be uniform".(Saigh, 1979) Furthermore, the modern Jewish community of Palestine had two sources: indigenous Palestinian Jews and successive waves of Zionist immigrants beginning with the 'Lovers of Zion' movement in 1882. The latter had a different historical experience and no understanding of the customary practices and traditions of Middle Eastern Jews and Arabs. For example, Muslim law favored partnership arrangements and:"large landowners frequently sacrificed economic advantage in exchange for community status in negotiations with peasants who worked their land."(Saigh, 1979:34) The goal of Zionism to build an autonomous Jewish infrastructure contradicted these traditions and consequently Zionism contributed to the disruption of Judeo-Arabic traditions. These traditions have been examined in Chapter I and their evolution traced in Chapter II. It is important to note that while developments in this historical era contribute to disruptions of those traditions, Jews and Arabs continued to form partnerships in every sphere. The importance of knowing this history is especially clear in a period when it is increasingly necessary to identify those traditions in whatever form and wherever they have survived.

The ideology of the Revisionist movement led by Jabotinsky stands at the opposite extreme of a continuum of which the Judeo-Arabic tradition forms one kind of beginning. Jabotinsky implanted in the Jewish psyche an

image of the Arab as mortal enemy. He fostered the idea of the inevitability of conflict between Jew and Arab and the impossibility of solution, except by sheer force. (Flapan,1979, Arendt,1974) The consequences of this perspective were critical for developments in the 1940's. Many Jews were willing to tolerate a general mood of totalitarianism where 'every means was justified including terror and ruthless retaliation in the struggle for survival" (Arendt, 1974) The belief that one had to be either conqueror or conquered prevailed and justified even terrorist attacks on civilians, for example the attacks of the Irgun, which thirty years later were to be repeated by Al-Fatah. History has shown how militarism escalates. Terrorism, inherent in militarism, is condoned and rationalized as' war' but condemned as 'terrorism' when manifested by powerless groups who do not have access to huge war machines.

The consequences unfold as actions of institutions that represent the new Israeli state reflect the ideology out of which the state emerged. Chapter IV describes the repercussions of the events of 1948-1949 for Arab-Jew relations.

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CHAPTER V

ARAB AND JEW IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, 1948-1980

Chapter IV examined historical developments affecting
the evolution of Jewish and Arab nationalism and their
impact on Jewish-Arab co-existence. In Chapter III we saw
that inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict were stimulated
by changes in social, economic and religious life during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At the same time many
of the traditional customs and forms of economic and social
relations that characterized the Judeo-Arabic heritage
continued to support Arab-Jewish co-existence. In the
twentieth century nationalism supported by European
intervention stimulated restructuring of social and economic
relations. Developments within and outside of the Arab
world supported those forces that were inimical to and that
attempted to suppress Judeo-Arabic culture. Chapters III
and IV demonstrate that in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries politics were used to emphasize religious and
ethnic differences. In the early 1900's the issue of
dependence on Great Britain for economic and political
survival fragmented the Jewish and Arab worlds. Most
critically, as pointed out in Chapter IV, the League of
Nations mandate to Great Britain of a distinct geographic
area created out of the administrative area of Palestine,
polticized and polarized the Arab national movement and the
Zionist movement. Those who choose dependence on Great

Britain to realize their national goals, gained power. This event, bolstered by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, became the circumstance around which national identification asserted itself, a fact that had far reaching implications for the participation of Jew and Arab in the development of modern institutions in Palestine.

This Chapter will examine the impact of the Jewish state on the Judeo-Arabic heritage. The focus will be on the consequences of the 1948-1949 war for Jew and Arab, and on economic survival, social organization, religious life,and political organization in Israel between 1948 and 1980.

As noted in Chapter Three the efforts of Jew and Arab to cooperate in making crucial decisions about the fate of Palestine continued as late as 1946. These efforts represented variations on three important ideological traditions, beginning with the bi-national vision of A'had Ha'am discussed in Chapter III. Hashomer Hatzair represented the second tradition with its vision of a socialist revolution led by a coalition of Jewish and Arab workers. Kedma Mizraha, calling for the advancement of Jewish-Arab relations, was created in 1936 by members of Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace), the Sephardic community, new immigrants from Germany and people from the left. (Kolat,1983:26) The motivating ideology, voiced by

Kalvarisky and others, affirmed traditional relations and ties as Semitic peoples, of Jew and Arab.

Following the 1939 Arab Revolt, Pinhas Rutenberg, Gad Frumkin, Moshe Smilansky, Moshe Novomesky and Judah Magnes,- known as 'the Five'- sought an agreement with Arab leaders based on the bi-national program supporting a ceiling on Jewish immigration in Palestine. The League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochment, organized in 1942, asserted that the realization of a national home for Jews could only come about as an outgrowth of agreement with the Arabs. The Bentov Plan, the work of a committee of the League, proposed international supervision, with the eventual establishment of a federalist binational government with representational parity for Jew and Arab. Jewish immigration would be based upon the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine and an agreed ratio of population. (Kolat,1983:25,29)

The Zionist leadership rejected the proposals of the Five and of the League for Jew-Arab Rapprochement and continued to mobilize all efforts to achieve a Jewish state through partition. Opposition to the partition plan which necessitated the transfer of 296,000 Arabs from the area to be designated as the Jewish state , was strong among Arabs and among Jews. Clashes between armed Arabs and the Haganah as well as anti-British actions, escalated. The White Paper of 1939 mobilized Zionist forces, supported by the Revisionists, to eliminate British rule in Palestine. The split within the Zionist movement reached an apex in 1942

when Zionists meeting in New York City produced the Biltmore Program. The Biltmore Program made clear the priorities of the Zionist leadership for whom mass immigration and Jewish nationhood were more important than agreement with the Arabs or with the British.(Kolat,1983:29)

Opportunities for dialogue between Zionists and Arabs declined sharply in the postwar period. The inhumane treatment of Jewish survivors of the Nazis gave impetus to proponents of the Biltmore Program and the militarist nationalist elements in Palestine. The Arabs of Palestine, reorganized under the influence of the Husseinis remained strong in their opposition to Zionism. In March 1945 resistance to Zionism was taken up by the newly formed Arab League. The 22nd Zionist Congress in Basle, December, 1946 rejected negotiations with Great Britain. Subsequently the United Nations Assembly proposed partition supported by the United States and the Soviet Union. Under the partition plan, Palestine was divided into six areas, three for a Jewish state and three for an Arab state, with Jerusalem as an international zone administered by the United Nations. The proposed Arab state would be 4, 476 square miles or 42.88 per cent of Palestine, and the proposed Jewish state, 5,893 square miles or 56.47 per cent of Palestine, with a higher percentage of better quality land. (Asadi,1976:79) In November of 1946 a final effort was made by Falastin al-Jadida, the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and leaders of the Palestinian Association headed by Fauzi al Husseini,

in support of a bi-national solution. Fauzi al-Husseini, who asserted that:'Imperialist policy is playing with both of us, Arabs and Jews alike and we have no choice but to unite and work hand in hand for the benefit of us both", was killed twelve days after the joint declaration appeared. (Gendzier,1975:31) Extremists among the Jews, led by Menachem Begin rejected the plan, as did Arabs who organized a resistance movement. Polarization of the Arab and Jewish communities intensified as British troops left Palestine in the spring of 1948.

Yair Evron notes that the Egyptian decision to invade Palestine on 13 May 1948 came after King Faruq had been informed by Syria that King Abdallah of Jordan had decided to occupy the territories alloted to the Arabs by the 1947 United Nations partition plan. Abdallah hoped to occupy Jerusalem in addition, thereby restoring the power of his family and father, Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Zionists led by David Ben-Gurion were anxious to create an alliance with Abdallah against the other Arab states seeking dominion in Palestine.(Evron,1973:16,17)

Several factors contributed to a Zionist victory in 1948. Inter-Arab conflicts as cited above contributed to a lack of preparation and coordination. The Palestinian nationalist movement had been weakened by the British and was subject to conflicting pressures from Arab leaders. The Zionist leadership on the other hand had organized politically, militarily and financially to ensure its

predominance. The success of the Zionists in creating institutions prepared to take on the administrative duties of a new state was attributable to British support in the hope that the Zionists would represent Imperial interests in the area. When the British deserted the Zionist cause in 1939, the Zionist leadership shifted its allegiance to the United States.

Their military success in the 1948-1949 war left the Jews with 20,850 square kilemeters or 77.4 per cent of the land and water surface of the former mandated territory. (Asadi,1976, Abdulfattah,1983, Zdyyad,1976) The Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian military rule and East Jerusalem and the remainder of the West Bank area was annexed to the Hashemite monarchy in Transjordan.

The 1948-1949 war represented a culmination of over fifty years of conflict regarding the fate of the Levant provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France wanted control of the Ottoman provinces for military-strategic and economic purposes. Beginning in the late 1800's an influx of European Jews added another dimension to the evolution of events that culminated in 1948. The creation by the British of Trans-Jordan, the League of Nations mandates, the efforts of the Zionists to win diplomatic approval from Britain, competition within the Arab world for positions of power, all contributed to the Palestinians' submersion in world-political developments. For thousands of years Arab Jews and Arabs in Palestine and all over the Middle Eastern lands

had experienced successive waves of conquering Empires
stimulating a re-organization of power, social organization,
ethnic relations. At this particular juncture in world
historical developments re-organization of power involved
internal conflict combined with presures from outside
forces, threatening the basis of Arab/Jewish life;
identification, mores, goals, possibilities. The
Palestinian from 1948 on, whether Jew or Arab, witnessed a
new level of military and moral destruction. In relation to
outside forces the struggle for survival at this juncture
took place on the basis of new definitions of who Jew and
Arab were; definitions framed by European imperialist
ideology.

The Zionist enterprise became inextricably tied to
imperialist ideology and policies with the issuance of the
Balfour Declaration in 1917. The Zionist enterprise
radically changed the import of Jewish emigration to
Palestine. Jews had emigrated to Palestine for centuries
for many reasons: the overriding motivation was safety. The
Arab lands welcomed Jews who within the status of dhimmi
were respected and for the most part encouraged to thrive.
Emigration from Russia and Poland in the late 1800's took
place within the context of far reaching changes on a world
wide scale. Nationalist movements within and outside of the
Middle Eastern lands were linked with economic, political
and religious survival.

Another critical factor linked to cultural survival changed the import of Jewish emigration to Palestine. In the final years of World War II tensions between the British and Jews escalated as members of the Jewish underground organized illegal rescue atttempts to save thousands of survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. Quotas restricted Jewish emigration world-wide. The fact that no other country would welcome Jews intensified the struggle for Palestine.

The aftermath of the Nazi Holocaust reinforced the power of those Zionists who asserted that all Gentiles were anti-semitic and that the only way to save Jews was by establishing a Jewish state. Ties of the Mufti of Jerusalem with Hitler in an effort to throw off British rule led to a generalized association of Arab with Nazi. The Holocaust experience became embedded in the psyche of the new state to unfold in a variety of scenarios. For many Jews the tragic experience justified any means that would secure Jewish national autonomy.

Historical developments in the final years of the British Mandate reinforced three critical beliefs that were incorporated into the ideology propagated by the new Jewish state. The first noted above, was an a-historical view of anti-semitism. That is, Herzl popularized the notion that all gentiles were anti-semitic no matter what the situation, location, or time. Secondly, Herzl and Weizmann encouraged the belief that Palestine was an empty land. In the late 1800's many Jews infused with a vision of a 'just society',

safe for Jews, emigrated to Palestine without any awareness
that people lived there. Both these beliefs represented a
western-ethnocentric view. They invalidated the historical-
cultural experience of the Palestinian Jew and Arab and were
propagated in ignorance of and at the expense of the Judeo-
Arabic heritage.

A third belief incorporated into the ideology of the
new state influenced the actions of many Jews in the
critical period in which the state was formed. This was the
belief that the fundamental goal of the Arab was to
annihilate the Jew. Several factors seemed to support this
belief. Disturbances in reaction to economic hardship and
social and religious disorganization resulting from the
British occupation resulted in attacks on Jews. Attacks on
Jews in reaction to increasing Zionist settlement were
another factor. For example, in 1929 in the town of Hebron,
local Arabs killed sixty-seven Jews and wounded sixty
others. Jews who had no knowledge of the history of
Arab/Jew coexistence came to regard these developments as
defining Jew/Arab relations.

Nationalism was linked to another belief that shaped
the way in which Jew/Arab relations evolved. Economic,
political, religious survival were tied to the concept of
territory as a way of defining peoples and ensuring their
hegemony. The Judeo-Arabic heritage provided a context for
national identification inclusive of Jew and Arab. Without
that context, one or the other had to prove their historic

right to the land. Ties to Palestine were embedded in Judaic and Islamic religiosity and political and social history. Movements justifying control of Palestine by Arab or by Jew came to usurp the political arena. Within that context each came to regard the other as mortal enemy.

The seemingly enormous contrast between this conclusion and traditional relations becomes understandable given the impact of historical developments described above. Traditional elements of tension became highlighted: issues of state power tied to economic survival, sectarianism tied to great power politics and most conclusively a form of national identification that was built on historical and current differences rather than shared history.

The Israeli state was created within this context and as a result of the factors outlined above- preparedness; superior military support, confusion of goals among the Arab states. The central question of this chapter is- what were the consequences of the new political status of Palestine for the Judeo-Arabic heritage? Stated in another way- now that the Jews had come into power, how would that power be used in relation to Arabs? Would the Arabs now become 'the dhimmi'?

Three views of the Israeli state frame sociological literature on the situation of Palestinian Arabs (now Israeli Arabs) in the Israeli state. The first and most popular, is coined 'nation-building' and uses a model of 'absorption-modernization' to describe the treatment of the

Israeli Arab by the state. In this context, the Arab is viewed as part of a 'traditional society' in the process of becoming modernized by Jewish society.(Landau,1969) The absorption-modernization model fosters an emphasis on the dual identity of Israeli citizen and Arab 'national' and studies the 'behavior' and 'reactions' of the Israeli Arab within that context. The emphasis thus is on the subordinate group and its cultural and psychological pecularities. In this context the Arab (subordinate group) is particularly vulnerable to the image of Arabs projected by the Jew, in control of mass media. Ethnic relations are removed from the context of economics and politics,i.e. history. Attitudes become an area of study, rather than the structural context that frames those attitudes.

The second view describes Israel as a colonial-settler state and raises questions about how Zionism does or does not parallel typical colonial models. In this case, the Israeli Arab is viewed from an historical perspective as part of the Palestinian people,a people who are being nationally suppressed. Research based on this perspective examines reactions to economic, political and religious repression , not as problems of psychological marginality but rather as the result of objective conditions. Two influential works analyze the situation of Israeli Arabs from this general perspective. Elia T. Zureik (<u>The Palestinians in Israel, A Study in Internal Colonialism</u>)1979 analyzes the effects of Zionist policies as a colonizing

movement. Ian Lustick (<u>Arabs in the Jewish State- Israel's Control of A National Minority</u>)1980, examines ways in which relationships between the Jewish Zionist community and the Arab community are defined by the goals of the dominant group. Lustick raises questions about the historical circumstances and fundamental conditions of Jewish and Arab life in Palestine and Israel that have been conducive to and/or reinforced the dependence of Arabs on Jews in Israel.

A third related view of the Israeli state is developed by Sammy Smooha. Smooha (<u>Israel: Pluralism and Conflict</u>)1978 describes Israel as a plural society made up of three distinct segments arranged in an economic, social,cultural and political hierarchy. Western Jews are at the apex; Oriental Jews in the middle and Israeli Arabs on the bottom. Smooha characterizes the status of the Arab minority as a 'quasi-caste' whose relations to the Jewish majority are controlled by a system of exclusion, dependence and subordination.

Our study is based on acknowledgement of the existence and importance of the Judeo-Arabic heritage and on an analysis of how that heritage fared, given the historical circumstances of life in the Middle Eastern lands. This model differs from others in that it establishes the importance of a continuous historical tradition that validates the age-old interrelationship of Jew and Arab. Our contention is that only by bringing the history of Jew-Arab interrationship into the foreground can we develop an

analysis of current relations that has integrity for Arab
and for Jew. This analysis serves that history rather than
the political investment of any particular group.

We have demonstrated that in 1948, the main historical
forces moving Israeli society to deal with the issue of
Arab/Jew relations were twofold. On the one hand there was
militarism associated with colonial intervention, European-
ethnocentrism, i.e., racism, distortion and lack of
information regarding the Middle East and national
identification tied to the notion of the right to possession
of land. On the other hand, there was a shared historical
experience, language, folk culture, tradition, way of life.
We have noted developments that gave power to the first set
of forces, the most significant being World War II, the
genocide of Eastern European Jewry and passive response of
the world. And we have noted the ways in which responses of
Jew and Arab to historical developments gave power to the
second; the most significant being attempts to build on a
shared historical experience in a variety of forms by
affirming shared origins, historical experience and national
identity. In analyzing uses of power by the Israeli state
and whether or not Arabs had become the new dhimmi, it is
necessary to keep in mind both sets of imperatives. We have
noted that the kinds of choices opened to and created by Jew
and Arab in the twentieth century were limited by the
escalation of military power, chauvinism in the form of
territorial 'rights', racism and mass murder. Under these

circumstances- the circumstances out of which a Jewish state
emerged- who were the conservators of the Judeo-Arabic
heritage? Who were the critics?

Social organization, economic survival, religious and political life, 1948-1982

We begin with a reiteration and clarification of
Zionist goals and how those goals affected social
organization, economic survival, religious and political
life of Jew and Arab in the new state. This discussion will
illustrate how the two sets of forces described above
influenced implementation of those goals.

Two fundamental goals affecting social organization,
economic survival, religious and political life were
acquisition of land and building an exclusively Jewish
labour force. As detailed in Chapter III some Zionists
believed Jewish land and labor were the key to establishing
a Jewish state. Others believed that it was reasonable to
limit settlement and that it was far more beneficial and in
fact crucial to join Arab and Jewish labor in creating a
common ecnomic base. The latter approach had precedent in
ties between Arab and Jew for centuries in Palestine
expressed through economic complementarity and connected to
shared agricultural practices.

The former belief- that Jewish land and labor were the
key to establishing a Jewish state- was supported by the

concept of national identification tied to territorial

rights, and maintained by military power. This concept was

supported by other popular ideologies. Religious

identification, the notion of God given right to the land

will be examined in two opposing manifestations- one ruling

out Jew-Arab coexistence and the other supporting it.

European-ethnocentrism, racism, distortion and lack of

information were belief systems that implicitly and

explicitly supported policies of land confiscation by

denying the existence and/or rights of non-Europeans.

Controversy regarding the 'exodus' of Palestinian Arabs

before, during and after the 1948-1949 war, illustrate this

point. From the publication of the UN partition resolution,

29 November 1947 until after the armistice in the summer of

1948 600,000 to 700,000 Arabs fled or were expelled from

their homes.(Flapan,1987:3) Territory won by the Zionists

in excess of what had been proposed by the United Nations

partition resolution for the Jewish state included Western

Galilee, 123,000 Arabs, the Jaffa enclave- 114,000 Arabs,

the Ramleh subdistricts and portions of sub-districts of

Nazareth including wholly Arab towns and villages. Almost

two-thirds of the 1948 refugees were from these areas.

(Cattan,1969) The General Assembly of the United Nations

meeting in June of 1949 estimated that 940,000 Arabs had

become refugees; the League of Red Cross Societies reported

one million.(Cattan,1969:72)

The popular view of the refugee situation and the one which was insisted upon by Israeli officials was that Palestinians had deserted the country by fleeing and therefore had no claim to it. Many Jews believed that the leaders of Arab states had told the Arabs to leave and that the Arab population did so of their own free will. Howard Sachar in The Course of Modern Jewish History, asserts that:

"The chaos was compounded by the presence of 650,000 Arab refugees from Israel. The plight of these pathetic, terrified creatures was the most heartbreaking tragedy of the Palestine War. It had been a needless tragedy. As the end of the Palestine mandate drew near, the Arab states bordering the Yishuv began to issue warnings to the Arabs of Palestine; they were told to clear out, to leave a clear field for Arab military operations, to seek temporary refuge in neighboring Arab lands. According to Arab League propaganda, there would be sufficient opportunity for all emigres to return, once the Jews had been driven into the sea. The propaganda was effective. As early as October 1947, small groups of Arab villagers began to leave Palestine; in succeeding months the numbers of departing Arabs swelled rapidly. It was vitally important for Ben-Gurion and his colleagues to check this flight. For one thing, the Arabs played an important role in the economy of the Yishuv; their sudden departure would merely complicate the problems of survival for the Jews. In Haifa, for example, Arab stevedores were needed to unload the freightage, the arms and supplies, upon which the new state would depend for its security. And Arab agricultural produce was even more crucial for the Jewish city populations. But more serious than these economic considerations, was the problem of world opinion. Israel was on trial before the world; the United Nations still had the power to attenuate Israel's boundaries, perhaps even to intervene with force. Every effort had to be made to keep the Palestinian Arabs at home, to give them equal rights and opportunities, if only to retain international good will.....In spite of the government's public and private assurances that they would not be harmed, the Arabs fled by the hundreds of thousands once the fighting broke out. They fled in answer to Arab League propaganda."(Sachar, 1977:485)

This assertion convinced many Jews of their both superior and deeper atttachment to Palestine. Louis Finklestein in The Jews their History, Culture and Religion, Vol IV, notes:

"One conclusion appears incontravertible. The mass flight of the Arabs came as a surprise to the Jews. Early in April, 1948, before the massacre of Deir Yassin, Ben-Gurion was speculating on the reasons for the flight of Arabs. During the latter part of the month, when the Jews took Haifa, the Jews pleaded with the Arab leaders not to encourage flight, and the Haganah distributed leaflets assuring the Arabs equal treatment. As the initial shock passed, however, the Jews ceased to discourage the exodus and even welcomed it.(Finklestein, 1960:710)

Supporting the view that the Jews ceased to discourage the exodus and even welcomed it, and the subsequent policy of not allowing refugees to return was the belief stated above that if the Arabs remained a majority Jews would not survive. Medad Yisrael, a West Bank settler expressed a commonly held perspective:

" The Jews, he said, had proved that the land was theirs by the way they lived on it. They caressed it. They cultivated it. They planted in it. And the land, in turn, gave them its fruits. What had the Arabs done for the land? What kind of lovers were they? They neglected it. Their allegiance was to the village rather than to the land. And if they had finally developed a Palestinian nat ionalism, they had done so only after having been confronted by the nationalism of the Jews...Besides, Medad added, during the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war, the Arabs ran away too easily, much as the Jews used to run away from towns in Poland and the Ukraine when hostilities would start in those regions; the Arabs ran because they weren't committed to the land, whereas the Jews in the Land of Israel, even during the war, would never leave it.
...."And I genuinely believe that if we lived under Arab rule the situation for us would by much much worse than the situation is for Arabs under Israeli rule. It would be a questions of our very survival. We would be killed. It would be Hebron, 1929; it would be Kfar Etzion, 1948."(Quoted in, 'A Stranger in My Home', Reich,Walter,Atlantic Monthly, June, 1984:54)

On the other hand evidence has surfaced which makes
clear that the military machine was utilized to a maximum in
order to achieve the Zionist goal of 'Jewish land'. Simha
Flapan in a carefully documented analysis 'The Palestinian
Exodus of 1948'(Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XVI, No.4,
Summer, 1987:3-26), notes that the Palestinian Arab
leadership would not have appealed to the Arab population to
leave since Arab armies coming from long distances needed
the help of the local population for food, fuel, water,
manpower and information."(Flapan, 1987:5) Declassified
documents reveal the efforts of the Arab Higher Council and
Arab states to restrain the flight. However, economic,
psychological and physical warfare forced Arabs to leave.
The military was the vehicle to realize Ben Gurion's goal of
making Israel as homogeneous as possible, and to make use of
the lands, properties and habitats of the Arabs to absorb
the masses of Jewish immigrants.(Flapan,1987:7) The
Haganah's Plan Dalet called for the destruction of villages,
expulsion of the population, closing of transport and
communication routes.(Flapan,1987:9) In addition to seizure
of territories and expulsions, the military utilized
terrorist tactics of looting, rape and murder to create a
situation of mass panic. The murder of women, men and
children in the village of Deir Yassin in April of 1948
shocked many Israelis and expresses clearly how
dehumanization dictates policies when run by the military.
On 12, 13, July, 1948, 50,000 Arabs were driven out of their

homes in Lydda and Ramleh.(Flapan,1987:13) For Ben-Gurion a condition rather than a deterrent of Jewish-Arab peace was the removal by any means necessary, whether through the terrorism of war or by means of transfer, of the Arab population. He asserted that the Arabs should not amount to more than 15 percent of Israel's total population; therefore Arabs who had fled could not be allowed to return.(Flapan,1987:17) In order to prevent their return, villages were razed and a series of laws instituted that turned land over to the military government. In spite of this evidence Ben Gurion wrote on 4 May, 1948, that: "history has proved who is really attached to this country and for whom it is a luxury which can be given up. Until now not a single (Jewish) settlement, not even the most distant, weak, or isolated, has been abandoned, whereas after the first defeat the Arabs left whole towns like Haifa and Tiberias in spite of the fact that they did not face any danger of destruction or massacre."(Flapan,1987:23)

There were voices of protest, externally and internally. On 25-27 May, 1948 the political committee of Mapam met to oppose official policy regarding the Arab refugees.(Flapan,1987:20) Outrage was voiced by Kibbutz members of the Haganah whose orders had been to promote non-aggression with their Arab neighbors. Yitzhak Avira, a founder of the Moaz Haim Kibbutz wrote: "Recently, a new mood has prevaded the public- 'the Arabs are nothing', 'all Arabs are murderers', 'we should kill them all', 'we should

burn all their villages',etc.,etc.. I don't intend to defend
the Arab people, but the Jewish people have to be defended
from deteriorating into far reaching
extremism."(Flapan,1987:19) On the other hand, extremism
was ignored by many, for example participants from Ahdut
Haavodah in the meeting of Mapam, who asserted that :"war
has its own meaning and its own rules, despite what might be
morally indefensible in any other situation. Thus Avrahim
Levite, one of the two party secretaries, acknowledged that
the cutting off of Jaffa was "very inhumane from the point
of view of absolute values." Still, he could "both justify
and welcome as a matter of highest morality and political
necessity every act of conquest - and the removal of every
Arab settlement- dictated by the needs of war." Levite
agreed that "every lawless act, all theft and looting, must
be fought vigorously, up to and including the meting out of
the death sentence." But, he felt, the immoral behavior of
the soldiers was finally a "secondary
question."(Flapan,1987:22)

The 'problem of the inhabitants' was dealt with in two
other ways: through the implementation of a series of laws
to ensure government control of the land and through the
establishment of a military administration.

In December of 1948 military rule was imposed on Arab
villages and towns based on Emergency Regulations enforced
by the British in reaction to the Arab Rebellion, 1936-1939.
Since a military ruler takes it upon himself to make

decisions that would normally be under the jurisdiction of the courts, it followed that the military administration established a set of laws based on military rule. This was done between 1948 and 1950 when legislation was enacted for formal seizure of property (lands, buildings). This legislation included the Abandoned Areas Ordinance (1948), the Cultivation of Waste Lands Regulation (1948), the Absentee Property Law (1950), the Development Authority (Transfer of Property Law (July, 1950).(Cattan,1969,Jiryis,1976,Lustick,1980) These laws were a necessary adjunct to the first act of the Provisional State Council, May 14, 1948 that abolished all restrictions on Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews. Over 684,000 new Jewish immigrants entered Israel between May 1948 and December, 1951. In two and a half years the Jewish population doubled. (Lustick,1980:44) Fifty percent of these immigrants came from Europe (including 100,000 Jews from displaced persons camps in Germany, Austria, Italy and Cyprus). The other half came from Iraq, Yemen, Turkey, Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, under a variety of circumstances stimulated by reaction to the Zionist victory. Settlement became a critical issue and was resolved by different means depending upon whether immmigrants came from Europe or from Asian and African countries. The differences will be discussed in subsequent sections.

Under the Abandoned Areas Ordinance the government had the power to declare any occupied area as 'abandoned', while

the cultivation of Waste Lands Regulation defined 'waste land' as any land which was not cultivated or "in the opinion of the Minister of Agriculture, was not 'efficiently' cultivated."(Cattan,1969:66) This land could be seized by the Minister of Agriculture. Refugees who were not allowed to return to their lands to cultivate them therefore lost them. Similarly the Absentee Property Regulations entitled the Custodian of Absentee Property to seize all property- land, buildings, possessions, money- of any citizen or resident of the Arab states or Palestine who had left his/her place of residence in Palestine, even if to take refuge from the war. Between 1948 and 1953, 350 of 370 new Jewish settlements were established on land classified as abandoned.(Lustick,1980) This land had been owned by Arab residents of Israel who were assigned "absentee status" by the government under the Absentee Property Regulations. In 1954 more than one third of Israel's Jewish population lived on land classified as 'absentee property'. Close to one third of the new immigrants (250,000 people) lived in urban areas that had been abandoned.(Lustick,1980:58) Furthermore, the Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law empowered the government to sell or lease acquired property only to the state, the Jewish National Fund, government institutions or local authorities of the State.

Article 125 of the Military Regulations imposed by the Israeli government granted the Military governor " the power

to proclaim any area or place a forbidden (closed)
area...which no one can enter or leave without.... a written
permit from the military commander or his deputy....failing
which he is considered to have committed a crime."
(Jiryis,1976:11) The majority of the Arab inhabitants of
Israel lived in the Galilee (60%) in the north, the
'Triangle' in the center of Israel (30%) and the Negev (10%)
in the South. Arab villages and settlements in these areas
were divided into 'closed areas': no Arab could leave or
enter without a written permit from the military governor
assigned to the area.(Jiryis,1976:89) Article 110 allowed
the military governor to place any person under police
supervision for at least a year subject to renewal. There
are contradictions in how many historians view the
consequences of land confiscation and the threat of the
Arabs to Israeli security. Historian Oscar I. Janowsky in
'The Rise of the State of Israel', expresses a commonly held
view:

"The Jewish National Home was built in the midst of an
Arab majority which was inevitably affected by the far
reaching changes. That the Arab population, or at least its
leadership, was hostile has beennoted, but this hostility
was not the result of harmful economic or social effects
suffered by the Arabs. On the contrary, they profited, at
least materially, from the coming of the Jews....The Jews
bought all but an insignificant fraction of the land they
acquired, and the exorbitant prices paid by them enriched
the Arabs. Except for some 317 families, Arab cultivators
did not become landless as a result of direct land sales to
Jews. The Arab death rate and infant mortality declined,
and the Arab population of Palestine grew more rapidly than
in neighborhing countries. Jewish medical and health
facilities helped the Arabs, and banks and mortage companies
were available to them. They were encouraged by the example
of the Jew to improve farming methods, develop industry,
organize co-operatives, combat usury. Their wages were
higher, agricultural productivity greater, and per capita

national income larger than in neighboring Arab lands.
Moreover, Jews made repeated attempts to promote
understanding and co-operation with the Arabs. The
Histradrut helped in the organization of Arab labor and in
the attainment of better working conditions. In the middle
1920's, the "Brit Shalom" group, in the early 1940's the
"Ihud" group, and especially the League for Arab-Jewish
Rapprochement, all worked for co-operation. These elements
were not numerous, but they included prominent Zionist
leaders who exerted considerable influence....However, the
differences between Arabs and Jews were too fundamental to
be bridged by these efforts. Estrangement deepened and the
two peoples constituted separate and self-contained
communities. By the end of the Second World War, the Jews
were a vigorous community with a dynamic economy and
effective political leadership. The Arabs, too, were
organized, determined, and militant. A quarter-century of
conflict had reached a critical stage, and decisive events
were in the making."(Janowsky,O. in Finkelstein,L.,
1960:699)

However, evidence detailed above indicates that state

ideology supported policies intended to keep Arabs from

reclaiming land and intended to control the Arab population.

Arabs were represented as a 'security threat' to the nation.

On the basis of security related issues many acts of

repression were justified by the military administration.

The definition of 'Arab' was circumscribed by military

objectives. In spite of a history of cooperative discussion

of the possibilities for Arab/Jew coexistence in Palestine

detailed in Chapter III, some of which is noted by Janowsky,

Arabs came to represent a monolithic group with one purpose

destructive to the Jewish state.

One of the reasons that many Jews were convinced of

their extreme vulnerability in relation to Arabs was the

recent confirmation of a history of anti-Jewish sentiment

erupting into violence. Those elements in the history of

Arab-Jew relations supporting these fears, loomed large.

For recently arrived immigrants in particular the myth that Jews represented a monolithic group whose purpose was to destroy the world, was fresh in their minds, alive in their bodies. As noted above half of the Jews who were settled on confiscated land were near-victims of the Holocaust. While for many Jews settlement was a priority related to military security, for others settlement meant the end to homelessness; to possible genocide. In 1948 Palestine reverberated with the intensity of colonial politics mixed with the urgencies created by mass murder and by the struggles of indigenous peoples to preserve their cultural integrity, their historic experience, their livelihoods and homes.

Many Jews and Arabs, recognizing the tragic confluence of events, understood the far reaching significance of the choices facing the Israeli government . Yaakov Hazan, a leader of Hashomer Hatzair and Mapam, insisted " that policy could not be based on what the Arabs "might have done" to the Israelis. Haganah participation in killing, plundering and raping Arab villages in the Galilee, he argued, could be ended by the shooting of one soldier. He rejected the notion that the Israeli army was bound to be like all other armies. "Poison is being injected into our lives and it won't stop with the end of the war." Hazan warned that the final result would be a kind of Jewish fascism and that if the country didn't build a united labor movement of Jews and Arabs, it would end up similar to South

Africa."(Flapan,1987:21,22) Other Jews viewed the circumstances differently. They took events to be an indication that the Israeli government must seize this historic moment and use any means necessary to resolve the 'Jewish issue' in modern terms.

Opposition to the hardships imposed by military regulations specifically to the treatment of Arabs came from Arab groups and from coalitions of Jew and Arabs. In 1958 with the May Day Demonstrations, the Arab Popular Front was formed, to be replaced by the politically active Al Ard movement in 1959. In December of 1961, the Jewish-Arab Committee for the Abolition of the Military Government organized a mass demonstration against military rule. The dominant political party, Mapai, formed with the merger of Achdut and Hapael Hatzair in the early thirties, was forced to form a coalition with Mapam, which insisted on a government review of its policy toward the Arabs. The following statement was signed by representatives from twenty kibbutzim in the summer of 1958:'About 200,000 of the inhabitants of Israel, belonging to another religion and with a different nationality, do not enjoy equal rights and are the victims of discrimination and repression. The overwhelming majority of Arabs in Israel live under a system of military government which deprives them of their fundamental rights as citizens...' (Jiryis,1976:38) In February, 1965, 400 demonstrators from Tel Aviv went to the closed area near Carmiel to make known their disagreement

with government discrimination against ' a section of the
citizens of the country'. (Jiryis,1976:110)

In spite of these efforts, and the abolition of the
military regime in 1966, and contrary to Janowsky's
assertions, violations of the civil rights and denial of the
national rights of Arabs in Israel fostered socio-economic
inequality and tensions.

As noted above, the goal of establishing a strong
economic base controlled by Jews was connected to the goal
of Jewish land. In the early stages of Zionist settlement
in the late 1800's Zionists had been helped in these efforts
by changes in the socio-economic structure already underway
in the Ottoman lands. These changes were precipitated by a
new relationship to the European governments, both voluntary
and involuntary. Absentee Arab landowners sold land in
order to acquire cash to enter into capitalist agriculture.
For example, by selling poorer lands they were able to
accumulate capital to improve orange production on their
better lands. (Davis,1977:14) In spite of this and other
means to acquire land, by 1948 Jewish owned land amounted to
only six percent of the total area of Palestine. In
addition to land won in the aftermath of the 1948-1949 war,
the new government rectified this through methods detailed
above.

Loss of land was a major factor in the changing
occupational base of Arabs and in tensions that resulted
from ensuing conditions, for example, inferior living

conditions and lack of economic power. Separation of Jewish and Arab labor was part of and was maintained by the institutionalization of a legal and extra-legal structure of segregation. For example, Israel's labor federation, the Histradrut, continued to provide benefits for Jewish workers, including fair wages and work conditions, productive positions, health benefits, social recreational facilities, and investment opportunities The Histradrut established controls in almost every area of the Israeli economy. It sponsored collective agricultural units, cooperative farms, and commercial cooperatives. Members of the Histradrut were entitled to shares in a unit Heurat Ovdim which representing the Histadrut in corporate form. The Histradrut controlled manufacturing and mining operations, construction companies, and service enterprises. Besides being Israel's national labour union and major employer, all members of the Labour Party holding a central position in determining national policy and ideology were also members of the Histadrut. (Zureik,1979:18)

On the other hand, between 1949 and 1952 the majority of the Arab labor force was concentrated in farming for Jewish owned enterprises and construction, and received thirty-five to seventy percent of Jewish wages for similar work. Arabs were increasingly forced to leave their villages for employment in the Jewish sector. A major factor inhibiting development of the Arab sector, lack of government subsidies, prevented industrialization of many

Arab villages. For example, in 1975 out of 105 villages, only 43 had electricity;less than half of Arab villages had no immediate or future plans to acquire electricity. (Zuriek,1979:133)

Earlier in this chapter we raised the question of whether or not Arabs had become the 'dhimmmi' of Israeli society. Many within and outside Israeli society point to the Israeli Declaration of Independence (1948) promising full consitutional rights to all of its inhabitants. On the other hand, sociological literature notes that Arabs are treated on a separate legal basis as a linguistic, religious and cultural minority. For example, there is no basis in Israeli law for intermarriage between Jew and Arab. The Law of Return guarantees automatic citizenship to Jews, not Arabs. (Davis,1977,Jiryis,1976,Lustick,1980) Arabs are barred from military service and are thereby excluded from subsidized housing and other benefits afforded those who have served in the army. On the basis of the 1953 National Insurance Law created to encourage families to bear many children, Israelis received twenty Israeli pounds per child. When it was discovered that Arabs, who tended to have large families, were benefiting more than Jews, the law was changed to confer family allowances based on military service. Arabs were thus denied benefits.

In some cases the civil rights of Arabs were infringed upon because of the Israeli government's refusal to recognize the Arabs as a people with their own national

goals. Political and civil liberties were upheld where Arabs were willing to identify themselves and their goals with that of the Ashkenazi ruling elite.

Before he became Minister of Defense and leader of the Labor Party, Shimon Peres, in 1962 categorized Israel's Arab minority as :"the indifferent resigned; the actively hostile; the hostile resigned", asserting that it was up to the government to decide which of these groups would dominate the Arab community. (Lustick,1980:67) In 1976 a confidential memorandum by an Arabist in the Ministry of Interior, Israel Koenig, made recommendations for the creation of a new political force in the Arab sector to be controlled by the government. He advocated the adoption of: "tough measures at all levels against various agitators among college and university students" and economic discrimination against Arabs to deprive them of the "social and economic security that relieves the individual and the family of day to day pressures, (and) grants them, consciously and subconsciously, leisure for 'social-nationalist thought.' (Lustick,1980:255,Shipler,1987:442)

Arab nationalist identification is suppressed by the Israeli government is encouragment of divisions in the Arab community between Muslim, Druse, and Christian and between antagonistic kinship groups. For example, the government refuses to identify the Druse as 'Arab' in spite of protests from the Druse community. The Druse receive more help in the form of government subsidies and local development

programs and are allowed a very modest role in the military which qualifies them for further benefits.

Discrimination and suppression of national identification is also reflected in the educational system. Because of economic discrimination, many Arab children had to work instead of attending school. Classes were crowded due to lack of government assistance. On the university level Arab students were not allowed to enroll in areas such as electronics and aeronautics for 'security' reasons. Eighty four percent of Arab graduates in the humanities and social sciences became teachers. The role of the Arab teacher has been riddled with contradictions. To keep his/her job, he/she has had to conform in some measure to a curriculum that is denigrating to Arabs. While in Jewish schools the historic struggle of the Jewish nation is lauded, two percent of the total number of hours has been alloted to Arab history. Arab children learn about their own history through a negative perspective; their own cultural and literary achievements have been ignored. Arab students must learn Hebrew but Jewish children have not been required to study Arabic. Lack of adequate teaching materials on Arab history and culture makes the Jewish population vulnerable to the characterization and reduction of Arabs to a 'security risk' potentially subversive and a threat to the coninued existence of the state. Arab children have experienced alienation and lack of motivation. In 1975 the median number of years of schooling among Arabs

was six as against 9.6 among Jews. Gaps in attendance rate
and literacy have reflected the neglect of the Arab sector
in terms of resources, relevant curriculum and job
opportunities.

Israeli citizenship has not provided Arabs with
positions of power within those institutions and
organizations that control the state. Of the 1,860
officials listed in Israeli ministries and independent
agencies in 1976, only twenty six were Arabs. Arab citizens
have had contact with the government through special 'Arab
Deparments' that have functioned without established budgets
or long-range programs.(Lustick,1980:93) Political power
has been concentrated in central committees, secretariats,
nomination committees of Zionist political parties.

Political parties have attempted to gain Arab votes
through cooptation of village notables and others who are
rewarded with tax privileges, jobs and other benefits. For
example, the director of the Arab branch of the Labor Party
in the western Galilee argued that:"To block the trend to
Rakah (Communist Party) and the formation of other
nationalist groups we must take care of young Arabs. We
must give them party membership and (what might be called)
"directed democracy". First of all we must identify those
who criticise us and then join them to us. Then we must
open more clubs in Arab villages and hire young Arabs to
staff them. Through such clubs we can provide additional
funds for musical performances, folklore groups, films,

lectures, trips or other activities which they want- make
them feel a little 'Israeli'. After they get these things,
they'll forget about their nationalism...of course we have
been doing these things but just look at how many of our
clubs are closed down and dusty- we need more funds and
workers to do what is necessary." (Personal interview with
Eliyahu Ronen, Acre, April 1, 1974) (Lustick,1980)

The Ministry of Religious Affairs has been the prime
authority in religious matters and its functions are
connected to control of land. In 1948 the government seized
Islamic Waqf property(property endowed for religious
purposes) and set up courts of Islamic law. Islam's
religious judges, Qadis were appointed by the Minister of
Religions. Islam's court authorities, Shari'a qadis, were
appointed by a committee of nine, four of whom could be non-
Muslims. The government rejected a proposal to reinstate a
higher Muslim Council, maintaining the request represented a
"political rather than a religious aspiration".
(Jiryis,1976:198)

The intermixture of religion and politics is
reminiscent of issues related to the dhimmi under Islamic
law. However, many in Israeli society point to the ways
that devout Muslims and Orthodox Jews respect each other's
religiosity, and that Jews and Arabs continue to participate
in each other's religious rituals as they have for
centuries. For example, the Israelis have set up an Islamic

museum in West Jerusalem to display art and handicrafts of Islamic societies.(Shipler,1987:374)

Along similar lines many assert that Arabs and Jews continue to complement each other culturally and that Israeli society has simply provided a new and more stable context for interaction. To support this view some point to the improved standard of living of Arabs through access to modern conveniences. Many Israeli Arabs function in important bureaucratic roles that confer status and privilege. Others also assert that failures in the system can be attributed to resistance among traditional elements to change, i.e., modernization. For example, they assert that ancient antagonisms among sectarian groups, kinship groups and villages, contribute to lack of leadership and organizational skills required to meet the needs of life in a modern society. However, in spite of improved living conditions for some Arabs, segregation of Jew and Arab based on the ideological position of the state as described above has continued to result in an overall lower standard of living and lack of access to resources available to Jews. And in spite of divisiveness among sectarian groups, etc., Arabs from a range of political perspectives have developed an organizational base from which to advocate for improvements.

For example, after the '48 war, anti-Zionist Jewish communists joined with Arabs to form the Israel Communist Party (Maqi). In 1965 the predominantly Arab Rakah or New

Communist List split from Maqi. Rakah organized the Arab general strike, March 1976 known as Land Day to protest expulsions and expropriations of land. Rakah's activities were based on the belief that Arab and Jewish workers as citizens of the same state have common interests and mutual goals and that discrimination on the basis of nationality, whether by the government, the Histradrut or other national institutions must be abolished. Until 1984 it was the only place where Arab voters could express their dissatisfaction with government policy. While Rakah has supported Israel's right to exist it has opposed the Zionist character of the state. (Lustick,1980,Schnall,1980) Haolam Hazeh formed in 1969, called for a regional Semitic Confederacy ensuring repatriation of Arab refugees. The Israeli Socialist Organization, Matzpen, composed of native Israelis from mixed backgrounds, Christian Arabs and more recent European immigrants, advocated the elimination of discrimination against Palestinian Arabs and Oriental Jews through the elimination of Zionism. Its platform included replacing the Histadrut with a trade organization run by workers committees; separation of religion and state; and elimination of the Law of Return.(Schnall,1980:92)

The First Arab Students Committee was formed in 1958 and joined with groups of Jewish students to protest discriminatory practices against Arabs.(Lustick,1980:26) Attempts by the Israeli government to break up these organizations have escalated in recent years, including

arrests, deportations and excluding student members from the job market. All of these groups represent support for Jewish-Arab coexistence and in this sense are the conservators of the Judeo-Arabic heritage.

Along with political parties and student organizations, a third element produced a movement that most poignantly represents the Judeo-Arabic tradition. The Black Panthers were an organization representing the interests of Jews from Middle Eastern countries outside of Palestine and North Africa. Between 1948 and 1956 thousands of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa were forced to leave their countries because of political tensions created by the emergence of the Jewish state. Zionists had already established organizations in these countries beginning in the late 1800's to encourage emigration to Palestine/Israel. However when these Jews arrived in Israel they found themselves in an environment shaped by the cultural mores of its European pioneer ruling elite. The term 'Oriental' became a reference point for discrimination based on the mythology that Jews from Middle Eastern and North African countries were, like the Arabs, backward, primitive, in need of European education and values.

Conditions for the 'Oriental' Jew were much worse than for the European Jew. Alex Bein notes that: 'The Ashkenazi (East European) Jews of the old yishuv had already settled in the towns and would probably not be suitable for other than urban occupations; but the Oriental Jews, particularly

those belonging to the Yemenite and Persian communities, could enter agriculture. As their needs were few, they could compete against the Arabs. Already Yemenite Jews were being employed for seasonal work at several Jewish settlements. If they could be transferred permanently to the settlements, there would be employment for them, while their women folk could work as domestic servants in the settlers' homes instead of Arab women."(Davis,1979:35) Oriental Jews served two related purposes in the Jewish State: of providing an underclass of labourers to help build the state, and acting as a competitive sector with the Arab sector.(Davis,1977,Schnall,1980,Smooha,1978)

The image of the Arab Jew as primitive, backward and without culture was used to justify the conditions these Jews were forced to endure when arriving in Israel. Most were crowded into transit camps and offered only manual jobs. In fact, as Uri Davis points out, many of the Jews from Asis and Africa were part of the cultural elite of their countries. Davis quotes B. Nadel, Yediot Aharonot, 23/7/1976: "Moroccan Jews tended to be the capitalists in that largely agrarian state. They were big, medium and small merchants, but also craftsmen such as gold, copper and silversmiths and carpenters. They made money by trading in the local Muslim produce and mediated between the French regime and the population at large, as well as between the local rulers and their subjects. They had a long and proud cultural tradition- Jews had resided in Morocco already in

the days of Bar Kachva (132-135 A.D.).....Jews emigrated from Morocco in the pre-state illegal immigrant ships and were detained by the British Mandate's authorities in camps in Cyprus. In 1948, several thousand Moroccan Jewish youth rushed to Israel and fought the Egyptian army, participating in the hardest battles in the south of the country, especially on those fronts where our soldiers had failed so far (f.i. against the Egyptian Hulaygat fortifications). Many of those youths were killed and many more were injured, yet after the war their achievements were forgotten. They had come without their families and had no relatives in the country, so they demonstrated in the streets for some sort of state assistance. They were nicknamed 'knifing Moroccan". Most of them went back to Morocco and returned only years later with the mass wave of immigration from Morocco."(Davis,1979:43) Discrimination and poor conditions in education, housing, jobs, continued. In 1968, the average family income of western Jews in Israel was 1116 Israeli pounds while that of 'Oriental' Jews was 470 pounds. (Schnall,1980:160) Only about half of Oriental Jewish families live with less than two people per room. In 1969/70 there were twice as many Ashkenzim in high status white collar occupations and 1.7 more Orientals in low status jobs. The history and culture of Oriental Jews has been grossly underrepresented in school textbooks.

The Black Panthers was started by teenagers from slums of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem who began organizing for better

housing, jobs and education. They believe that the treatment of "Oriental' Jews reflected the government's obsession with breaking all ties to Arab culture. Some members of the Black Panthers defined their goals as linked with those of the Palestinian Arab: "We favor the creation of a Palestinian state next to Israel and oppose the secularization of Israel. The large portion of Oriental Jews support the right wing, not out of a sympathy with their views so much as out of sheer protest and a desire for an organized opposition. We believe that the Oriental community can be a force of peace and understanding with the Arab world. We have much in common. When Oriental Jews get together with Arabs there is an immediate affinity."(Smooha,1980:166) Sammy Smooha believes an alliance between Oriental Jew and Arab is discouraged by the 'religious-national quasi-caste line': ..."the emphasis on the sectarian Jewish character of the state solidifies two quasi-castes, stressing Oriental membership in the superior Jewish quasi-caste and consequently downplaying the Oriental-Ashkenazi division." (Smooha,1980:102) More than in any other case the situation of Oriental Jews represents the consequences of a European ethnocentric racist view that pits Jew against Jew. Further those who opt for assimilation of the Arab Jew to western mores as a solution to unequal conditions are critics of the Judeo-Arabic heritage.

Another group whose political reference point is the Judeo-Arabic heritage comes from a religious perspective. As noted earlier, religious identification with the land was a major element supporting the Zionist goal of Jewish land. But Naturei Karta is a religious anti-Zionist organization led until 1974 by Rabbi Amram Blau, a Palestinian Jew from one of Jerusalem's oldest families. This group has asserted that any attempt at Jewish independence without 'divine intervention' is heretical and that Zionist aspirations are in addition the main factor disrupting Arab-Jewish cooperation in the Middle East. Rabbi Blau's relations with Arabs prior to Zionism were close; he maintained communications with Moslem leaders in Jordan and East Jerusalem until his death. Naturei Karta opposed participation in the Va'ad Leumi (Jewish National Council) and voting in municipal elections.(Schall,1980:8)

The above represent viewpoints of individuals, organizations and movements that from a variety of perspectives have acted as conservators of the Judeo-Arabic heritage. Their criticisms have emerged from the ways in which the Israeli government has encouraged separation of Arab and Jew. The Israel Defense Force and Gush Emunim represent the opposite perspective. Critics of the Judeo-Arabic heritage, both organizations are based on ideologies that ensure the polarization of Jew and Arab on both a theoretical and day to day practical level.

Military service in the Israel Defence Force is compulsory for men and women; 35 months for men and 24 for women at age 18, with annual reserve duty for thirty years. Ihe I. D. F. grew out of the Haganah, the military arm of the Jewish Agency in pre-forty-eight Palestine. Schnall quotes the following characterIztion of the effect of the I. D. F. on Israeli culture:" A certain cockiness, as well as a well developed sense of independence, has also been noted and may be correlated to the role of the military in Israeli life. Suffice it to say that every veteran can find satisfaction and status in his reminisciences of military life and many look forward to reserve duty as a change of pace from the mundane world they know. There can be little doubt a major cultural contribution can be attributed to Zahal in its influence on popular culture."(Schnall,1980:48) The I. D. F. is considered a training ground for political leadership: the Ministry of Defense is the most powerful cabinet post. The power of the Ministry of Defense to overide courts has been cited above. Militarization of Israeli society is reflected in the privileges afforded those who have served in the army. The Israeli military represents the national commitment of the society as a whole, so that exclusion of Arabs from the Army makes them particularly vulnerable to feeling they are 'outsiders'. Worthiness is measured by serving in the army: explicit privileges granted to those who have performed military service is testimony to that fact. Security is the reason

most often given for justifying limitations on equal rights for Arabs.

Although often at odds with the government in terms of tactics, Gush Emunim (the Block of the Faithful) also believes that the primary goal of the Arab states is to destroy the Jewish state. Gush Emunim has launched a massive settlement movement, justified by a religious interpretation of history that inhabiting the land of Israel is equivalent to fulfilling all other religious requirements. In this sense they are implicitly linked with the I. D. F.: war has a holy purpose and is the expression of full devotion to an ideal. Gush Emunim ideology places history within a religious context: that is, the only significant events are those that happen 'outside of time' through religious revelation. Whether or not they are members of Gush Emunim, Jews who hold this belief consider the Arabs to be 'strangers in their house', a sentiment often voiced by Palestinian Arabs (and Palestinian Jews) toward the European Jew.

The 1967 War and Consequences of the Occupation for Jewish/Arab Relations

Post 1948 competition for power between Egypt and Jordan and between Israel and Egypt dominated inter-Arab politics and attempts of the Israeli government to establish allies from among the Arab States. Israel's commitment to

share power with Jordan inhibited the government's ability to negotiate with Egypt, or with the Palestinians. The Baghdad Pact, February 1955 between Britain, Turkey, Iraq and Iran created a defense organization and triggered defensive reactions from Egypt and from Israel.(Evron, p 33)1973 Within the Israeli government, the Lavon Affair, 1954 stimulated internal divisions, and the return of Ben Gurion to power in 1955. A group of Israeli agents were accused of setting off bombs in American establishments in Egypt in an attempt to disrupt the newly emerging U.S./Egyptian alliance. Minister of Defense Pinhas Lavon was forced to resign and two Jewish agents in Egypt were hanged.(Evron,1973:36) Ben Gurion supported the 1955 attack on Gaza in reaction to the threat that Egypt posed to Israel. Shortly after, Egypt launched Fedayeen attacks against Israel. During 1955, 234 Arabs and 55 Israelis were killed,for the most part along the Israeli-Egyptian border. When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 tensions escalated.(Evron,1973:38) On the eve of the 1956 British, French and Israeli attack on Egypt, curfews were imposed by Israeli security forces on Arab villages.(Davis,1977:147) According to official court records instructions were to kill anyone who broke the curfew, whether aware of it or not..." a dead man (or according to other evidence 'a few dead men') is better than the complications of detention." Forty nine Arabs, including seven children and nine women returning from work to the village of Kufr Qasim after the

curfew with no knowledge of it, were "taken off bicycles, carts and lorries, lined up and shot at close range."(Davis,1977:147) The 1956 war in which Israeli British and French armies overran Gaza, the Sinai and Suez Canal area not only resulted in extensive suffering for Jews and for Arabs in Israel and in Egypt, but also acted as a stimulus to Palestinian student activists in Cairo who formed a commando battalion to help the Egyptian war effort.

Between 1948 and 1967 Palestinians joined a range of nationalist organizations: the Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Arab Ba'th socialist party, the Arab Nationalist Movement.(Quandt,1973) Some were attracted to Egypt's president Gamal Abdul Nasser's nationalism, others became influential politicians within the Hashemite regime in Jordan.(Quandt,1973) Those who rejected Jordanian authority and Nasserism (Arab unity under Egyptian leadership) or Syrian nationalism began to build on a vision of Palestinian nationalism that had been emerging since the early 1900's. The most important of these organizations, al-Fatah, was formed by a group of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip, in the mid-50's, whose spokesperson was Yasar Arafat. In the late 40's and 50's students at American University of Beirut formed a political organization led by a Palestinian of Greek Orthodox background, Dr. George Habash. Other Palestinian groups with tenuous connections to the Arab National Movement surfaced between 1965 and 1966. One was the Palestine

Liberation Front, led by Palestinian Ahmad Jibril, to which several branches of the Arab National Movement belonged.(Quandt,1973,Cobban,1984)

The resurgence of the Palestinian movement with the establishment of al-Fatah in the years between the Suez War in 1956, the failure of union between Egypt and Syria (1958-1961) and the June War (1967) were characterized by an impatience with Arab regimes and political parties in the area. (Quandt,1973) Al-Fatah asserted that pan-Arabism would not solve the Palestinian problem. Al-Fatah attempted to disentangle itself from intra-Arab rivalries and competing ideologies within the Arab nationalist movement by focusing on building a military, financial and social support system for Palestinians. George Habash's movement, on the other hand, asserted that a socialist revolution that would affect the entire Arab world was a necessary corollary of the Palestinian movement.

In the mid-60's several Palestinian groups initiated military raids against Israel in an attempt to escalate tensions between Israel and the Arab states. This was one factor that motivated the Arab League, and especially Nasser to create the Palestine Liberation Organization as an umbrella for all organizations serving the cause of the Palestinian Arabs..

All four elements; intra-Arab tensions, Israeli-Arab conflicts, domestic differences within Israel and rivalries between Arab states contributed to developments culminating

in the 1967 War. Following the failure of unity talks with
Syria and Iraq, in 1964 Nasser announced that the Arabs
would not take military action to prevent Israel's diversion
of Jordan River Waters to the Negev.(Evron,1973) Nasser's
stand disillusioned moderates in the Arab Nationalist
Movement and spurred others to develop a more radical
ideology.

At the same time many within Israel were taking a
radical stance in response to policies of Arab countries.
Goldschmidt notes that:"It is true, though, that Arab
hostility made Israel's life harder. All road and rail
connections between Israel and its neighbors were cut.
Planes flying to and from Israel could not fly over Arab
countries, let alone land in their airports. The Arab
countries refued to trade with Israel and imposed a boycott
against the products of any foreign firm that did business
there....Ships carrying goods to Israel could not pass
through the Suez Canal or even enter certain Arab ports.
Egypt blockaded the Straits of Tiran between the Red Sea and
the Gulf of Aqaba, hampering the development of Israel's
port at Eilat. Arab diplomats abroad publicly shunned their
Israeli counterparts. Arabic books, newspapers, and radio
broadcasts were often viruleent in their hostility to Israel
and is supporters." (Goldschmidt,1983:260) Egypt's refusal
to allow Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran,
guerrilla attacks around the Israeli borders, and an
economic recession were the circumstances under which Israel

attacked Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1967. As a result of this war and of the 1973 October War in which Egypt and Syria planned a co-ordinated attack in an attempt to retrieve territory, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank of Jordan, the Sinai Desert and Golan Heights of Syria and the Gaza Strip. Refugees from the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a result of the Israeli Arab War of June 1967 were estimated by the government of Jordan in May of 1968 at 410,248. (Cattan,1969)

Since 1967 the occupied territories have been a focus for the realization of Zionist policy, a source of controversy that has attracted world-wide attention and a crisis area for Jew/Arab relations. For many occupation of the west Bank of the Jordan River has come to symbolize fulfillment of the Zionist mission. The poignancy of the claims that have supported the Israeli government are embedded in its soil: historical necessity, theological rights tied to national identification, military necessity. For some Jews the West Bank is 'Judea' and 'Samaria', ancient site of Jewish kings and prophets. In the words of one West Bank settler: "This is where David ran from Saul. On that hill Judah Maccabee sprang a trap on an occupying Syrian army many times the size of his and won Jewish independence. North of here, in Shechem, which the Arabs call Nablus, Arbraham made his first stop in Canaan, and Joshua his farewell address. On the other side of those hills is Shiloh, where we've just built a Jewish settlement,

where I live with my wife and children, and where, 3,000
years ago, we made our first capital and became a people.
This is a place from which we were repeatedly expelled and
to which we repeatedly returned. And now we've returned
once again. We're back to stay. This is Israel. This is
my home."(Reich,1984:54-90) This settler is one of 30,000
who by 1980 relocated on the West Bank. Some went with
similar convictions; others to fulfill the goal of military
security; others to take advantage of government subsidies
that made it possible for them to work in Tel Aviv or
Jerusalem and live cheaply in West Bank housing.

For many Arabs, refugees of the 1967 war and those who
have remained on the West Bank, the occupation has the
opposite significance. It represents the culmination of
centuries of occupation- first by the Ottoman Turks, then by
the British and the Jordanians. Their ancestral ties to the
land have sharpened into nationalist fervor, a determination
to put an end to the economic hardships, and political
repression that have characterized Jordanian occupation and
that continue under Israeli occupation. Examination of the
effects of Israeli economic and settlement policies in the
West Bank ('Judea' and 'Samaria'), and its effects on
indigenous life, will illustrate why.

Since 1967 the major economic byproduct of the Israeli
occupation has been the export of labor services to Israel
itself. Many Palestinian small farmers, artisans, and
shopkeepers could not compete with wages paid by Israeli

capitalists or the Palestinian bourgeoisie, and have themselves been forced into wage labor. The number of Palestinian wage earners from the West Bank and Gaza working in Israel increased from 9,000 in 1969 to 70,000 in 1974.(Hilal,1977:169)

During the eighteen years of Jordanian rule there was a high rate of unemployment and no significant industrial or agricultural investment in the West Bank region of the Jordan River. After 1967, the Israeli government imposed a range of programs that resulted in dependent specialization in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel acquired a large trade surplus with the territories: by 1973 the territories were their second largest export market. Small factories, workshops and other enterprises became dependent on the Israeli market or world capitalist market. For example, Israel encouraged exports of agricultural products to Europe and the Arab States (through a policy of 'open bridges' to Jordan) and encouraged agricultural production to meet the particular needs of Israel's internal and external markets.(Hilal,1977)

Palestinian wage laborers have borne the brunt of the economic changes brought about by occupation. Workers from the West Bank in Israel have been in large part confined to manual labor; without benefits and receiving lower wages than Israelis. Conditions of life as itinerant workers have been dangerous and exhausting. Workers sleep in shanties, sheds, garages and commute three to six hours a day on

buses. Women have been forced into full time 'outside'
work, along with full time responsibility for family
domestic labor.

Workers remaining in the West Bank and Gazahave been
faced with unemployment and worse wages. Many families have
been without electricity: 81 percent in the West Bank and 92
percent in Gaza were without running water; 84 percent on
the West Bank and 87 percent in Gaza were without
bathrooms.(Hilal,1977:170)

Political and security considerations have dominated
economic policy and social organization in the occupied
territories. The Israeli government has avoided large-scale
public investment to avoid a decision on the political
future of the territories. West Bankers have been required
to submit to Israeli security requrements as holders of
Israeli I.D.'s as well as to Jordanian security provisions
as holders of Jordanian passports.(Avkadie,1977,Dakkah,1983)
All signs of Palestinian nationalist sentiment have been
consistently censored and repressed. Strict measures were
taken against active members of the Palestine Liberation
Organization; political assembly was outlawed and
organizations suppressed to hinder the development of West
Bank nationalist leadership and a cohesive political
community.

The basic principles of West Bank policy have been are
the same as those that governing pre-1948 strategy:
settlement, economic hegemony, military security. The

Israel Defense Force has been charged with maintaining the territories as 'defensive outposts', a means to 'alter the hostile intentions of our Arab neighbors'.(Maloz,1984:62) With these aims in mind, in October of 1978, after the Camp David accords, the government produced a comprehensive five year plan for settlement of 'Judea' and 'Samaria', Their objective was to create Jewish enclaves among the "population areas of the minorities- that is the 800,000 Palstinian inhabitants."(Nakleh,1983)   The settlement strategy was to surround major Palestinian towns to prevent their expansion and cut off Arab towns from each other. The massive loss of land by West Bank Palestinians and their replacement by tens of thousands of Israeli Jews attracted by subsidized housing and supported by the pioneer zealots of Gush Emunim has clarified the grounds of Arab/Jewish hostilities.

Disposession of the indigenous population has been encouraged by means other than land confiscation. Potential leaders were encouraged to emigrate; for example, during 1981/82 the military closed down Bir Zeit Univeristy on the West Bank. for 'security reasons' on three separate occasions. This and other similiar tactics aimed at limiting higher education in the occupied territories has forced many intellectuals to leave the area and to teach at foreign universities. Emigration has been encouraged by not allowing Palstinians passage into Jordan unless they sign a commitment not to return for three to five years. Because

opportunities for employment have been scarce, as noted above, many Palestinians have been forced to leave in search of work.(Tsemel,1983)

Palestinians living in the 61 refugee camps throughout the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon have been living in squalid conditions subject to constant military surveillance and often terrorism. They have suffered from an uncertain future, loss of status due to loss of land and separation from family and friends. Village life is sometimes recreated in the camps, so that children if asked where they come from will often give the name of their village in Palestine. Refugees are reluctant to accept any conditions other than return to their homes: politicization in the camps is high as the spirit of the 'right to return' is kept alive. Anger at Zionists for loss of their homes, livelihoods, and communities, often turns into hostility toward Jews in general, particularly among the children whose only contact with Jews is often the butt of a rifle. For this reason the refugee camps have been ripe receptors for a range of Arab propoganda about Israel and Israelis. Children grow up with a distorted and oversimplified view of a highly complex situation. Desperation for a life of stability with integrity makes them vulnerable to extreme positions denying Israel's right to exist and denial of any historic connection of Jews to the land. From this perspective the situation in the West Bank has heightened the contradictions that Jews and Arabs

face in attempting to resolve nationalist goals. Power accrues to those elements that act on the belief that Jew and Arab are inherently enemies the more repression is used as a tool to control those elements.

Detention and imprisonment has been a common form of repression : "Israeli police receive from (secret) security services, Shin-Beth, lists of persons to be arrested. Shin-Beth collects its information from informers or rumors in current circulation. In addition to lists of persons suspected of having been present in certain places, or of having participated in certain events, there is a fixed list of young 'instigators' who are to be harassed by arrests as opften as possible. Even if innocent, they are accused of intending to do something or of being indirectly involved. In addition, arbitrary and indiscriminate arrests are carried out during every wave of protest and resistance and sometimes even when quiet, sometimes for the purpose of exploiting pressure on parents with the intention of recruiting the latter as collaborators." (Journal Palestine Studies, Vol.VI, No.2,Winter,1977,Issue 22,:206)

Resistance to the occupation has surfaced in a variety of forms, of which organizing by the Palestine Liberation Organization is one. For a time fragmentation of the political elite through ties with the Hashmeite regime and cooptation by the Israeli government weakened the nationalist movement. But the 1972 municipal elections in the West Bank strenghtened the position of its town mayors

as political leaders.(Heller,1980) However increased
opportunities to reach an agreement with Arab mayors
concerning a Jordanian solution or other non-PLO settlement
were rejected by Israel who feared that moderate leaders
would eventually be influenced by the more radical politics
of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The October 1973
Yom Kippur, Ramadan War between Egypt, Syria and Israel and
the official recognition of the PLO as legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people did contribute to a
process of radicalization in the West Bank. Harsh reactions
of the Israeli military to protests by Israeli Arabs against
land appropriations in the Galilee,and demonstrations in the
West Bank against Gush Emunim settlement, further alienated
West Bank mayors.(Ma'oz,1984)

      With the April 1976 free elections for municipal
government, local leadership emerged as a major voice of
Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank. The Committee of
National Guidance, 1978, an organization representing most
public organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip- women,
students, professionals, labourers, cultural and welfare
associations, established close ties with Israeli Arabs and
conformed increasingly to PLO directives.(Ma'oz,1984)

      Studies indicate that the 1967 War strongly affected
the attitudes of Jewish youth toward Arabs. According to
Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons,(New York; Holt,
Reinhart and Winston,1971) many Israeli soldiers were
surprised and some were deeply disturbed to discover among

the refugees a form of 'Arab Zionism': the living memory of a lost homeland, to which they were passionately attached as the Jews had remained attached to Zion in the lands of their dispersion. The education of these young soldiers- some were born after the establishment of the state- little prepared them for a discovery such as this. Upon entering a refugee camp one young soldier discovered that the inmates were still organized into and dwelled according to the village, town and even street- they had lived in prior to the dispersion in 1948, villages and towns that were now thoroughly Israeli: Beershebas, Zarnuga, Ramleh, Lod, Jaffa, Rehovoth..."(Elon, 1971:266) High School students notified the Israeli government of their frustration with the government's refusal, in 1970 to discuss peace proposals when Nasser asked Nahum Goldman to visit Cairo for that purpose. Their concerns affected their motivation to fight: "Up to now we have believed that we go to fight and serve (in the army) for three years because there is no alternative. After this incident, it became clear that even if there were to be another alternative, however slim, it is ignored."(Zureik,1975:59) In spite of the overall conservative trend among Jewish university students in Israel, in 1970 the world union of Jewish students adopted a resolution asking the Israeli government to recognize the rights of Palestinians while affirming Israel's right to exist. In a December 1973 Tel Aviv Survey, high school students noted that from a historical perspective mistakes

had been made in how Zionist leaders related to the Arab Nationalist movement: that a political agreement should have been reached with Arabs before buying land and establishing the state: " I wanted to ask Mr. Dayan who declared that we will not return Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, West Bank and Sinai- what then is he prepared to return? Does he think that with humiliating conditions such as these the Arabs will sit down with us at the negotiating table?" Another student felt that tensions between Arabs and Jews were the outcome of a failing rooted in old ideas and bad, bad education. Even at home I was taught from an early age to hate the Arabs. Although they did not tell me this in detail, it is a fact that up to the age of seven I hated the Arabs and feared them." (Zureik,1975:57,74)

Sociologists note that Israelis from a variety of political perspectives share an image of the Arab as the 'enemy', bent on total destruction of the state. The trend has been to reduce a highly complex set of cirumstances based on historical developments of which many Israelis are unaware, to psychological attitudes and inherent character traits. For example studies show that the Israeli elite view conflict between Arab and Jew as a result of 'an irrational and emotional attitude on the part of the Arabs.' 'National character analysis'is based on representing diverse groups of Arabs with varying situations and historical backgrounds as one monolithic group. National characteristics are created to fulfill poltical goals. As Fouad Moughrabi

notes the image of Arab as enemy of the state, "leads to wide acceptance by the population of the pre-eminence of the armed forces establishment in the making of foreign policy.(Moughrabi,1984:166)

Studies have indicated that the social-political organization in which Israeli Arabs experience a high degree of powerlessness strongly affects how they view Jews. According to Arabs and Jews working in Arab communities, common stereotypes of Jews included violence, sexual permisiveness, greed, sneakiness, technological superiority and a lack of personal warmth.(Lustick,1980)   In the eyes of Arabs who have become the manual laborers of Israel, the Jew is the "owner, boss, man of power who exploits his workers. Or he is seen as uneducated and arrogant, one of the 'chosen people' who is unwilling to stoop to menial work and so leaves the jobs of garbage collector, janitor, dishwasher, construction worker, fruit picker, citrus packer to the underclass whom he despises, the Arab." (Shipler,1986:266)

Stereotypes that Arabs have of Jews are the result of cultural differences with the Ashkenazi, differences in life styles, ways of dressing, ways of expressing themselves. They also emerge from the socio-political conditions of daily existence. In this sense, class differences and political repression foster stereotypes of Arabs among Jews. Many Jews in Israeli society view the Arab as 'dirty, lazy, thieving, incompetent and at the same time uppity, wealthy

and brash' (Shipler,1986:266) Because free political
expression among Israeli Arabs is repressed, Jews are
vulnerable to viewing Arabs as sneaky and potentially
dangerous, hiding their true feelings which may at any
moment erupt.

Ashkenzi predominance in Israeli society has added a
challenging element to Arab-Jew relations. It has brought
about the meeting of peoples with not only widely differing
historical experiences, but also of peoples who have been
taught to view one another from an ethnocentric perspective.

Nonetheless Jewish/Arab traditions have remained
strong. The challenges of historical developments have
shaped the Judeo-Arabic culture but have not destroyed it.
Arabs and Jews have working relationships on every level of
Israeli society. For example, Arabs and Jews worked
together to support the work of political clubs established
in Arab towns and villages to improve education, building
facilities, improve the status of women, build roads, bring
in public services.(El-Asmar,1978) Joint businesses reflect
a centuries old tradition of economic omplimentarity between
Jew and Arab. Arab and Jewish university students have
worked together to demand equality for Arab and Jewish
university students regarding admission criteria, student
housing, availability of suitable work for Arab students and
the right to organize on campuses. Arabs and Jews continue
to share traditional foods, to participate in each others'
religious ritual. Arab Jew and Arab are in many cases

indistinguishable in appearance and continue to speak the same language. The influence of the Judeo-Arabic heritage on Israeli society continues to underlie the many contradictions that have become the foreground of the struggle for survival of both peoples.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the following related questions: How did the new political status of the Jewish community affect the Judeo-Arabic heritage? Now that the Jews have come into power, how would that power be used in relation to Arabs? Under the new circumstances of the state, who were the conservators of the Judeo-Arabic heritage and who were the critics?

Nationalism and militarism in the twentieth century introduced a new element into Arab/Jew relations. Fawzi Turki notes that: "when Theodore Herzl, the European from Vienna, spoke of creating "a rampart of Europe, an outpost of civilization" against "Asian barbarism" in Palestine, no one came forth to oppose the concept and its execution. The event was appaluded."(Turki,1972:12) Jewish nationalism emerging out of the European historical experience and ideology, known as Zionism, became the movement of a Europeanized elite: as their policies unfolded two implicit concepts informing Zionist ideology became clear. One is the a-historical and immutable nature of anti-semitism. The second related concept was that Jews could be served best by

using anti-semites to help them achieve their national goals. The logical consequence of the second was adherence to Westernization- western values, mores, politics, as fundamental to the building of a Jewish state. Among Zionists and among Arab Nationalists a range of responses to world political developments created intra-communal cleavages that have become absorbed into the social-political fabric of Israeli society. Whether an Arab or a Jew is defined as a 'moderate' or a 'radical' has become dependent upon where they stand on nationalism. Nationalism has become the overriding issue of Arab-Jew relations: from a concept intended to bond peoples with an identity based on a shared experience it became a concept representing all of the elements that separate Jew and Arab. Furthermore and most critically, the consequences of militarization as accepted by both Arab and Jew are dehumanization of each by the other and a license to terrorism on both sides.

The significance of Zionist ideology for daily interaction in the newly formed state has been detailed. Jews and Arabs are highly segregated, occupying opposite strata socially, economically, politically. Contradictions invalidate the declared commitment of the Israeli Declaration of Independence to uphold the civil rights of all of its citizens within the context of a secular democratic state. On the contrary, religious activities including religious schools and Rabbinic courts are publicly financed. Nationalism and faith are intertwined. The Law

of Return allows any Jew to automatically become an Israeli citizen and the Orthodox constituency has the power to decide who fits that definition. Israeli citizenship for Jews automatically implies privileges not available to Muslims or Christians. The state, backed by nationalist religious elements, poses barriers in every sphere to intermingling of Jew and Arab.

Another important aspect of Zionist ideology is the notion of the historical necessity of creating a Jewish majority in Palestine in order to ensure the continued dominance of Jews in Israel. To back this up Zionist organizations were created on the basis of the concepts of 'Jewish land' and 'Jewish labor'. Arab land disposession was a devastating factor in bringing about loss of social status, poverty, changes in occupational patterns, patterns of school drop out and despair. In 1975 half of Israeli Arab workers and all of approximately 64,000 Palestinian migratory laborers held the lowest paying jobs in agriculture, construction and menial services for Jewish employers. All but five percent of Jewish employees are unionized and over three fifths belonged to the giant Histadrut which therefore has primary control over the labor force negotiating wages and work conditions on a nation-wide basis. Regional development, housing, education, political positions, the police force, are controlled nationally. The Jewish Agency and Ministry of Immigrant Absorption establishes immigration policies. Jews run Arab education

and mass media, manage the special Arab Deparments and
intervene in Arab local government. While in 1917, Arabs
were 91 percent of the total population, in 1947 they were
68 percent, in 1949, 14 percent, and in 1987, 17
percent.(Smooha,1978:75) The fact that Arabs have separate
Departments further supports their segregation. The over-
all inferior position of the Arab in Israeli society ensures
that Arab-Jew relations will be fraught with tensions. A
system of cooptation, forced dependence, pacification, and
compliance structures daily life between Arab and Jew and
distorts their images of one another The struggle for
national and civic rights occupies much of the energy of the
Arab community (sometimes as we have seen, with rigorous
support of Jews). The energies of the Zionist establishment
have been absorbed in instituting a system of social
controls designed to ensure the pacification of all
elements- Jew and Arab- who pose a threat to Zionist
hegemony.

As a result, segregation of Arab from Jew and of Arab
Jew from European Jew has contributed to erasing history and
fostering the notion that Jew and Arab are eternal enemies.
The complex struggle between nationalisms is exacerbated by
the struggle between classes. In this sense Arabs are the
unannounced 'dhimmi' though not officially subordinate, in
actuality, the underclass.

Segregation (and racist policies in general) of
'Oriental' Jews in Israeli society profoundly works against

the preservation of the Judeo-Arabic tradition. Uri Davis
faces the matter after quoting Kokhavi Shemesh, a leading
member of the Israeli Black Panther organization who was
taught that there was a :"big difference between me and the
Arabs, that is, they have tried to instill into me that Jews
are better than Arabs and that we, the Jews are a chosen
people."(Davis,1977:36) Davis asserts:"The term Oriental
Jew was coined in Israel to categorize and identify the
post-1948 massive Jewish immigration from Asia and Africa.
It is an ideologically motivated term of reference, coined
in an attempt to hide away a critical contradiction
underpining the social and political reality of the newly
established state. The majority of Israel's post 1948
Jewish population, (approximately 60 percent) is culturally
Arab, and yet divorced from its Arab heritage and
affiliation through being situated in Israel as second class
citizens of a western extension, a settler colonial polity,
based on the distinction between Jew and Arab and on the
exclusion and dispossession of the latter in the process of
transforming Palestine into Israel. The specific terms of
their determination have far reaching implications on the
eventual destiny of the Jewish state of
Israel."(Davis,1977:34)

     The specific terms of their determination also have far
reaching implications for the eventual destiny of the Judeo-
Arabic heritage. Palestinian Arab Jews and Arab Jews from
other Middle Eastern lands helped to settle the land,

support the economy, build roads, increase the armed forces, but never had a say in and did not participate in ruling the country. These Jews, like the Arab in Israeli society, have become the 'outsiders', displaced by a force as familiar and as strange as they might ever confront: the European Zionist Jew. Along with the creation of the term 'Oriental' to distance himself from a critical part of his own heritage, the western Jew utilized the term 'modernization' to rationalize the neglect of that crucial aspect of his own heritage. In the face of 'modernization' with its necessary corollary of militarization and nationalism based on the monopoly of one ethnic group over another, we must continue to look with a finely tuned ear and eye for the survival of the Judeo-Arabic heritage, which as much as any other aspect of Jewish history represents the source and the richness - the very basis of all of Jewish life.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The history of relations between Jew and Arab begins in the lands of their common origins. Through sharing language and cultural values; through philosophical, literary and religious exchange; through complimentary social and economic strategies for dealing with the challenges of daily survival, Arab and Jew produced a heritage that has had an impact world-wide.

Two facts, then, draw our attention: first the extent to which this tradition has receded and is unrecognized. Second, in popular media Jew and Arab are most often represented as enemies and in fact, have become deeply divided in the course of historical developments in the lands that are their ancient homes. The preceding chapters have detailed the forces that contributed to the destruction of the Judeo-Arabic heritage and as well that contributed to its continuing survival. We have examined four basic models of Arab-Jewish coexistence: intermingling of Jew and Arab in pre-Islamic times, the dhimmi model during the centuries of the Arab Caliphate and Ottoman rule; Arab-Jew interrelations in the colonial era, and finally, the relation of Arab and Jew in Israeli society from 1948 to 1980. This methodology has brought to light a number of important conclusions as well as enduring questions that can guide future work in the area of Arab-Jew relations.

Judging from research on Arab/Jew relations in the
areas of the Middle Eastern lands that we have examined, Jew
and Arab are not, as popular media too often asserts,
eternal enemies. On the contrary, given variations over
time and place, the predominant conclusion is that Jew and
Arab supported each other's survival. Most importantly this
evidence points to a time when racism did not rule relations
between Jews and Arabs. As K.L. Brown points out in
describing relations beteen North African Arabs and Jews,
Jews and Muslims had:" stereotypes and folklore about one
another that did not stand in the way of dyadic-personal,
face to face relationships between members of two religious
communities based on mutual interests, affinities and
respect for qualities of individuals."(Brown,1981:275)

Secondly, our study of relations between Jew and Arab
from the eighteenth century to the present indicates that
dissension between Jew and Arab has been deliberately
fostered in the course of colonial intervention and
concommitant changes in this period. Jew and Arab have
participated in, encouraged, dissented to and rejected those
forces. For example, in the face of economic changes
fostered by colonial intervention, Jews and Arabs chose to
participate in developments exacerbating tensions between
them, because of the benefits they received. Others
participated out of necessity; there was no other way to
survive. Some Jews and some Arabs lived in areas remote
enough to be untouched by those changes. And still others

rejected them and continued to participate in traditional
forms of economic complimentarity.

K.L. Brown graphically illustrates this point in
discussing the effects of French colonial rule in Morocco in
1912.(Brown,1981) The code of religious and moral behavior
shared by Jews and Muslims in the pre-colonial period began
to diminish in importance and many Jews lost touch with the
shared Moroccan Arabic dialect. Commerical relations
between Jews and Muslims changed as Jewish craftsmen and
traders moved into other more viable occupations after the
beginning of the protectorate. Brown notes that economic
and social relations became:"looser and more differentiated,
less tightly-knit and personal"(Brown,1981:270); and that
economic complimentarity was reduced as competition between
the two groups became widespread. While Jews and Muslims
suffered from the instability of political conditions, so
did relations between them. As the economic life of the
community came to depend on ties with Europeans, political
interests and cultural values shifted and produced
antagonisms where once there had been a 'community of
interests'.(Brown,1981) Widening class disparities in any
historical period but particularly in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries as a result of government policies
internally and from the outside have been a major source of
disruption to Jew-Arab relations.

A fruitful approach then, to the question of what can
we expect for the future of Arab-Jew relations has to do

with willingness on both sides to clarify the grounds of

dissension and to ask whether or not and for what reasons

those in power are making choices that foster dissension

rather than coexistence. It is clear as we continue to

examine the grounds of dissension that this cannot be done

in a vacuum. The forces of dissension only become clear in

the context of world historical developments; so that this

process (and experiment and task) must be supported by the

world at large.

For example, racism is a force that has helped to

disrupt the Judeo-Arabic heritage in a number of ways. We

noted the effects of Christian anti-semitism in the Middle

Eastern lands, fostered by colonial intervention, missionary

schools and imported political propaganda. Anti-Arabism and

Jew hatred were built into the notion of the 'civilizing

mission' of the 'west'. Racism was not an indigenous

phenomenon: that is, no ideology of hatred of Jew by Arab or

Arab by Jew operated within the context of Middle Eastern

societies. Furthermore, because of racism, the Judeo-Arabic

heritage has been ignored, diminished in importance and

distorted.

Religious fanaticism is another factor that has

produced violent eruptions in relations between Jew and

Arab. In periods such as the Spanish Reconquista and

Crusades of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when

tensions were high between the Christian world and Muslims,

minority groups suffered. Rulers who advocated return to a

'pure Islam' often imposed or reimposed restrictions on the 'dhimmi' that had otherwise been ignored. Similarly some groups of Orthodox Jews in Israeli society today contribute to the worsening of conditions for Arabs, and to institutional racism enforced by many Israeli Jews.

During the period of changes in power from Muslim Arab to Muslim Turk Jews suffered from 'resettlement' policies of the Ottoman government. Similarly the concept of transfering Arabs in the twentieth century to make way for Jewish settlement, has caused enormous hardship and bitterness toward the Israeli government. On the other hand, the Ottoman government compensated Jews by enforcing economic policies that benefited their communities. The Israeli government has not acted similarly.

Education has played a major role in the history of Arab-Jew relations and will play a major role in these relations. The question must be asked: what is the role of education and whose interests does it serve? Beginning in the nineteenth century tensions were fostered between minority groups as education became closely tied to economic advancement. Bernard Lewis accentuates another critical aspect of the role of education in 'The Decolonization of History:Islam in History'.(Lewis,1973:51-56) His point is that since the advent of European rule, the purpose of writing history has been to facilitate colonial domination. This is done by defining pre-colonial times as backward and by presenting the colonial regime as "an instrument of

enlightenment and progress. This kind of history, taught to both rulers and ruled, served the double purpose of demoralizing the latter and nerving the former for sometimes disagreeable duties they had to perform. A further aim is to divide the subject peoples by inventing fictitious national entities."(Lewis,1973:51) Lewis uses as an example the case of the French creating a mythical version of North African history in order to foster antagonism between Arabs and Berbers.(Lewis,1973) But the analogy holds true for Jews and Arabs. Colonial historians have portrayed the Arab as destructive rulers and asserted that the Jews were rescued by the coming of the Europeans. Similarly Jews are portrayed as destructive rulers from whom the Arabs must be rescued. Both views are based on mythical views of the history, serve the interests of those who perpetrate them, and serve to divide Arab from Jew in order to rule over both.

What was the situation of Jews under Arab-Muslim rule and did that situation foster or discourage the Judeo-Arabic heritage? How does the situation of Arabs ruled by a Jewish majority, compare? Under what kind of government are Arab-Jew relations most likely to thrive?

With the rise of Islam in the seventh century, Jews ceased to be an outcast community persecuted by the ruling Christian church and became one of a number of minority groups with a special status. Jews and Christians were considered to be 'People of the Book'; following religions

that represent an earlier and incomplete form of Islam. As such they were termed 'dhimmi' and were protected in exchange for recognition of the supremacy of Islam signified by payment of the jizya, a poll tax. With the 'Covenant of Umar' discrimination became institutionalized. Dhimmi were subject to a series of restrictions and treated as second-class citizens.

What did it mean to be a 'second-class citizen' in Islamic society? The Jews were not subject to any major territorial or occupational restrictions. They had far greater social mobility than in Christian Europe and at various times held important and influential government positions. The Arab Caliphate and Turkish Muslim state kept intact the indigenous community organization of minorities. Jews had their own courts and their own religious and secular leaders. A great number of the dhimmi had access to the economic activities of the state and several reached positions of great power and influence. For a number of reasons noted in Chapter I related to the evolution of Islam and confluence of historical developments, Jews experienced a degree of tolerance that was supportive to the continuation of Jewish-Arab symbiosis- sharing of language, cultural values, economic and political goals. There was little sign of deep-rooted hostility and ideologically motivated negative attitudes between Arab and Jew. On the other hand, as dhimmi, their situations were always insecure and subject to change. Intolerance and suffering were the

result of factors analyzed in Chapter I, and noted above.
And as Bernard Lewis notes, in the eighteenth century this
system was subject to severe strain as the dhimmi "tried to
combine incompatible objectives of equal citizenship,
foreign protection and national independence."
(Lewis,1984:170)

There is an implicit analogy between the historic
dhimmi relationship and the situation of Arabs in
contemporary Israeli society. While discrimination against
Arabs is not built into Judaism, in fact Arabs are treated
as second-class citizens. Like the historic dhimmi they
cannot bear arms- that is they do not participate in the
Israeli military. However,unlike the historic dhimmi, Arabs
do not have access to the economic power of the state. Nor
are they considered to be a group with a distinct national
identity. They are not allowed to develop independent
political organizations. Intermingling of Jew and Arab is
not only discouraged, but is blatantly feared. Racism has
become a factor inhibiting relations on both sides. Israeli
racism has the additional power of the state to back it up.
The fabric of the society has absorbed the colonialist
ideology: each considers the other to be 'inferior',
'dangerous', 'deceitful', 'all-powerful', 'evil'. The
Israeli government has created the conditions to carry out a
dhimmi program that is even more successful than the
original.

Our study brings into the foreground historical developments that are the precondition for the present state of affairs. As militarism tied to industrial development colonial intervention, and racism, have come to dominate world politics, they have produced incalcuable suffering for Jew and for Arab.

What are the forces that may come in to change that ? Are there forces at work undermining the political presupposition of the new dhimmi relationship? What are the chances for the forces that brought Jew and Arab together, to be revived?

To address these questions it is useful to turn to those elements that have supported the Judeo-Arabic heritage since they represent factual evidence that coexistence is possible.

Throughout history economic complementarity is a theme demonstrating shared strategies for survival. There are rare examples in Israeli society today of joint businesses between Arab and Jew built on that tradition.

When religion was not connected to state power, more flexibility in rituals and customs accounted for a shared folk religion. Jews and Arabs made pilgrimages together to visit shrines of saints and visited one another's healers. These customs continue to be relevant for many Arabs and Jews.

Respect for land is an ancient and commonly held belief structuring life between Arab and Jew centuries ago. Shared

agricultural practices brought prosperity to both. Land was cultivated for the benefit of all members of both communities within any given larger grouping.

In the 1980's Israeli society is witnessing a proliferation of organizations whose work revolves around Arab-Jew relations: for example, The Committee for Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue founded by Oriental Israelis; Hamizrach El Hashalom (East for Peace), the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, Institute for Education for Coexistence Betwen Jews and Arabs, and many more educational, cultural, and community groups. History shows us that the struggle of all peoples against injustices: economic and civic inequality, religious and political warfare, racism in all its manifestations, over and over again resurfaces in the face of enourmous odds. These groups represent the resurfacing of those elements that have kept alive the Judeo-Arabic heritage ; and in this sense have the support of a long historical tradition. Many of them address directly the issues examined in this work: world-wide historical developments in terms of economic policies, imperialism , religious fanaticism tied to state power, and militarism: are all factors that have contributed to the disappearance of the Judeo-Arabic heritage. Because there are Arabs and Jews who benefit from these developments as well as Arabs and Jews who suffer, the future will be

decided by those within both groups who have the courage to examine the consequences of these developments for future relations.

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CHAPTER VII
TEACHING CURRICULUM

This curriculum is designed for secondary and higher education, as well as for use in community settings. The analytical approach is important for students in their final year of secondary education. At this point they will benefit from learning how to think about complex historical issues that require probing beneath the layers of popular misconceptions that infect their daily lives.

In a college setting, this course is designed to give students the opportunity to rethink the meaning of history as it affects current events. It is designed to give students tools to form judgments about issues that are determining the future. An essential aspect of their educational process is learning how to live in a world where conflicting interests dictate social and political process. They must learn how to think critically about difference. They must learn to think critically about the forces that are controlling the evolution of world historical developments and how those developments shape their daily lives. It is hoped that special programs currently implemented in some universities specifically for teaching about socially relevant issues (such as racism, sexism, anti-semitism) will expand to include courses with a specifically historical orientation. It is only through such courses that the import of social issues educational

work can significantly affect the quality of life in society at large and in the university setting.

The following materials are designed to assist in teaching about the history of Arab-Jew relations:

1. Goals of chapter

2. Outline of chapter

3. Important themes of chapter

4. Suggested activities for chapter

5. Suggestions for evaluating content with students

6. Materials, Other Resources

7. Glossary

The curriculum can be taught in a traditional fourteen week semester. With a total of forty-two classes (three classes per week), ten classes can be devoted to each chapter, allowing one class for each of the eight themes presented (for each chapter), and two classes for evaluation. Media presentations are suggested, to be utilized as introductions to each chapter. The historical material can be taught through a combination of lecture, dialogue with students as analytic themes are explored, related outside readings for students, and group activities. Teachers are encouraged to begin the course with a discussion of how students' backgrounds will affect their relationship to the materials presented; and to address how interaction between students might be affected.

Chapter II

Goals

A. To familiarize students with the social, political, economic and religious life of Arabs and Jews in pre-Islamic times.

B. To familiarize students with the social, political, economic and religious life of Arabs and Jews under Islam.

C. To explore the implications of dhimmi status as a model for minorities living under foreign rule.

Outline

Introduction

I. Relations Between Jew and Arab, Pre-Islam

    A. Origins of both peoples

    B. Historical Setting

    C. Social organization, economic livelihood

        1. Cultural and religious life

        2. Women

    D. Impact of Outside Forces

    E. Summary

II. The Emergence of Islam

    A. Description of Muslim State

    B. Circumstances of Muhammad's rise to power

    C. Muhammad and the Jews

    D. The Consolidation of Islam

    E. The Period of the Caliphates

    F. Islam and Dhimmi Status

G. Jews Under Islam

    1. Jews under Abbassid Rule

    2. Tenth- Thirteenth Centuries The Fatamids and Ayyubids

        a. Partnerships

        b. Legal Matters

        c. Leadership

        d. Jewish Vulnerability

        e. Government Interference

        f. Jewish-Arab Intermingling

H. Thirteenth - Sixteenth Centuries- The End of the Caliphate

    I. The Ottoman Empire

        A. Economic Life

        B. Iberian Jews

        C. Summary

    J. Conclusion

Important Themes- Correcting Misconceptions

A. Many students will not be aware of the origins of Jew and Arab in the Middle Eastern lands. Some scholars consider both Jews and Arabs to be part of the Semitic peoples who moved in waves across the Arabian peninsula. In any case, Jew and Arab share a common heritage associated with their emergence as peoples in shared geographic locations in the Middle East.

B. In the West, a false equation between Arab and Muslim is common. In Chapter One students learn that Christians and Jews in the Middle East also consider themselves Arabs. Christian Arab, Muslim Arab, Jewish Arab, share a common linguistic, cultural and historic heritage.

C. A common misconception links 'Arab' with'nomad'. Jews also may be categorized as unilaterally nomadic (the wandering Jew). Chapter I demonstrates that groups of Arabs and Jews were agricultural, citied, or nomadic.

D. Stereotypes falsely depict the Arab as 'backward', and the Jew as'modern'. Both terms have been invented to justify colonial intervention in and usurpation of, other cultures. This theme is developed beginning with Chapter One, where students learn that Arabs and Jews together evolved systems of irrigation, crafts, commerce,literature.

E. Our educational system rarely teaches about the historical suppression of women, and is fraught with misinformation and misconceptions about women, breeding stereotypes that falsify women's experience. Students must become aware first that women were primary participants in every phase of life in the Middle Eastern lands- economic (agriculture and crafts), religious (pilgrimages, healing), political (advisors and warriors), literary (poets). Secondly, Arab women are often characterized in relation to Jewish women, as less'advanced'. In Chapter I students learn that Arab and Jewish women shared a customary way of life with similar values, goals, visions and struggles. Even

as Judaism and Islam evolve as distinct religio-ethnic
cultures many of the similarities between them survive.

F. A common misconception corrected in Chapter I is that
Muhammad depicted the Jews as evil and corrupt. In this
Chapter students learn about the strong influence of Judaism
on Islam and the events leading to Muhammad's alienation
from the Jews.

G. In regard to the rise of Islam, western students are
taught that Muslims were 'fanatical warriors' who subjected
their conquered populations to inhumane treatment (the Koran
or the sword). A central area for discussion is the system
of social-religious organization that became the Muslim
state. There are several important features of this topic,
beginning with a careful examination of the treatment of
conquered populations by Muslims.

Students will note a major difference under Islam where
the interpenetration of faith and power, religion and
authority shaped political and social organization. State
policies evolved out of varying interpretations of the
Shari'a, holy law. According to the Shari'a, the Caliph or
ruler was elected by God.

Secondly, a comparative analysis of the status of
minorities under Islam and in North American society
deserves attention. The popular misconception is that Jews
were highly discriminated against under Islam. Dhimmi
status afforded the Christian and Jewish minorities
privileges and protections as described in Chapter I.

Within that basic system, Chapter I reveals a wide variety of experiences of Jews (and Christian Arabs) in the Middle Eastern lands. The following discussion is pertinent. While in North American society 'minority' populations are ostensibly given full equality, in actuality they suffer from discrimination in every area of daily life. On the other hand, while discrimination was institutionalized under Islam, minorities were for the most part able to overcome those limitations and lead full productive lives as stable elements of the Islamic world.

Furthermore, Jews contributed to the consolidation of Islam and continued a traditional way of life with their Arab neighbors (Christian and Muslim). Chapter I develops many examples of the fruitful interchange of Arab and Jew under Islam and in the Ottoman Empire, a continuation of the Islamic state under Turkish rule.

H. Students learn in Chapter I about the importance of the Ottoman state, often neglected in standard histories, and of the important contributions of Jews to Ottoman society. This theme will be continued in Chapter II, where the important evolution of events in the Ottoman Empire strongly influences the development of Arab-Jew relations.

Suggested Activities

A. Have students evaluate newspaper, television and radio reporting on Arabs and Jews. Ask students to collect examples to present . After a discussion analyzing content

of their data, compare these findings with what they have learned about Jews and Arabs in Chapter I.

B. Ask students to compare the situation of the dhimmi in the Islamic state with the situation of minority groups in North American society. Divide students into groups. On the basis of their findings, ask each group to propose a system of social-political organization and describe its benefits and liabilities. In presenting their proposals to the larger group, are there shared goals in terms of what form of social-political organization students feel most comfortable with?

C. Ask students to interview a Jew and a Muslim focusing on religious beliefs, cultural traditions, political beliefs, relation to history, level of comfort in the communities they live in, relations with one another. Compare and evaluate findings in the class.

D. Invite speakers to address the following themes:

    I. Muslims in North America

    II. Jews in North America

    III. Comparison of Judaism and Islam

    IV. Misconceptions about the Middle East

    V. Jewish and Arab women

Suggestions for Evaluating Content with Students

A. Design a group discussion in which groups of students debate the issue of how Jews fared under Islam.

B. Design a group discussion in which groups of students defend or refute the proposition that Jew and Arab are 'eternal enemies'.

Chapter III

Goals

A. To analyze the effects of European imperialism on Arab and Jewish social, political and economic survival.

B. To explore the effects of European imperialism on relations between Jews and Arabs in selected Middle Eastern countries.

C. To examine the role of Jew and Arab in social, economic, political and religious transformations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Outline

Introduction

I. The Ottoman Reforms

    A. Background

    B. Tanzimat Reforms

    C. Reforms and the Millet

    D. The Capitulations

    E. Land Reforms

    F. Transportation, Demographic Changes

    G. Class Conflict

II. North Africa- Seventeenth- Twentieth Centuries

    A. Economic Livelihood

B. Education

C. Demographic Changes

D. Social, political, economic, religious complementarity

III. Conclusion

Important Themes

Chapter II examines the politics of transformations in social organization affecting economic livelihood and religious life during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These transformations introduce new elements into Arab-Jew relations and are critical for understanding Arab-Jew relations in the twentieth century. The following are central themes for discussion; areas that are often overlooked and/or misrepresented in educational texts.

A. The introduction to Chapter II emphasizes the importance of the Ottoman Empire to world historical developments. This discussion helps to break down the false separation between 'East' and 'West' that informs much of western education. Often the Ottoman Empire is misrepresented as 'the sick man of Europe', a western version that ignores the significant interrelation between European developments and developments in the Middle Eastern lands.

B. The introduction to Chapter II also raises fruitful questions for discussion about the transformation of values that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. It is important here to discuss the meaning of the term 'underdeveloped', as

another example of how an indigenous culture can be
misrepresented and its values and traditions concealed by
the use of a term invented by the colonizer. Both
discussions can help students to clarify their values and
assumptions by examining the interconnection between those
values and assumptions and world historical developments.

C.   A central theme emphasized in Chapter II is the range of
interpretation of any historical period, depending upon
differences in class status. This theme was introduced in
Chapter I where students learn that historical
interpretations that the experience of the Sephardi, exiled
from Spain and Portugal in the period of Ottoman rule
differed from that of indigenous Jew. In Chapter II,
widening class disparities result in a range of experiences
affecting relations between Jew and Arab. This discussion
can encourage students to develop a more complex view of
history and can discourage students from seeing Jews and
Arabs as monolithic groups with one antagonistic historical
experience between them.

D. A critical theme in Chapter II is colonial intervention.
Attempts of European governments to colonize the Middle
Eastern lands through economic and political intervention
had costs and benefits for Arab-Jew relations. This theme
continues to be a focus for discussion in Chapters III and
IV where the impact of outside forces on Arab-Jew relations
is central to how relations evolve.

E. Chapter II demonstrates how European anti-semitism and anti-Arabism have influenced historical developments. Discuss with students the implications for Arab-Jew relations revealed in this chapter.

F.   European-style education had an impact on the lives of Jews, Arab Christians and Arab Muslims examined in Chapter II.   Analysis of the effects of the proliferation of new educational experiences introduces students to several important issues.   First, it can encourage them to further examine the goals of education and how this affects ways that information is presented.   Who controls what they learn?   A second important discussion is the role of education in aiding or hindering interethnic relations. Third, what are the benefits and liabilities of a system of social organization in which 'advancement' depends upon the assimilation of sometimes oppressive concepts absorbed through the educational system?

G.   Chapter II includes a lengthly discussion of ways in which complementarity and intermingling between Jew and Arab continued to provide a basis for stable relations.   There are two concepts important for students to learn in order to absorb this material.   The first, introduced in Chapter I and continued here, is that history is not merely the story of the elite, their politics, wars, diplomatic maneuvers, institutions.   Oftentimes the daily lives of people will tell a different story, one which may or may not be critically affected by the decisions of those in power.

Here students learn that Jews and Arabs created a folk culture that represents a tradition which is traced and affirmed in Chapters I-IV. Secondly, this knowledge helps to break down the misconception many students have that Jews and Arabs are intransigent enemies at cross purposes historically and currently.

H. The notion that Jews were considered by Christian Europe as allied to the Muslim, will be new to them, but more understandable on the basis of Chapter I. The conclusion to Chapter II leaves students with a basis for examining ways in which, and under what circumstances, Jew and Arab worked together politically. This theme is important because in Chapter III students are presented with a historical discussion of Zionism and Arab nationalism that demonstrates under what circumstances Jews and Arabs had similar interests regarding nationalism.

Suggested Activities

A. Ask students to identify the forces that brought about economic changes in the Middle Eastern lands beginning with the eighteenth century: industrialization, imperial intervention, changing role of the Ottoman government. What roles did Jew and Arab take on in this process? How do students evaluate those choices? How were relations affected?

B. Ask students to collect data that demonstrate the role of economics in creating both tensions and alliances between

'minority' groups in North American society. Have them evaluate why some groups are more clearly in the upper classes and others comprise the lower classes. On the basis of this discussion and of activity (A), what generalizations are useful in deciding what kind of economic system is workable for society at large?

C. Ask students to give specific examples of the role of education in creating self-identity. List courses taught and evaluate content. Are they learning about their particular cultural heritage? Ask students to identify any bias that affects how they view themselves (either by inclusion or omission). On the basis of this data, list four ways that education affected Arab-Jew relations in the period addressed in Chapter II.

D. Invite an Arab Jewish woman, an Arab Christian woman and an Arab Muslim woman to discuss differences between their own and North American culture and how they accommodate to and/or resist the demands of those tensions.

Suggestions for Evaluating Content with Students

A. Students should be able to identify the following terms: Capitulations; Tanzimat Reforms; client-patron relations; Alliance Universelle Israelite; protege system. Ask students to give several examples of how each of the above affected Arab-Jew relations in positive and in negative ways.

Chapter IV

Goals

A. To familiarize students with the main trends in the historical development of Arab Nationalism.

B. To familiarize students with the main trends in the historical development of Jewish nationalism.

C. To examine the interrelationship between Zionism and Arab Nationalism.

D. To examine how industrialization and nationalism in western Europe before and during the British Mandate in Palestine affected social, economic, political and religious life in Palestine.

Outline

I. Introduction

II. Arab Nationalism: 1800-1914

III. Jewish Nationalism: 1800-1914

IV. Non-Jewish Zionism

V. Zionist Goals

    A. Zionist Institutions

VI. Conclusion

VII. Ottoman Policy and the Attitude of Arab Nationalists toward Jewish immigration, land settlement and Zionism pre-World War II.

VIII. Social, Religious, Economic Consequences of World War One and Aftermath for Arab-Jew Relations

IX. Arab-Jew Relations, 1920-1948- Transformations in
social, economic and religious life- Palestine

A. The British Mandate

X. Conclusion

Important Themes

Chapter III corrects popular misconceptions regarding
two key historical developments for Arab-Jew relations: Arab
nationalism and Jewish nationalism. Arab nationalism is
often misrepresented in the west as a monolithic movement
that uses violence to obtain its goals. Zionism is also
misrepresented as a monolithic movement. Two general views
toward Zionism characterize the mass media. One represents
Zionism as having redeemed Palestine. The second views
Zionism as a racist, totalitarian ideology. The following
themes provide useful material for discussion, challenging
assumptions and demonstrating the complexity of developments
leading to the creation of the state of Israel.

A. The introductory material for Chapter III emphasizes how
forms of social organization and political organization in
the Middle Eastern lands evolved. The concept of a secular
state with a national identification unifying the diverse
peoples included within its boundaries, contradicted the
organization of peoples within the Dar-Al-Islam (House of
Islam). An exploration of these differing concepts and of
the implications of both for Arab-Jew relations in the
Middle Eastern lands will prepare students for the

subsequent material of Chapter III. Two points are important to note: on, is that nationalism did not evolve solely in reaction to outside influences from Europe. Two, it is important to discuss the difference between ethnic feeling and national feeling.

B. Students are generally unfamiliar with developments and events that sparked an Arab nationalist movement. In this chapter they will learn how European politics, the Young Turk Revolution and movements within Islam, contributed. It is important for students to examine the significance of the literary, cultural renaissance stimulated by Arab nationalists for the Middle East as a whole.

C. Students will learn in Chapter III that Zionism was an historical development with many different strands; that Jews had a range of reactions to and participatory roles in its development. Like Arab nationalism, the way in which Zionism evolved was affected by both internal and external forces. Both had a range of consequences for Arab and for Jews, depending upon geographic location, class, religious leanings, political affiliations.

D. Chapter III introduces students to the history of the complex relations between Jews and Arabs involved in nationalist movements. Students will learn that the polarization of Jew and Arab in terms of nationalist movements was a gradual process involving a range of external factors, as well as internal differences.

E. On the level that world historical developments have been shaped by diplomatic history determining alliances and antagonisms, war and peace, trust and loss of trust, pre-World-War One diplomacy had far reaching consequences for Arab-Jew relations, still affecting current events. This chapter makes clear how that history framed a new set of issues disrupting relations between Arab and Jew.

F. The period of the British mandate was one of critical decision making in the Arab world and in the Jewish world. This period shows clearly how methods of colonial rule designed to create a system of dependence and control, further solidified tensions between Jew and Arab. This discussion will provide a basis for examining the administrative apparatus created by the Zionist organization pre-1948 and the Israeli state itself.

G. The militarization of governments is so often assumed as inevitable, that students often do not develop a critical consciousness of the consequences for social relations, interethnic relations, human survival. This important theme is critical for discussion of the way in which Arab-Jew relations were affected by the Industrial Revolution and consequent expansion of and use of warfare capabilities. What kinds of choices were available and pre-determined as twentieth century politics determined the forms of social organization that evolved? How did those choices frame the terms of Arab-Jew relations in the twentieth century?

Suggested Activities

A. Ask students to collect data through personal interviews with Jews and non-Jews and through the media, that gives them a basis for evaluating how a general sample of the public views Zionism. What do persons know about the history of Zionism? Compare findings with what they have learned in Chapter Three about Zionism. If there is a disparity, analyze why.

B. Ask students to collect data through personal interviews with Jews and non-Jews and through the media, that gives them a basis for evaluating how a general sample of the public views Arab Nationalism. What do these persons know about the history of Arab nationalism? Compare findings with what they have learned in Chapter III about Arab Nationalism. If there is a disparity, analyze why.

C. Have students develop on the basis of this chapter and other research, a definition of anti-semitism. Ask them to evaluate solutions proposed by Zionists for eradicating anti-Semitism and to propose their own solutions. What are the benefits and liabilities of each solution proposed?

D. Organize students in groups representing: a) Palestinian Jews b) European Jews c) British officials d) Arab Muslims e) Arab Christians. In a round table discussion have each group give a presentation to the others detailing in historical context its reactions to the British Mandate over Palestine and its demands from the British government.

Suggestions for evaluating content with students

A. Have students divide into groups representing the interests of the various groups of Arab Nationalists and Zionists discussed in Chapter III. Ask them to present to each other their goals; the historical developments prompting them to develop those goals and to dialogue about ways these goals might contradict or serve the interests of other groups.

B. Have students review the policies of the British throughout the Mandate and present a rationale for those policies. Were they successful in achieving their goals? Why not?

Chapter V

Goals

A. To examine the genesis of the Israeli state and how it shapes relations between Jews and Arabs.

B. To examine fundamental conditions of Jewish and Arab life in Israeli society.

C. To examine how Jews' and Arabs' concepts of one another evolved in the period after the creation of the state of Israel.

D. To examine the historical genesis and current perspectives of movements in Israeli society regarding relations between Arabs and Jews.

E. To examine forces within Israeli society contributing to the dissolution of the Judeo-Arabic heritage and to examine

forces within Israeli society contributing to the survival of the Judeo-Arabic heritage.

Outline

Introduction and Review

I. Social organization, economic survival, religious and political life, 1948-1980

    A. Arab Refugees

    B. Military Administration

    C. Responses of Jews and Arabs

    D. Social, economic, political status of Arabs

        1. Labor

        2. Law

        3. National Rights

        4. Education

        5. Politics

    E. Jew-Arab interaction

        1. Rakah

        2. Arab Students Committees

    F. Oriental Jews

    G. Naturei Karta

    H. Israel Defense Forces

    I. Gush Emunim

II. The 1956 War and Consequences of the Occupation, 1967 for Jewish-Arab Relations

    A. Background

    B. Palestinian Nationalism

C. The West Bank

    1. Economic Policies

    2. Politics

    3. Refugee Camps

III. Conclusion

Important Themes

The central theme of Chapter IV is the impact of the new Jewish state on the Judeo-Arabic heritage. The chapter begins with a review of events culminating in the 1948,1949 War. One important theme reviewed here and examined throughout the Chapter is cooperation of Jews and Arabs. Many efforts at cooperation were ultimately fruitless because of factors that are important areas for discussion. For example, efforts were obstructed by outside forces whose interests were not served by Jewish-Arab cooperation.

Another important theme introduced in subsequent chapters is the effect of differences among Arab groups and between the Arab states. Similarly intra-communal conflicts among Jews gives us important insight into the range of perspectives and political goals among Jews during the period addressed.

Two related topics are essential to focus on in regard to developments detailed in this chapter. They are militarism and racism. Chapters II and III give many examples of how racism and militarism connected to industrial development disrupted customary relations between

Jew and Arab in the Middle Eastern lands. In Chapter IV we witness the escalation of this process. By 1948, militarism and racism are two predominant forces determining the future of Arab-Jew relations. These themes bring into the foreground the question raised in Chapter III of how people define themselves and each other. Militarism and racism foster dehumanization of 'the enemy'. They foster stereotypical thinking that serves to distance one group from another. Some Jews and Arabs continued to define themselves and each other on the basis of historical traditions that were 'humanizing'. Given those historical traditions, dehumanization can never be completely successful.

Religious fanaticism is a theme connected to militarism and racism that students hear a great deal about. At this point in their study of Arab-Jew relations students are aware that neither Islam nor Judaism are inherently 'fanatical', but that movements have and continue to arise within both communities with extreme ideological positions. Nor is there one conclusion to be made regarding these groups. As noted in Chapter IV they are varied and the consequences of their presentations are varied (Naturei Karta and Gush Emunim). It is important to note that where religious fanaticism is connected to militarism the consequence is enormous suffering based on discrimination, acceptance of only one perspective and acceptance of only one outcome.

Another important and related theme for discussion in Chapter IV is how politics and economics influence the ways people define themselves and one another. It is crucial to note that some groups of Arabs and Jews respectively benefited from political developments stimulating economic policies that were very harmful to others. We noted this in Chapters II and III where peasants were hurt by policies that benefited absentee landowners. Another example in this chapter is differences in experiences of Ashkenazi Jews, particularly those in power, and Jews indigenous to the Arab world.

In the Introduction to Chapter IV sociological literature on Arabs in Israeli society is reviewed. This discussion brings out some very important points for discussion. Much work in the area of minority relations focuses on attitudes of one group toward another based on cultural, differences. Some sociologists focus on the attitudes of Arabs, for example, toward the Israeli state, as the prime factor determining whether or not they are able to adjust to the new situation. Others focus on the issue of 'modernization' and assert that the conflict of traditional values of Israeli Arabs with those of the new state creates barriers to adjustment. Other scholars point to political and economic policies as factors determining the responses of Israeli Arabs to the new state. They assert that Zionist goals are inherently inimical o the goals and visions of Palestinian Arabs.

Our analysis adds to this discussion the insight (corroborated by scholars in this field) that knowledge and understanding of history is essential for the future of Arab-Jew relations and for work in the area of minority relations in general. Only from this perspective can we analyze in depth the range of forces - political, economic, educational, cultural, religious- affecting the course of Arab-Jew relations. In this case history give us knowledge, insight and vision affirming possibilities for the future of Arab-Jew relations.

From an historical perspective, Chapter IV raises the question of whether Palestinian Arabs have become the new 'dhimmi'. This discussion necessitates a detailed study of policies outlined in this chapter as well as a review of material introduced in Chapter I.

The role of education is a theme that provides insight into the way Arab-Jew relations evolved (Chapters III, IV), and is crucial to address in terms of how students are able to approach this material. Introducing this curriculum, we noted how anti-Arab and anti-Jewish propaganda filter into the educational system and that distortion and lack of information seriously detract from educational discourse on this issue. Students can see this point clearly by examining the role of education in Israeli society. How is history presented? From whose perspective? Our conclusion highlights this critical factor that must determine the effectiveness of teaching and learning in this area.

Suggested Activities

A. A Palestinian Jew and a Palestinian Arab have grown up together and are, at the founding of the state of Israel, in their early twenties. Have students describe in detail what their lives would have been like before 1948 and how they would have changed after 1948. How might their friendship be affected?

B. Ask students to choose one 'minority' group with whom they are familiar in North America. Utilizing concepts discussed in relation to Arabs in Israeli society, of accommodation, cooptation, dependence and resistance, give examples in each of these categories comparing the minority group they choose with Arabs in Israeli society.

C. Invite an Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab living in Israel to describe their experiences, problems, conflicts, and what they share.

D. Divide students into groups representing Arabs and Jews working in coalition. Have the groups work together and present activities and strategies for developing a type of society in Israel beneficial to both.

Suggestions for evaluating content with students

A. Ask students to describe in detail some of the policies of the Israeli state, beginning in 1948, with a rationale for those policies.

B. Have students develop a dialogue between a Palestinian Arab living on the West Bank and a West Bank Jewish settler. The dialogue must present the historic and current situation of each and present a political position in regard to their current situation that evolves from that history.

C. Ask students to develop a proposal for resolutions to current Arab-Israeli tensions, applying what they have learned in studying about the Judeo-Arabic heritage.

Materials, Other Resources

1. Maps are an essential tool for this curriculum because many students have no geographic familiarity with the areas discussed.

2. Many video-tapes and films are currently being produced dealing with various aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. New Jewish Agenda, 149 Church Street, New York, NY 10007 is an excellent source. First Run Features, 153 Waverly Place, New York, New York, 10014, distributes 'Routes of Exile: A Moroccan Jewish Odessey', a film exploring the ancient origins of the Jews of Morocco, the impact of colonisation on Arab-Jewish relations and the Moroccan Jewish exodus to Europe, North America and Israel. 'Routes of Exile' is an important supplementary teaching tool for this curriculum. The following films about the Middle East were among those listed at the Middle Eastern Studies Association Conference in Boston, 1987:

AGAM: LIGHT AND FORM (Israel) c. 1974

18 min. Color 16mm.
Prod. David Goldstein. Dir. Jaques Katmor for Gal-
Kahol. Courtesy of Institute of Students and Faculty
on Israel. Distributor: Alden Films, 7820-20th Ave.,
Brooklyn, NY 11214 (718) 331-1045. Interviews with
Israeli artist Yaakov Agam and examples of his
kinetic art.

ANOU BANOU: THE DAUGHTERS OF UTOPIA (Israel) 1983

85 min Color 16mm
Dir. Edna Politi. Distributor: Jewish Film Festival,
4560 Horton St. Suite R407, Emeryville, CA 94608.
(415) 428-1727 Hebrew with English sub-titles.
Three-generational saga of kibbutz life recounted by
six women who journeyed to Palestine in the 1920's
to build the society of their
feminist/socialist/zionist dreams.

FAMILY TIES (Jordan/Tunisia/Egypt) 1984

50 min Videotape
Part 9 of THE ARABS: A LIVING HISTORY series.
Script: Nadia Hijab. Dir Colin Luke. Courtsey of
Landmark Films, 3450 Slade Run Drive, Falls Church,
VA 22042. (703) 241-2030 or 1-800-342-4336.
Investigation of question: how can Arab women
preserve the strength of family life and still lead
their own lives? Journalist Nedia Hijab talks with a
traditional extended family in Amman, a young
Tunisian woman seeking more independence, a
Jordanian pilot caught up in her flying career.

KARAGOZ (Turkey) 1977

35 min Color 16mm
Dir. S.Eyuboglu. Courtsey of Dr Ilhan Basgoz,
Turkish Studies Program, Indiana University, 143
Goodbody Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405 (812) 335-2586.
Turkish Shadow Theater displaying the ethnic,
cultural and social diversity of the Ottoman-Turkish
Empire.

LEGACY OF THE MAMLUKS (Egypt) 1984

28 min Videotape
Prod. Mary R. Savin. Dir. R. Sundermeyer for CPTV
and Hartford Theological Seminary. Courtesy of
Humanities Council Resource Center, 41 Lawn Ave.
Wesleyan Station, Middletown, CN 06457
(203) 347-6888.
This film was produced to complement the major
exhibit of Mamluk Art organized for the Smithsonian
Institute by Dr. Esin Atil: a panorama of artifacts
placed in historical and artistic context by a panel
of informed commentors.

LIKE THE SEA AND ITS WAVES (COMME LA MER ET SES VAGUES)

Israel 1980   100 min Videotape (PAL)
Dir/Prod Edna Politi. Courtesy of filmmaker 3-5
Chemin Tavan, 1206 Geneva, Switzerland.
Hebrew/Arabic/French; English subtitles.
Dramatic feature about an Israeli woman of Lebanese
origin and the childhood friend she encounters while
both study in Paris, touching on the personal
dimensions of the political conflict as well as
their relationship as women.

MEMORIES OF JEWISH INDIA (India) 1985

10 min Color 16mm
Dir/Prod. Benjamin Hayeem. Courtesy of filmmaker,
132 E 17th St, NY, NY 10003 (202) 674-7048
Expressionistic montage of Jewish cultural heritage
in India featuring the synagogues of Bombay, Poona
and Calcutta.

1982 PERFORMANCE OF THE HAJ (Malaysia) 1983

64 min Color 16mm
Filem Negara. Courtesy of the Embassy of Malaysia,
Office of Information 2401 Massachusetts Ave NW,
Washington DC 20002 (202) 328-2700
Chronicle of a group of Malaysian pilgrams starting
with instructional lectures before departing for
Mecca, following their participation in the rituals
of the Haj and ending with the return home.

PERMISSIBLE DREAMS (Egypt) 1983

30 min Color Videotape (PAL)
Dir. Atiyat Al-Abnoudi. Courtesy of Women Make
Movies, 225 lafayette Street, NY, NY 10003 (212)
925-0606. Arabic with English narration and Sub-
titles.
Conversations with Umm Said, a peasant woman in the
Nile Delta, who reflects on her colorful life as
wife, mother, and enterpreneur.

PRESSURE (LAHATZ) (Israel) 1984

52 min Color 16mm
Dir/Prod Michele Ohayon. Loan from Filmmaker c/o
Annie Ohayon Garth Group, 745 Fifth Ave, NY, NY
10151 (212) 838-8800. Hebrew/Arabic with English
Sub-titles.
Israeli-Palestinian relations in the microcosm of a
relationship between two university students and the
social pressures that drive them apart.

SHADOW OF THE EARTH (Tunisia) 1982

90 min Color 16mm
Dir/Prod. Taieb Louhichi. Distributor: Mypheduh
Films, 48 Q Street NE, Washington, D.C. 20002 (202)
529-0220 and P.O. Box 315, Franklin Lakes, N.J.
07415 (201) 891-8240. Arabic with English sub-titles
Drama of impact of govermental regulations on
traditional nomadic society in Tunisian desert.

SHADOWS OF TURKEY (Turkey) 1986

17 min Videotape
Prod. Karen Murphy, Clair Hickman, Walter G.
Andrews. Dir. Tim Lorang, Instructional Media
Services, University of Washington. Courtesy of
Department of Far Eastern Languages and
Civilizations, University of Washington, Seattle, WA
98195 (206) 543-6033
A short documentary to introduce the traditional
shadow plays of turkey and their historical and
cultural context. This prefaces THE WITCHES
(CAZULAR) a shadowplay translated into English and
adapted for general Americal audiences (to be
released soon).

SHAHSAVAN NOMADS OF IRAN (Iran) 1984

28 min Color 16mm
Prod/Dir Arlene Dallalfar and Fereydoun Safizadeh.
Courtesy of filmmakers, 18 Channing St., Cambridge,
MA 02138 (617) 868-1562
Documentary tracing seasonal migration of the
Shahsavan nomads of northwestern Iran with attention
given to both the role of women in tribal ecosystem
and the changes in migratory pattern due to
sedentarization policies.

SIYAH KALEM (Turkey) 1950's

14 min Black/white 16mm
Prod/Dir. M. Ipsiroglu and S. Eyuboglu. Narr A.
Mill. University of Istanbul Cultural Series #2.
Loan from Dr. Talat Halman, 333 E. 30 St. NY, NY
10016 (212) 725-4803
A breif but careful survey of the pages of a
provocative anonymous 15th century Turkish artist
whose satirical drawings still fascinate historians.
Technical limitations are easily surmounted by the
importance of the material.

STRANGER AT HOME (Palestine/Israel) 1985

93 min Color 16mm
Prod/Dir. Rudolph van den Berg, courtesy of National
Council on US-Arab Relations. Distributor: Ben van
Meerendonk, X-I Media Consultants, 76 Degraw St,
Brooklyn, NY 10231 (718)596-5104
Arabic/English/Hebrew with English sub-titles.
Palestinian artist Kamal Boullata, exiled for 20
years, returns to Jerusalem with his friend, Dutch
filmmaker van den Berg. Both confront dreams and
apprehensions.

SURNAMEH OF MURAD III (BOOK OF FESTIVITIES) (Turkey) 1960's

22 min Color 16mm
Dir M. Ipsiroglu and S. Eyuboglu. Loaned by Dr Talat
Halman, 333 E. 30 St, NY, NY 10016 (212) 725-4803
Study of the innovative minatures produced to record
the forty-day celebration organized by Murad III in
1582. The album not only displayed, as intended, the
Sultan's wealth to the world, but also offered a new
type of documentation of a major event.

C. Many agencies, periodicals, journals, newspapers focusing

on the Middle East can be of use in teaching this

curriculum. 'New Outlook', one such magazine gives an

updated guide to Peace networking in Issue 29, May-June,
1986. This listing includes: 1) Extraparliamentary Peace
Movements 2) Educational, Cultural and Community Groups 3)
Civil Rights Groups 4) Research and Policy Institutes 5)
Academic Institutions 6) Activism in Support of Nonviolence
7) International Activism 8) Political Parties 9) Cultural
Activism 10) Palestinian Connection

The Association of Arab- American University Graduates,
Belmont, Massachusetts, is an excellent resource for
literature and other teaching materials. The American
Friends Service Committee, 2161 Massachusetts Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02140, provides speakers, films,
and distributes a slide show on the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict, produced by the Middle East Mobile Education
Project in 1975, and updated by the American Friends Service
Committee in New England. The slide show presents
historical background, an exploration of who Israelis and
Palestinians are and a review of human rights and repression
as it applies to Palestinians and Jews of the Middle East.

d) Sources for Further Readings

The Middle East and Islam: a Bibliographic Introduction,
Diana Grimwood-Jones, Derek Hopwood, J.P. Pearson,
Humanities Press, Inc., Atlantic Highland, New Jersey, 1977
emphasizes general works, bibliographies, history, politics,
social conditions, education and economic conditions. It is
divided into the following sections:1) The Middle East 2)
The Arab-Israeli Conflict 3) The Arab Countries 4) The

Arabian Peninsula 5) The Fertile Crescent 6) The Nile Valley
7) The Maghrib 8) Turkey 9) Iran, and includes sources for
Maps and Atlases of the Arab world.

Arthur Goldschmidt's eighteen page Bibliographic Essay (<u>A
Concise History of the Middle East</u>, Boulder, Colorado,
Westview Press, 1983, pp.377-395) "intended to serve
students and nonspecialist readers", is an excellent source
for instructors.

Glossary

Arab- In biblical terms, descendants of Ishmael, one of Abraham's sons. All those who identify culturally with the Arab world, whose native tongue is Arabic or Arabic derived dialects. Arabs can be Muslims, Christians or Jews.

Arab Jew- Arab-Jews share the cultural milieu of the Arab peoples. They lived in the Arabian peninsula centuries before the rise of Islam. Their native language is Arabic or a dialect derived from Arabic.

Arab Higher Committee- A central voice of the Palestinian Nationalist Movement organized in the 1930's during the period of the British Mandate.

Ashkenazi- Ashkenaz means German. Descendants of German Jews who migrated to Eastern Europe and whose native tongue was Yiddish.

Arab Nationalism- Emerging in the late eighteen hundreds a multi-faceted movement expressing loyalty to the idea of Arab unity. Some Arab Nationalists asserted that the Arabs constitute a single political community and ought to have an autonomous government.

Balfour Declaration- Statement by the British government communicated in a letter to Lord Rothschild by Arthur James Balfour, foreign secretary, November 2, 1917, of support for Zionist aspirations for a homeland in Palestine. Approved on April 24, 1920 at the Allies conference at San Remo and incorporated into the Mandate on Palestine given to Great Britain by the League of Nations, July 24, 1922.

Caliph- Ruler of the Islamic state elected by God, with ultimate power in military, civic and religious affairs.

Capitulations- Treaties signed between the Ottoman sultans and Christian states of Europe concerning the extraterritorial rights which the subjects of one of the signatories would enjoy while staying in the state of another, as a result of commercial colonies established in various regions of the empire.

Client-Patron Relations- Reciprocal economic relations between Jews and Arabs the terms of which are protection in exchange for services.

Dhimmi- In the Islamic state, 'unbelievers' who followed a monotheistic religion. The dhimmi were second-class citizens subject to a series of restrictions, but also protected by the state in exchange for payment of the jizya,or poll tax.

Hadith- Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, documented by a reliable witness.

Haganah- Secret Jewish organization for armed self defense in Palestine under the British Mandate, which eventually evolved into a people's militia and became the basis for the Israel army.

Halacha- Jewish law regulating every aspect of Jewish life

Hijrah- Migration of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, 622 A.D., first year of the Muslim calendar.

Histadrut- General Federation of Labor in Israel, established in 1920, and the largest labor federation in Israel. Conducts extensive economic aid and cultural activities and investment activities.

Jewish Agency- An international, non-governmental body, centering in Jerusalem, assisted by the World Zionist Organization for the purpose of encouraging Jews to help in the development and settlement of Israel. Begun in August, 1929 with the support of the League of Nations, and initiated immigration, settlement, youth work, etc.

Jizya- Poll tax paid by the Dhimmi, symbolic of subordination, and paid in exchange for protection by the Islamic state.

Judeo-Arabic Tradition- Basis of the advanced civilizations produced by Arab and Jew in the Middle Eastern lands, through close social, spiritual, intellectual, commercial, political, relations.

Mellah- Jewish quarter in North African towns.

Millet- An administrative classification allowing incorporation into the Ottoman economic and political system without destroying the religious-ethnic identity of the various Ottoman peoples.

Muslim-Christian Association (MCA)- A group of associations set up by Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs during the spring and summer of 1916 in response to popular opposition to Zionism.

Ottomanism- National identification with the Ottoman Empire, arising in the eighteen hundreds, as a way of unifying the diverse peoples of the Ottoman lands.

Palestine- Term first used by the Romans to describe an administrative unit that became the geographic term for Southern Syria. An administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine became the name of the area mandated to the British, 1922-1948.

Sephardi- Descendants of Jews exiled from Spain and Portugal in 1492, who migrated to North Africa, the Balkans, Turkey, and other Middle eastern lands, North America, Central and South America. Their native language is Ladino.

Shari'a- Islamic law regulating every aspect of life, developed by jurists from the Qur'an and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad.

Sykes-Picot Agreement- Secret agreement for partition of the Middle Eastern lands signed during World War One by Britain, France,Russia and Italy.

Tanzimat- (Arrangements)-Reforms instituted by the Ottoman government beginning in 1829.

Ulama- Interpreters of the divine law of Islam.

Umma- Political-religious community defined by Muhammad, of followers of Islam.

West Bank- Area of Palestine on the west side of the Jordan River, annexed by Jordan in 1948 and captured by Israel in 1967. Called 'Judea and Samaria' by some Israelis.

White Papers- Issued by Great Britain as statements of policy in connection with Palestine during the British Mandate period. Issued in 1922, 1929, 1937, 1938, 1939.

Young Turk Revolution- Takeover in 1908 of the Ottoman government by Turkish nationalist students and army officers to restore the constitution and institute western reforms. Organizing body was the Committee of Union and Progress.

Zionism- Root of the term is word 'Zion' which early in Jewish history became a synonym for Jerusalem. Modern term first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century denoting the movement whose goal was the return of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. First used to denote philanthropic activities, supporting small scale settlement. With the First Zionist Congress, became a political movement.

Qur'an or **Koran-** Divine book of Islam, a collection of revelations given to Muhammad and from which Islamic law, literature and culture have evolved.

The lands from Nile to Oxus before the rise of Islam

from Hodgson, Marshall, The Venture of Islam, Vol. I, Chicago and London, the University of Chicago Press. p. 84

Muslim lands, ninth and tenth centuries

from Hodgson, Marshall, The Venture of Islam, Vol. I, Chicago and London, the University of Chicago Press. p. 129

Countries of the Afro-Eurasian landmass, 1970

from Hodgson, Marshall, The Venture of Islam, Vol. I, Chicago and London, the University of Chicago Press. p.311

THE MIDDLE EAST
Countries Shown . TURKEY
State capitals shown : ⊙ Cairo

Miles
0   500

shown in Fischer, W.B., The Middle East New York, E.P. Puton & Co, Inc., 1974

ISRAEL

Pre-war Territory
Conquered Territory
Arab Nations

MEDITERRANEAN
SEA

N

Beirut

LEBANON

Damascus

Kuneitra

SYRIA

Haifa

Nablus

Tel Aviv

Amman

Old City

Gaza

Hebron

Rafah

DEAD
SEA

Port Said

el Arish

JORDAN

SUEZ CANAL

Qantara

Kusseima

Ismailia

Suez

Kuntila

Eilat

SINAI
PENINSULA

SAUDI ARABIA

Gulf of Suez

Gulf of Aqaba

Miles

0   100

EGYPT

RED SEA

Palaces

shown in Gendzier, Irene L., Edt., A Middle East Reader, New York, Pegasus, 1969

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